THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMANY 




Sculptor: Ranch 



Statue of Frederick ii in Berlin 



THE MAKING OF 
MODERN GERMANY 

Six Public Lectures 
Delivered in Chicago in 1915 



By 

FERDINAND SCHEVILL 

Professor of Modern European History in 
The University of Chicago 




CHICAGO 
A. C. McCLURG & CO. 

1916 






Copyright 

A. C. McClurg & Co. 

1916 

Published February, 1916 



W. F. HALL PRINTING COMPANY, CHICAGO 

FEB 21 1916 

©JI.A4'i084;; 



7/ 

P 

PREFACE ^' 

THE following six lectures were delivered In the year 
19 1 5 at the Invitation of the University Lecture 
Association (In cooperation with the University of Chi- 
cago). In preparing them for publication I considered 
myself free to reshape them, to add, subtract, and fuse, 
with a view to presenting as close and connected a story 
'>f the evolution of modern Germany as was possible 
inder the circumstances. Various features have been 
added — Footnotes, Maps, a Select Bibliography, and 
a body of eight Appendices — of which I entertain the 
hope that they will be found, each In Its own way, to 
supplement and enhance the text. 

The lecture form has for the historian many disad- 
vantages, but also undeniably one advantage; as such 
I look upon the necessity of marching onward by a sin- 
gle designated highway In order that the audience may 
not lose the sense of movement and direction. Among 
the often painful disadvantages, I am particularly Im- 
pressed with the obligation of avoiding. In the Interest 
of a smooth and swift journey, many matters which lie 
off the highway and yet arouse a most legitimate curi- 
osity. It was to meet this drawback that I have added 
the features spoken of above, more particularly the 
Appendices, each of which presents some subject having 
an Immediate value and interest for the reader. The 

[v] 



vi Preface 

Bibliography is of course only a first aid to beginners, 
and offers no more than a list of books which may prove 
useful to such as desire to penetrate farther into the 
origin and development of the German state and 
society. 

As these lectures were arranged for in the spring of 
1 9 14, they were not planned with an eye to the present 
terrible conflict. Inevitably however, the great Euro- 
pean war, overwhelming and monopolizing the thought 
of the whole generation of living men, pointed my 
inquiry toward the economic and other causes which 
produced the struggle. Although this is in no sense a 
war book and the military happenings since August, 
1 9 14, lie wholly outside my scope, I hope none the less 
that I have added to our understanding of the issues 
involved in the struggle and illuminated somewhat its 
significance for the Germany of today and of the future. 

It is Goethe, I think, who says that no subject, not 
even the natural history of the beetle nor the summer 
cycle of a seed of grass, can be profitably examined with- 
out a fundamental basis of sympathy. I need there- 
fore offer no apology for treating with sympathy the 
Making of Modern Germany. But a sympathetic 
approach, I venture to hope, has no kinship with blind 
bias and does not preclude that patient search and philo- 
sophic objectivity which should be the historian's staff 
and scrip upon his pilgrimages. Moved by the desire 
to understand in order to explain, I have put to myself 
the question which, according to Ranke, should light 
the way for every worker in the field of history: Wie 
ist es eigentlich gewesenf Accordingly, how Germany 



Preface vii 

came to be and what she is at the present moment in 
state and in society — such, putting it summarily, is the 
line of approach represented by these lectures. 

If we assume — and most of us imbued with 
modern science are inclined to assume — that life 
in society is not all blind chance, but that it proceeds in 
part at least under the control of man's operative intel- 
ligence, it becomes our right and duty to learn as much 
as possible not only concerning our own American soci- 
ety but also of every other commonwealth which cour- 
ageously, though with mixed success, struggles with the 
problems of our time. Such a human commonwealth is 
Germany. Better knowledge of it is devoutly to be 
wished, for the study will supply our people with matter 
for an enlightened self-criticism, as well as with creative 
suggestions that may lead to an improved control of 
the many confused and complicated aspects of modern 
community life. 

F. S. 
The University of Chicago, igi6. 



CONTENTS 

LECTURE PAGE 

I The End of the Elder Germany, and the 
Rise of Brandenburg after the Thirty 

Years' War 3 

II Frederick the Great and the Advent of 

Prussia as a European Power .... 35 

III Napoleon Bonaparte: Prussia's Overthrow 

AND Reconstruction 67 

IV Progress and Reaction: From the Congress "~ 

OF Vienna to the Revolution of 1848 . 99 

V Bismarck and the Unification of Germany 127 

VI Germany since Her Unification .... 159 

appendix 

A The Hohenzollern Rulers from the Great 

ELECTOR TO THE PRESENT DaY .... 209 

B The List of States Composing the German 

Empire 211 

C Concerning the Title and the Powers of 

THE German Emperor 212 

D The Suffrage Provisions for the Reichstag 

AND FOR THE SeCOND ChAMBER OF THE 

Prussian Parliament (Landtag) . . . 216 

E The Race for Colonies 219 

F The Polish Question 222 

G The Ems Dispatch 235 

H The Alsace-Lorraine Question .... 243 



Bibliography 251 

Index 255 

[ix] 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Statue of Frederick ii in Berlin .... Frontispiece ^ 

Frederick ii, Called the Great 56' 

Queen Louise 76' 

Stein 94 

Scharnhorst 94 

Kant 94 

Goethe 94 - 

Bismarck 168"'' 

MAPS 

The Territorial Growth of Prussia in the Seven- 
teenth AND Eighteenth Centuries .... 22" 
The German Empire, 1914 250 



[xi] 



The End of the Elder Germany and 

the Rise of Brandenburg after 

the Thirty Years' War 



The Making of Modern 
Germany 



jFir0t Lecture 

THE END OF THE ELDER GERMANY AND THE RISE OF 
BRANDEN3URG AFTER THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR 

npHE series of six lectures which I am beginning is 
^ to treat of the making of modern Germany. I 
shall direct my attention in the main to the study of the 
complicated political movement which culminated, after 
many dramatic episodes and as the result of the labors 
of many generations, in the unification of Germany in 
1 87 1 ; in connection with that political story I shall try 
also to set forth the leading facts in the social evolu- 
tion of the German people itself. As the presentation 
of this material will require five lectures, I shall be able 
to devote my sixth and concluding lecture to a sketch of 
united Germany's recent development. 

The terrible war now raging in Europe, in virtue of 
its being an unfinished event and as yet quite beyond 
the reach of a calm and unbiased exposition, I feel justi- 
fied in avoiding. However, if I must decline to speak 
of what lies beyond my ken, I shall at least not hesi- 
tate to proceed to the very edge and threshold of the 

[3] 



4 The Making of Modern Germany 

war In order to explain how It happened that Germany 
was sucked Into Its seething and unfathomable vortex. 
The purpose of my first lecture is to lay as broad 
a foundation as possible for the understanding of the 
many complicated problems that confronted Germany 
in her long struggle for unification. To this end I 
shall not scruple to penetrate Into a relatively distant 
past, and to show how in the Middle Ages there existed 
an elder Germany which after a period of fame and 
splendor ignomlniously crumbled Into dust. This elder 
Germany came into being In the ninth century at the 
same time that England and France first took shape 
as political entities, and, like England and France, this 
elder Germany was. In point of view of government 
and society, what we familiarly call a feudal state. By 
that term Is meant that Germany was indeed a mon- 
archy, but that the monarch enjoyed only limited pow- 
ers and that the essential controlling factors in the 
political life of the nation were the two privileged 
classes, the clergy and the nobility. Privileged — why? 
For the simple reason that In a very primitive society, 
living by agriculture and agriculture alone, they boasted 
a practically exclusive ownership of the land. But 
though the clergy and nobility owned the soil they 
did not fertilize It with the sweat of their brows. They 
left that menial service to the peasants who consti- 
tuted the mass of the population, performed the total 
productive labor of society, and eked out as best they 
could a wretched existence from the pittance their 
landlords left them after generously providing for 
themselves. 



The Rise of Brandenburg 5 

Of towns deserving the name there were none in 
that distant, barbarous time, since the scanty needs 
of a young and uncouth society could be amply satis- 
fied in the small market centers that sprang up by ford 
and crossway. A rapid sketch of this feudal Germany 
of the Middle Ages presents the following fundamental 
elements : It was passionately Christian under a church 
which was an integral part of the great Roman Cath- 
olic church; it was agricultural with the land owned 
by the great landlords, the prelates and barons, and 
worked by the peasants whose economic and legal sta- 
tus was very miserable; and it was monarchical with 
the political power shared between the sovereign and 
the great lords of church and state, but never exer- 
cised autocratically by the sovereign, even when he 
was a man of exceptional power, because his depend- 
ence on the privileged orders was, under existing con- 
ditions, fixed and irremediable. 

Now if you should try to imagine yourselves back in 
early medieval times looking about the European world 
and taking stock of the young and formative German, 
French, and English nations, you would be impressed 
with the fact that Germany was better organized, 
probably more populous, and certainly more powerful 
and possessed of greater international authority than 
her two western rivals; and on the basis of such obser- 
vations you would be justified in prophesying that a 
great and brilliant future was in store for her. That 
prophecy, however, would be found to run counter 
to the facts, for history shows that this brilliant 
medieval Germany, after a relatively brief career. 



6 The Making of Modem Germany 

showed unmistakable signs of decay and that even 
before the end of the Middle Ages it had been fairly 
outstripped by England and France which, consoli- 
dated in government and strengthened by new terri- 
tory, presently struck that proud stride which carried 
them not only without break but with cumulative tri- 
umph through century after century down to our own 
day. 

I am therefore obliged to put the question, What 
was it that produced this overthrow of medieval Ger- 
many after so prosperous and vigorous a beginning? 
The complete answer would prove a long story, but 
in the main it will be found to be contained in a num- 
ber of ferments and ideas peculiar to the period. Many 
or all of these may seem to us of a later age no better 
than absurd hallucinations, but our altered viewpoint 
should not keep us from recognizing that they had 
a perfectly intelligible origin in the conditions of the 
time, and that they enjoyed an extraordinary and uni- 
versal authority. 

One of the most potent of the concepts dominating 
the medieval period was the coming again of the 
Roman Empire, the famous world-empire of Caesar 
and Augustus. It was fervently believed that this 
revived Roman Empire would establish harmony 
among the newly formed European nations, terminate 
the fierce local strife maintained everywhere by the 
feudal barons, bring back an even-handed justice ready 
to let its sword fall on rich and poor alike, and cul- 
minate by realizing that noble prospect, the dream 
dreamt by lovers of their kind in all periods of the 



The Rise of Brandenburg 7 

world's history, universal peace. What wonder then, 
that in the formative centuries to which I am inviting 
your attention, the sovereign of the German state, who 
by his sudden rise towered above the shoulders of the 
other sovereigns of Europe, should have had the idea 
suggested to him that he was the prayerfully awaited 
Roman emperor! 

The clergy, who were the only educated and intel- 
lectual men of the time, were particularly emphatic 
in preaching the imperial doctrine, and had much to 
do with bringing the German monarch to the point 
of action. Above all, the pope, head of the Christian 
church, beckoned from across the Alps and summoned 
him to take the seat divinely prepared for him in the 
Eternal City. Accordingly, he gathered his followers 
and entered Italy. At Rome he was festively received 
by Christ's vicar, who put the crown upon the visitor's 
brow and solemnly, without the faintest sense of 
absurdity, proclaimed him — in simple truth no more 
than a semi-barbarous chieftain from the frozen north 
— the Roman emperor come again ! 

To such heights had theory carried the German sov- 
ereign's adventurous footsteps when he found himself 
face to face not with theory but with reality. To grasp 
the situation in its fullness we must keep before our 
mind that the medieval theory of the emperor, grant- 
ing to that functionary universal authority in civil 
matters, had as its counterpart the theory of the pope, 
which conceded to the head of the Christian church 
sole and unquestioned authority in matters spiritual. 
Finally, to harmonize all the elements of their teach- 



8 The Making of Modern Germany 

Ing, the theorists affirmed that pope and emperor were 
in no sense rivals, but that each supplemented the other 
since each enjoyed authority in an absolutely distinct 
realm. But however clean cut the doctrine was, the 
application of it was a different matter and for a rea- 
son so simple that we can only wonder that the delusion 
was not dispersed as soon as it was born. 

Just as in the actual living of our lives an exact 
dividing line can not be drawn between body and soul, 
so in our community existence it cannot be drawn 
between church and state; and no matter how sincere 
we be in our desire to keep these domains separate, 
in practice mankind thus far has steadily found them 
variously and inextricably entangled. The result was 
that pope and emperor fell to furious quarreling and, 
in spite of all the philosophic assertions about inde- 
pendence and equality, each rudely attempted to estab- 
lish his authority over the other in the profound private 
conviction that if there was to be world-mastery it 
should be exercised by one and not by two individuals. 
Never did a theory, redolent of Arcadian promise but 
based on a false and arbitrary view of the nature of 
man and of society, produce a more terrible crop of 
disasters! The details do not concern us here. Suf- 
fice it that pope and emperor were at daggers drawn 
for many generations and ended one bloody war only 
to begin another. And naturally in the course of this 
bitter struggle the pope summoned to his help what- 
ever agencies he found at hand. Among these, first 
to consider and of steadiest service, was the great spir- 
itual agency of excommunication — the power he had 



The Rise of Brandenburg 9 

as representative of Christ on earth to lay his curse 
on those whom he regarded as the enemies of Holy 
Church. But help of a more material sort was not 
lacking either. He called upon the prelates and great 
lords of Italy to aid him with their arms and resources; 
he called upon the rising Italian cities such as Flor- 
ence, Milan, and Venice, which were just coming to 
the front through the development of commerce and 
Industry; and finally he did not scruple to send his 
appeal across the Alps and call upon the princes of 
Germany, always anxious to reduce the power of their 
sovereign in order that their own power might grow 
by his decline. 

Before this combined pressure of the pope and his 
supporters applied for generations, the emperor went 
to the ground, and to the end of escaping complete 
destruction he was at last obliged to make peace on 
such terms as he could get. In their final form these 
terms Involved his bending a humble knee before the 
pope, whom he recognized as his superior, and his 
withdrawal from Italy and her affairs; but of more 
particular concern to us, as students of Germany, is 
that he was obliged to surrender most of his sovereign 
rights In his German homeland to the princes and 
bishops, that Is, to the lords lay and spiritual, and to 
be content henceforth with the merely nominal head- 
ship of the nation. 

This movement of decline in the power of the sov- 
ereign was complete by the thirteenth century, and 
therewith the first or medieval unity of Germany was, 
If not destroyed, at least very substantially undermined. 



10 The Making of Modern Germany 

But Destiny is ever ready to grant new chances to those 
of her children whose courage does not fail them, and 
the emperor, weakened and reduced as he was, had 
tossed to him at least one splendid opportunity to win 
back his lost authority. It came in the period of the 
Protestant Reformation. 

You all are familiar with certain far-famed and 
rather obvious aspects of the Reformation. You know 
that early in the sixteenth century there arose an 
Augustlnlan friar, by the name of Martin Luther, who 
joined issue with the pope over the question of In- 
dulgences, and that the Indulgence issue, broadening 
and deepening until it drew ever wider circles, ended in 
the effort to terminate once and for all the pope's con- 
trol of the Christian church in Germany. Knowing so 
much, you are aware that the Reformation was in the 
eyes of contemporaries as well as in our own eyes a 
passionate movement in the field of religion and church 
government. 

But the Reformation was a great deal more than 
a religious crisis, for It could never have been so gen- 
eral and powerful if it had not run parallel with a 
great national outburst. The national sentiment had 
become awakened, really for the first time in German 
history, by what were profoundly felt to be oppress- 
ive acts of the pope against the German state and 
people. It was, above all, his policy of extortionate 
taxation that aroused the whole nation on palpable, 
material grounds against the Roman pontiff as a for- 
eign tyrant whose yoke was galling and destructive. 
So deep was the patriotic indignation that any emperor. 



The Rise of Brandenburg 11 

possessed of sufficient understanding to put himself at 
the head of the movement and speak the magic word 
for which the people waited, would have found a force 
behind him capable of sweeping him irresistibly into 
the position of command abandoned In the thirteenth 
century. On the ruin of his power the princes and 
prelates had built their individual states, but they would 
now have been ruined in their turn and the central 
power would have been reconstituted if the emperor, 
making the most of his unique chance, had boldly 
stepped before his nation as its heaven-sent leader. 

It was the Immeasurable misfortune of Germany 
that a nationally minded emperor was not at hand 
at that moment when the whole political stage was set 
for his arrival, and that In consequence the splendid 
opportunity was permitted to go by unused. The 
emperor, contemporary with Luther, was Charles V, 
an Intelligent man In his way, who cut a very con- 
siderable figure in the world in a long reign of thirty- 
six years (1520-56). But from the German national 
viewpoint Charles v had one overwhelming drawback 
that more than cancelled his many personal merits: 
he was brought up far from German influences in the 
Netherlands and Spain, countries that he was destined 
to inherit and to which he belonged quite as much 
as to Germany, and his Dutch and Spanish teachers 
had inculcated in him a blind devotion to the Roman 
church. 

When, on moimting the throne, he came to Germany 
for the first time in his life, Martin Luther had just 
precipitated the enormous Reformation crisis. Per- 



12 The Making of Modem Germany 

haps we should in justice remember that Charles was 
only twenty years old when he faced the situation, 
but, whether it was the fault of his inexperience or 
of his cold and narrow nature, he proved himself 
utterly incapable of understanding what stirred the 
nation to the very depth of Its soul. Not only did 
he manifest an immediate aversion for Luther, but 
feeling himself to be a Spaniard rather than a German, 
he eagerly resolved to do what lay in his power to 
crush the national movement, since in his eyes it was 
but the cloak of a rebellion directed against the divinely 
sanctioned power of the church. By virtue of his 
position he was enabled to gather together a minority 
of the people and princes on his conservative plat- 
form, while the majority, the rebellious and progress- 
ive mass of the nation, fell In behind the banner of 
Protestantism. Thus the country was torn from end 
to end and an unparalleled opportunity to produce 
unity served only as the occasion of a new and more 
fatal division than had existed before. 

The two parties. Catholics and Protestants, faced 
each other with bitter religious animosity and, begin- 
ning with sporadic conflicts patched up with ambigu- 
ous treaties, they at last engaged in one of the most 
terrible and prolonged struggles of history. I am 
referring to the great civil conflict known as the Thirty 
Years' War. The Thirty Years' War was waged in 
the seventeenth century from the year 1618 to the year 
1648, and when it was over it left behind a devastated 
country and an utterly exhausted people. Considered 
as a duel of rival religions the most striking thing 



The Rise of Brandenburg 13 

about the Inhuman combat was that It brought a vic- 
tory to neither side. It was substantially a draw, with 
the result that the peace of Westphalia, which con- 
cluded the long agony, declared that those who were 
Protestants might continue to remain Protestants and 
that those who were Catholics might continue to remain 
Catholics. By virtue of this compromise there was 
established In law and In fact that mixed Germany, 
part Catholic and part Protestant, that meets and 
astonishes the religious Inquirer to this day. 

From a political viewpoint however, the Thirty 
Years' War was so little in the nature of a compro- 
mise and so wholly decisive that It put a final end to 
the German state. It accomplished that result by 
virtue of the articles of the treaty that deprived the 
emperor of his last remaining sovereign powers and 
distributed them among the princes, bishops, and city 
republics; that Is, among the several hundred small 
states making up the dominion of Germany. It Is 
true that the Imperial office was not abolished and 
that even an imperial legislature {Reichstag) and an 
Imperial court {Reichsgericht) were left standing. 
But since all the effective powers of government had 
been legally transferred to the component states, the 
federal Institutions became more and more negligible. 
It happens that they were not abolished and the coun- 
try cleared of their useless and unhandsome presence 
till 1806, one hundred and fifty years later; but that 
fact need not hinder us from declaring that as a 
national state Germany ceased to figure In the politics 
of Europe from the year 1648. 



14 The Making of Modern Germany 

Under these circumstances it may seem surprising 
that not infrequently in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries we encounter an emperor who was a person 
of power and dignity; but let us make no mistake, he 
owed such distinction as he enjoyed not to any power 
the federal constitution gave him — how could he when 
the constitution had become a mockery? — but solely 
to the power springing from his hereditary possessions, 
to what the Germans call his Haiismacht. For it should 
be noted that the emperor was also head of the German 
province of Austria which happened to be larger than 
any other German state and gave him an important 
revenue. Such power as he wielded after 1648 was 
therefore an exact expression of the area, population, 
resources, and organization of Austria. But as these 
were considerable and on the increase the Austrian 
ruler was enabled to speak a weighty word in the coun- 
cils of Europe, due, however, as anyone with eyes can 
see, to his hereditary lands and in no sense to any 
authority conceded to him by the moribund German 
constitution. 

Thus going to the root of things and refusing to 
be deluded by appearances, we may confidently assert 
that the year 1648 saw the end of the elder Germany. 
That end indeed had long been threatening. In the 
thirteenth century the emperor had been obliged to 
give way before the encroaching princes, and when 
the Reformation gave him a popular following with 
which to renew the struggle, he had, through a fatal 
mischance, scorned to use it. The Protestant-Catholic 
cleavage had followed, ending in a civil war of unpar- 



The Rise of Brandenburg 15 

alleled dimensions and ferocity, and when it was at 
last over political Germany presented the appearance 
of having been broken as under the blow of a giant's 
hammer Into scores of little fragments. 

You will permit me to pause at the peace of West- 
phalia in order to illustrate with some corroborative 
detail the misery of Germany at the time she lost her 
national unity and found the blackness of death closing 
over her. It Is Important that we comprehend her 
general situation, for It is the year 1648 that I accept 
as the effective starting-point of the new Germany, 
whose story Is the real matter of these lectures. 

The political annihilation already recounted was 
only part of the wretched story of the Thirty Years' 
War. The economic exhaustion was no less complete 
and furnishes the explanation of the grinding want that 
henceforth for years to come pinched every class and 
household. The long war had driven its burning 
chariot over every square mile of German territory, 
and there were extensive areas where the contending 
battle lines had swayed to and fro a score of times. 
The result was that the cities were depopulated, their 
commerce and Industry dead. In the countryside 
whole counties were deserted by their peasants, who 
no longer were willing to till the fields since before 
the harvests could be gathered, the ripening grain 
would be leveled with the ground by the trample of 
armed hosts. In some particularly stricken regions 
the jungle had resumed its sway and an Impenetrable 
underbrush covered the scattered and pathetic vestiges 
of man's labor. 



16 The Making of Modern Germany 

We need not believe all the tales told by contem- 
porary chroniclers — tales, for instance, of famished 
men turned cannibals, or of wolves that laid siege to 
villages deserted except for a few toothless men and 
women — but the simple indisputable facts are these : 
The population was reduced by more than half; all 
the material savings of the nation, its working capital, 
was wiped out; the cities, sapped of the trade which 
was their life-blood, had become empty shells; and 
the villages, when they had not been burned with fire, 
had been plundered of their movables and left as bare 
as a bone. Considering all these items we become 
aware that, economically, we are confronted with a 
nation which is once again at the beginning of things 
and which, having lost the patient and painful accumu- 
lations of centuries of labor, must make an absolutely 
new start. 

Nor are we yet at the end of our tale. Educationally 
and Intellectually the situation was no whit less dis- 
couraging. In the course of thirty years of warfare 
that slowly ground the hearts out of men, the schools 
and universities had fallen into neglect, and even the 
churches, both Protestant and Catholic, had to a large 
extent been obliged to shut their doors for lack of 
pastors. The generation alive in the year 1648 had 
been brought up without learning or religion; that is, 
without those Institutions by virtue of which man has 
chiefly succeeded in differentiating himself from the 
beasts of the field. The society therefore of the West- 
phallan treaty, grown up amidst scenes of violence 
and inured to habits of war, was brutalized, anarchic, 



The Rise of Brandenburg 17 

unused to curb or restraint, and profoundly unwilling 
once more to submit to discipline and acquire the train- 
ing necessary for fruitful social cooperation. 

Such were the elements of German decay in 1648, 
bad enough under any circumstances but rendered 
acutely alarming by Germany's position in Europe. 
During the long civil war the neighbors of Germany, 
some of them strong and ambitious powers, had natur- 
ally cast an interested eye upon her confusion. By 
taking sides with either Protestants or Catholics they 
were able to insinuate themselves into the situation and 
had ended by invading her territory. The powers 
most actively engaged in this policy were France and 
Sweden. France, under the guidance of Cardinal 
Richelieu, one of the boldest and cleverest statesmen 
she has ever produced, entered Germany from the west 
and established herself on the upper Rhine in the prov- 
ince of Alsace; at the same time Sweden, yielding to 
the initiative of her famous and heroic king, Gusta- 
vus Adolphus, crossed the Baltic sea and planted herself 
on the German coast, holding firmly in her grasp the 
province of Pomerania. 

When the peace of Westphalia concluded the war 
France and Sweden resolutely insisted that they be re- 
warded with the territory each had successfully seized. 
These German losses at two points, west and north, 
were in themselves a serious blow, but when you now 
recall that the political effect of the war was to destroy 
the central government and to leave Germany politically 
paralyzed, it became highly probable that the loss of 
Alsace and of the Baltic coast would merely prove the 



18 The Making of Modern Germany 

preface of further seizures. And If these seizures 
continued, was it not more than likely that other neigh- 
bors, in addition to France and Sweden, becoming 
interested would appropriate each one what lay con- 
venient to his hand and thus effect in the course of time 
a complete partition of the German realm and a final 
annihilation of the German name? 

But even the gray tints thus far contributed do not 
adequately present the whole desolate picture of Ger- 
many in 1648. To measure the depth of the country's 
downfall you must look about in the European world 
of that day and see Germany in relation to the great 
movement in which mankind was then engaged. The 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries constitute a momen- 
tous period. They witnessed a splendid new birth; in 
fact it was during their sway that our race laid those 
broad foundations upon which has been erected the 
lofty ediiice of our recent civilization. 

Though it is difficult indeed to express in a few 
words the weighty happening, I must make the attempt. 
What was it that took place? After long centuries 
of medieval twilight, In which man had been content 
to walk a narrow path with humble, downcast eyes, 
he began to feel the need of an untrammeled outlook. 
He gazed about him with quickened curiosity, and as 
day by day the world unfolded a new charm, he gradu- 
ally became enamored of its loveliness and was stirred 
to penetrate Into its remotest comers. Travel, com- 
merce, industrial enterprise, and that methodical obser- 
vation which we call science followed in due order 
and enriched the mind of man with their varied benefits. 



The Rise of Brandenburg 19 

As a consequence the parochial medieval world slipped 
away like a dissolving mist and our great, free earth 
and the celestial universe enfolding It hove gradually 
into view. 

Of course I can not tabulate all the fresh forces 
which were released In man and society and cooper- 
ated to produce the Modern Age. I shall have to 
content myself to point out one of these revolution- 
izing agents, perhaps the most important of all. In 
the fifteenth century began the Voyages of Discovery. 
Under the leadership of Intrepid Portuguese, Spanish, 
and Italian adventurers, hardy men such as Prince 
Henry of Portugal, Vasco da Gama, Christopher 
Columbus, and Magellan, sea voyages were under- 
taken, as a result of which the familiar little continent 
of Europe shrivelled to its true proportions and the 
big round world with Its land and oceans assumed the 
physical aspect which it bears for us today. The west- 
ern hemisphere with North and South America, as 
weU as vast, uncharted tracts of Asia and of Africa, 
now first disclosed their wonders to the white man 
and invited him to trade, to conquer, and to settle. 

This brilliant opening was offered only once — and 
since there was only one world to discover could 
be offered only once — to the peoples of Europe, and 
It was offered In the time when Germany was passing 
through the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War. 
It is clear that for a people to make the most of the 
unique opportunity for power and expansion, it had to 
have a strong government capable of giving ample pro- 
tection to the adventurers and merchant-companies who 



20 The Making of Modern Germany 

risked their all to cross the ocean and seize the inaccess- 
ible and often hostile lands. These facts considered, 
what European nations were in a position to compete 
for the exceptional prizes lifting their siren voices from 
afar? Of course only such as were organized — Por- 
tugal and Spain first, later England, France, Sweden, 
and the Dutch. A country like Ireland, conquered by 
England and deprived of its power of independent 
action, and such countries as Italy and Poland that 
were the prey of domestic anarchy, never entered the 
race at all. And Germany, the object of our particular 
concern, was definitely eliminated because the Voyages 
of Discovery with all they meant of splendor and 
opportunity occurred at the very time of those calami- 
ties that I have been describing and that brought down 
upon her the loss of her central government and her 
final dissolution into three hundred insignificant states. 
When in 1871 Germany became again united she 
naturally, in sign of her recovery, went down to the sea 
in ships and sought out colonies beyond the bounds of 
Europe. But on whatever land her eye fell there was 
already established an earlier claimant except in a few 
tropical regions unsuited as habitations for Europeans. 
What at that late date Germany could still take pos- 
session of was unprofitable waste and in no sense the 
likely basis of a prosperous colonial empire. Essen- 
tially reunited Germany is therefore a purely European 
power and this narrow destiny has been meted out to 
her because of her disastrous eclipse in the heroic age 
when the trans-European continents were partitioned 
among the cunning and the strong. 



The Rise of Brandenburg 21 

And her loss was not merely a matter of wealth and 
power, but, In point of fact, primarily a loss in the 
realm of mind and character. The Spaniards, French, 
and English found themselves, they really only discov- 
ered the reaches of their genius in wrestling with the 
varied problems cast up by the new world beyond the 
Atlantic ocean. This will appear to any one who will 
take the trouble to imagine the history of Spain or 
France or England apart from their colonial enterprise 
and the colonial communities which that enterprise 
called into being. How the glow would fade from the 
pages of their history without the Spanish Main, the 
treasure of the Incas, the Indian wars, the search for 
El Dorado, the northern fur trade and a thousand 
equally thrilling facts and incidents ! Taken together 
they signify an experience in the fierce heat of which 
the souls of Spain and France and England, as we have 
come historically to know them, received their finest 
edge and quality. And of this invaluable experience 
stricken and stay-at-home Germany was by decree of 
fate deprived. 

A dark and somber picture this of seventeenth cen- 
tury Germany! But, after all, the situation, however 
desperate, can not have been entirely without hope. 
There must have been somewhere in that dead, dull 
mass of German life a tiny spark that could be made to 
blaze again, for how else are we to explain that some 
two hundred years after the loss of her first unity Ger- 
many, mewing her eagle-youth, was re-created? As 
I have already stated, it is this process of the second 
unification that we are going primarily to examine in 



22 The Making of Modem Germany 

these lectures. Therefore by way of introduction I 
shall now invite your attention to the first inconspicu- 
ous signs of recovery in the diseased commonwealth — 
signs that led to movements which, proceeding logically 
from stage to stage, culminated at last in the famous 
scene enacted on January i8, 1 871, in the Hall of Mir- 
rors at Versailles. 

If you will turn to a map (page 30) and find the 
broad North German plain you will observe that it is 
crossed by parallel streams, such as the Rhine, the 
Weser, the Elbe, the Oder, and the Vistula, all of 
which flow from the south and carry the waters of the 
central highlands of Europe to the North and Baltic 
seas. In the heart of that North German plain, be- 
tween the Elbe and Oder rivers, there existed in the 
seventeenth century the little state of Brandenburg, in 
outer semblance very much like Saxony, Hanover, 
Brunswick, Mecklenburg, and the other German prin- 
cipalities that lay about it. If I propose to isolate it 
for examination it is because this state of Brandenburg 
served as the nucleus of the new Germany. So strange 
a fact must straightway raise the question why this 
dominion rather than any of its neighbors should have 
been thus singled out by destiny. 

A swift plunge into the history of Brandenburg 
before and during the seventeenth century will supply 
the answer. The little state came into being in the 
early Middle Ages as a march (in German, mark), or 
military district to protect Germany from'the incursions 
of the numerous Slav tribes to the east. A national 
outpost organized for war it grew in measure as it 




The Territorial Growth of Prussia in t 

This map shows the territorial growth of Brandenburg-Prussia in the sej 
with Its parallel streams of the Rhine, Weser, Elbe, Oder, and Vistula. Brs 
sand and marsh levels between the Elbe and Oder. When the Great Electo 
the ducny of Prussia (later called East Prussia). In addition, he had inheri 
of Cleves. By virtue of the treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Great Elector 
Magdeburg on the Elbe. It was the above group of lands which he merged 
His grandson, Frederick William I, acquired in 1720 the mouth of the C 
But the acquisitions which gave Prussia a standing among the great pov 
added to the Hohenzollern lands Silesia and West Prussia. Silesia enabled 
knit up the detached East Prussia to the bulk of the monarchy. 




•: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 

Dteenth and eighteenth centuries. We have before us the North German plain 
'enburg, the nucleus of modern Germany, is seen, with its capital Berlin, in the 
iiounted the throne in 1640, he was not only lord of Brandenburg, but also of 
I certain small territories on the lower Rhine, here comprized under the name 
[uired the part of Pomerania east of the Oder and the city and territory of 
'» an ordered state. 

)■ with the port of Stettin, and a section of Pomerania to the west of the river, 
u of Europe were made by Frederick the Great (1740-86). This sovereign 
issia to compete with Austria for the control of Germany, and West Prussia 



The Rise of Brandenburg 23 

overcame its enemies. And undoubted progress was 
made from the first, but the rate of territorial advance 
was for a long time not particularly striking owing to 
the circumstances that one of the largest of the Slav 
tribes, the Poles, presently organized a powerful rival 
state of their own. In spite of ever increasing diffi- 
culties, the rulers of Brandenburg, keeping a vigilant 
lookout, managed gradually to extend their sway, espe- 
cially in the direction of the Baltic sea, the natural aim 
of a north-German inland power seeking an economic 
outlet. 

In the sixteenth century a very important accession 
to the original nucleus took place. A branch of the 
ruling line of Brandenburg had acquired the throne of 
the duchy of Prussia, and when, in 1618, that branch 
died out the title to Prussia passed to the main line. 
The duchy of Prussia of that period was a small state 
on the coast of the Baltic, to the east of the Vistula 
river. Its capital and chief port of trade was Koenigs- 
berg. Though settled by Germans since the thirteenth 
century, when it was conquered from the heathen and 
now long since extinct tribe of Prussians, it was never 
officially incorporated in the German Empire. A hun- 
dred years after its acquisition by the ruler of Branden- 
burg, this remote and inconspicuous Prussia gave its 
name to all the lands accumulated by the reigning house, 
and completely drove the older name of Brandenburg 
from common usage. In order not to anticipate, that 
change will be explained later in its proper chronolog- 
ical place. All that we must be sure of seizing at this 
point is that seventeenth century Brandenburg and 



24 The Making of Modem Germany 

Prussia were two distinct and geographically separated 
provinces of German speech which an accident of in- 
heritance had given to the same sovereign. 

A similar succession accident, befalling shortly after- 
wards, opened the prospect of acquiring the duchy of 
Pomerania. When, in the year 1631, this duchy, 
lying on the Baltic sea, between the Vistula and the 
Oder, lost its last native ruler, Brandenburg, on the 
basis of kinship and treaties, laid claim to the territory. 
Owing to the fact that the Thirty Years' War was 
raging just then and that Sweden presented a counter 
claim to Pomerania based on the unanswerable argu- 
ment of possession through conquest, Brandenburg 
could reahze only a part of her expectations, and after 
long haggling was paid off (1648) with eastern Pom- 
erania, leaving the more valuable western Pomerania, 
including the mouth of the river Oder, in the hands 
of Sweden. None the less she secured by this com- 
promise a valuable additional coastline on the Baltic. 

Thus matters stood at the close of the Thirty Years' 
War. The ruler of Brandenburg, by virtue of his posi- 
tion at the eastern periphery of Germany, where polit- 
ical conditions were very much more in flux than in the 
more settled Rhine regions, had been able to take 
advantage of certain territorial opportunities and had 
acquired the duchy of Prussia, eastern Pomerania, 
and a not inconsiderable number of lesser German dis- 
tricts, of which Cleves on the lower Rhine calls for 
particular mention as marking the western limit of the 
scattered Brandenburg possessions. A look at the map 
will show that the sovereign's lands now straggled in 



The Rise of Brandenburg 25 

loose array across the whole north-German plain from 
the Rhine to the Niemen ! Therefore my former state- 
ment that Brandenburg was In 1648 a state very much 
like all Its neighbors calls for qualification. Through 
lucky territorial additions it had become the largest In 
area of all the north-German states and by reason of 
this circumstance was endowed with a notable material 
force; In fact the material force was so considerable 
that under proper organization there was reason to 
believe that the state would reach a development en- 
abling Its ruler to enforce a respect to which the 
Impotent little princes all around could never hope to 
aspire. 

With quickened Interest we now direct our glance to 
the all-important question of the organization of the 
little north-German territory. That first organization, 
its various evolutionary phases, Its successes and fail- 
ures, and finally the many remarkable men who pre- 
sided over the work, will henceforth engage our 
attention. And at the very head of the list of states- 
men-builders we encounter the brilliant name of the 
Elector Frederick William. His family, which bore 
the name of Hohenzollern, had exercised rule in Bran- 
denburg since the beginning of the fifteenth century, 
that Is, for over two hundred years prior to Frederick 
William's accession. The Hohenzollerns had pro- 
duced some sturdy, capable men, as the steady advance 
of Brandenburg would go to prove, but they had not 
yet given birth to an energetic and compelling person- 
ality. If the Elector Frederick William was the first 
Hohenzollern who acquired a European reputation, 



26 The Making of Modern Germany 

that was due, In fairness be it said, to his undoubted 
talents but, in hardly less degree, to his exceptional 
opportunity. For, mounting the throne in the year 
1640, toward the end of the Thirty Years' War, he was 
able to take advantage of the Peace of Westphalia, 
which ended the long agony of Germany and gave the 
signal for the resumption of civilizing labor throughout 
the land. 

Frederick William found himself in the momentous 
year of the Peace at the head of the territories 
already enumerated — Brandenburg, Prussia, Pomer- 
ania, Cleves, etc. — not Inconsiderable in total area 
but widely scattered In space. Each of these had its own 
administration and was provincially hostile to any close 
association with Its neighbor. Monstrous disunion and 
confusion, hardly conceivable by the modem man, were 
the leading features of the situation and were start- 
lingly reflected by Frederick William's wealth of titles. 
While he was elector and margrave in Brandenburg, 
locally endowed by custom with certain definite rights, 
he was duke in Prussia on the basis of a local Prussian 
constitution, duke In Pomerania, with powers deter- 
mined by Pomeranian law, in fact he was a score or so 
of different political personalities, some of them infi- 
nitesimal and ludicrous, and might have gone distraught 
over his multiple role If he had not from the first 
decided on a policy of simplification. As a symbol of 
that policy he encouraged the general use of his chief 
title of elector (Kurfiirst). That title had in the Mid- 
dle Ages become attached to the ruler of Brandenburg, 
and signified that its holder, besides governing Bran- 



The Rise of Brandenburg 27 

denburg, had the right, together with six other leading 
territorial magnates, to elect the German emperor. 
The right had once upon a time meant much, but by 
the seventeenth century, in consequence of the decline 
of the German constitution, was largely an empty 
honor. None the less, because of the national signifi- 
cance of the title, Frederick William preferred it to all 
others. He became known in his life-time to all his 
subjects alike as the Elector Frederick William, and 
because his work proved permanent and beneficent, he 
has since been called simply and admiringly the Great 
Elector. 

Mounting the throne at the youthful age of twenty, 
the Great Elector ruled for nearly half a century, from 
1640 to 1688. He showed from the first, in addition 
to a tireless energy, a remarkable comprehension of 
finance, economics, and administration as contributory 
factors in the upbuilding and strengthening of a state. 
At the same time his every step in the foreign field gave 
evidence of a broad and clear vision of the entangled 
politics of Europe. Making allowance for the smaller 
scale on which he worked, we may unhesitatingly 
declare that he takes rank with the greatest constructive 
statesmen of the seventeenth century; with men like 
Cardinal Richelieu in France and Gustavus Adolphus, 
king of Sweden. Cardinal Richelieu, above all, we 
are obliged to think on studying that minister's famous 
reorganization of the French government, must have 
supplied Frederick William with some elements of his 
policy. 

The central thought that inspired the Great Elector 



28 The Making of Modern Germany 

and irradiated all his plans was the perception of the 
woeful impotence of Germany at the end of the Thirty 
Years' War. He observed that there were many pow- 
erful neighbors peering covetously over the German 
boundary and, as he read the signs in the sky, he con- 
cluded that the time would come, and in all probability 
come soon, when, resuming the policy followed in the 
late conflict, these neighbors would combine to effect a 
complete partition of the helpless German lands. Fred- 
erick William was filled with patriotic regret and even 
anguish of spirit at this prospect, but as matters stood 
— the central government destroyed, himself the insig- 
nificant prince of a ruined province, the whole German 
community exhausted and reduced to barbarism — 
there was lltde he could do effectively to help the situa- 
tion. But though he might not prove the savior of the 
fatherland, he need at least not sit idly by, awaiting 
with hands folded in his lap the clap of doom. As an 
active, practical man he could find a task, limited per- 
haps in scope, but worthy of engaging his whole energy 
and intelligence. That task, he came to see with grad- 
ually enlarging vision, was to take the territory of 
Brandenburg-Prussia in hand and to organize it as 
thoroughly and effectively as he knew how. Then, 
should Germany's troubles continue, as was only too 
likely, there at least would be his own state, a solid 
nucleus in the midst of a fluid and chaotic swirl. 

During his long reign the Great Elector worked 
steadily at this constructive program, the main features 
of which are easily recognizable. Most important to 
his mind was a new central administration, all the ofl^- 



The Rise of Brandenburg 29 

clals of which were to depend upon himself. He felt 
that without a compact government, the social order 
and cooperation which were necessary after the long 
anarchy of war could not be attained, nor the assurance 
be given to peasant and citizen that they would enjoy 
the product of their labor. Under the system he had 
In mind, the taxes assessed according to law would flow 
Into a central treasury and be applied by state officials 
to genuine community ends, such as justice, roads and 
canals, forests and mines, and, finally, an army. 

An army! That In Frederick William's manly view 
was the necessary keystone of the whole plan. With 
the German situation characterized by political Imper- 
manence and threatened with ruin he very reasonably 
made up his mind that It was Indispensable for Bran- 
derburg to be able to defend Itself, and, when the occa- 
sion rose, to meet force with force. Though Imposed 
by his common sense, the policy was supplemented by 
every patriotic Instinct that stirred in his breast and 
led him to dedicate with an almost niggard zeal every 
thaler that he could spare from his private allowance 
as well as from his public resources to the assembling 
and equipping of a standing army. Of course with his 
small territory and reduced funds he could not create 
an army at will, because soldiers cost money, but he 
could strive to make his force effective In proportion to 
Its size, and that this was successfully done was proved 
by its creditable participation in several wars. 

In the course of these wars which, since the age was 
turbulent, were numerous, the Elector's troops appeared 
In the field against Poland, Sweden, France, and even 



30 The Making of Modern Germany 

Turkey. The details need not occupy us here. Suffice 
it to say that all the wars conducted by Frederick Wil- 
liam with his small, though well-disciplined force, served 
in the first place to banish disaster from the threshold 
of Brandenburg, and that second, being courageously 
if not always triumphantly waged, they secured the 
little state a leading place in northern Germany and 
even carried its reputation modestly afield beyond the 
Rhine and Alps. 

At this point we may pause, reiterating that Fred- 
erick William's central administration and strong army 
became the fundamental institutions of Brandenburg- 
Prussia, and that, created in the second half of the seven- 
teenth century, they were steadily improved in the fol- 
lowing generations. Only in their light can the political 
movement of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
which came to a head in the rebirth of Germany, be 
understood. Of course, by themselves they were of 
small account, being just machinery; but properly sup- 
ported by statesmen and rulers capable of contributing 
intelligence and purpose, supported finally by the reborn 
German society itself, encouraged to take up once 
more its interrupted labors in the field, shop, school, 
and laboratory, army and administration proved them- 
selves more than mechanical arrangements, and un- 
doubtedly served as the historical agents of a mighty 
national revolution. Let our final word today be this: 
in the ill-starred seventeenth century German national 
life in all its aspects was in complete decomposition. 
In the disorder and wild flux a hard, resistant nucleus 
was necessary which in the nick of time, when the 



The Rise of Brandenburg 31 

country's need was greatest, was supplied by Branden- 
burg under the Great Elector. My next lecture will 
show how the fortunate and forceful emergence of 
Brandenburg proved the beginning of a new Germany. 



II 

Frederick the Great and the Advent 

of Prussia as a European 

Power 



SieconD Lecture 

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE ADVENT OF PRUSSIA 
AS A EUROPEAN POWER 

T N my first lecture I discussed the gradual overthrow 
-■■ of the elder Germany founded in medieval times, 
and showed that by the year 1648, at the end of the 
Thirty Years' War, that overthrow was as good as 
complete. I also pointed out that the older German 
state was no sooner dead than there began a quiet, 
Inconspicuous work of reconstruction which centered 
in the little north-German state of Brandenburg. En- 
couraging signs of vigor became apparent In Branden- 
burg Immediately after the treaty of Westphalia, 
largely owing to the presence at the head of affairs of 
a born ruler of men, Frederick William, the Great 
Elector, and to his calling Into existence a central admin- 
istration and a professional army. In Frederick Wil- 
liam, a man of solid attainments, intelligent without 
brilliance, cautious and yet enterprising, we hail the 
first of the makers of Modern Germany. 

In my lecture today I purpose to speak of Frederick 
II, called the Great. He was the great-grandson of 
the Great Elector and looms as large In the eighteenth 
century history of the state as did Frederick William 
In that of the seventeenth century. Frederick 11 came 
to the throne in 1740, exactly one hundred years after 

[35] 



36 The Making of Modern Germany 

the Great Elector, and held the scepter until his death 
In 1786. By constant vigilance and extraordinary au- 
dacity he was enabled to strengthen and enlarge his 
inheritance, thereby lifting himself and his dominion 
to the dignity of a great European power. 

But before I pursue Frederick's remarkable story, 
I wish to discuss a few general issues and developments, 
the removal of which from our path will greatly facili- 
tate our progress. First of all, let me dispose finally 
of the change of name from Brandenburg to Prussia. 
I have already pointed out that by the accident of in- 
heritance the ruler of Brandenburg gradually accumu- 
lated a number of other dominions, among which was 
a province, Prussia by name, on the southern shore of 
the Baltic sea. Now in the year 1700 the then ruler of 
Brandenburg, son and heir of the Great Elector and an 
insignificant man taken up with pomp and ceremony, got 
the idea into his head of calling himself king, a title 
thus far unknown in Brandenburg where, as we have 
seen, the current designation for the sovereign was 
elector. If his vanity had taken counsel of historical 
logic, he would have blossomed forth to the world as 
king of Brandenburg. But he preferred, on grounds 
which need not be examined here, to adopt the style of 
king of Prussia, taking his royal title from his relatively 
recent Baltic acquisition. From that moment the cus- 
tom struck root of including all the scattered dominions 
of the Hohenzollerns under the name of Prussia. 

The need of some common name for the increasing 
territories of the house was imperative, and what, after 
all, was more natural than to take it from the title of 



Frederick the Great 37 

the sovereign? If he was king of Prussia, then Prussia 
was a satisfactory name to designate the totality of his 
dominions. None the less Brandenburg and not the 
Baltic shoreland of Prussia Is the true kernel of the 
Hohenzollern state. Let us dismiss the relatively unim- 
portant question by repeating that, beginning with the 
year 1700, we are justified in calling the state with which 
we are concerned Prussia, and In distinguishing Its ruler 
with the title king.* 

Another matter that It seems to me important to dis- 
cuss before going on with the achievements of Fred- 
erick II Is the eighteenth-century theory of the Prussian 
state. Permit me to remind you that the Idea is often 
put forth that states originate In theories and that the 
laws and institutions of a given state are no more than 
the practical application of a theory mysteriously inher- 
ent in that state. In spite of the prevalence of the Idea, 
I find myself unable to accept It. Like most pragmatic 
students I hold that the institutions of every state under 
the sun have their origin In the necessities and habits 
of the community, and that only long after the institu- 
tions have taken shape, certain reflective students, given 
to generalization in the field of politics, come forward 
and deduce from the institutions a set of fundamental 
principles which they announce as constituting the 
spiritual essence or theory of the state. 

Assuming for the sake of argument that I am right, 
and that the laws and institutions of Prussia were born 
out of the country's political necessities. It is none the 

* For further details concerning Prussia — the original Baltic Prussia 
— see Appendix F. 



38 The Making of Modem Germany 

less true that they are reducible to theoretic statement, 
and that a consideration of this statement may serve 
to throw a welcome light on the fundamental character 
of the government. The usual declaration with regard 
to eighteenth-century Prussia Is that its basic principle 
was patriarchal control, that Is, that the state was 
omnipotent and that It totally overshadowed the Indi- 
vidual citizen by subordinating his activity and happi- 
ness to its own ends and interests. Accepting this defi- 
nition, we become aware that the spirit of eighteenth- 
century Prussia was in sharp contrast with the con- 
temporary spirit of such countries as England and our 
own United States. In the eighteenth century we insti- 
tuted and, for that matter stiU possess, the individualist 
state. 

The theory of the Individuahst state may be phrased 
in some such form as this: that the government be 
obliged to keep as aloof as possible from the affairs 
and activities of the citizens, and that it permit the 
development of the social and economic life of the com- 
munity under the free play of competition. Thus Prus- 
sia and the United States in the eighteenth century were 
dedicated to opposed theories of control. However, 
the point to which I desire to return and on which, as a 
student of history, I must lay stress. Is that our Indi- 
vidualist state is just as much the result of special 
American conditions as the patriarchal state of Prussia 
is the result of special conditions In Germany. It is 
not as If the American and Prussian peoples in the 
eighteenth century exercised a free choice In the mat- 
ter of their state and, like Hercules In the ancient Greek 



Frederick the Great 39 

fable, stood for a while in deep reflection at the parting 
of the ways. Nothing In their history would remotely 
justify us in representing them as ever making a con- 
scious choice among two or more state-theories; rather 
each solved certain difficult besetting problems as best It 
could and the result In one case was the Prussian mon- 
archy, In the other the government of the United States. 
Excellent testimony in support of this view of the 
connection between social conditions and political insti- 
tutions is supplied by what has happened in the United 
States within the last twenty years. In that period the 
terms of many of our American problems suffered a 
considerable change. Certain economic phenomena, 
notably the great trusts, aroused an alarmed attention 
and caused a sharp criticism to be leveled at our too 
rampant individualism, hitherto our chief source of 
pride. Social and political conditions, too, bringing 
bosses, graft, and labor struggles to the fore, seemed to 
betoken a growing measure of national 111 health. More 
and more we inchned to ascribe the fundamental cause 
to our captains of industry and to their secret control of 
the elections and the government. Mr. Roosevelt 
coined the phrase about malefactors of great wealth, 
and earnestly invited us to beware of them as a menace 
to the republic. Though certainly not unanimously con- 
verted to this view, we have generally come around to 
the decision to bind the rich and powerful with restric- 
tions hitherto unknown in our history, in order that they 
may not use their individualist freedom, coupled as It is 
with disportlonate political power, against the Interests 
of the community. Accordingly, we have put the rail- 



40 The Making of Modern Germany 

roads under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, we have prosecuted and dissolved the 
trusts, and we have passed scores of laws intended to 
protect the factory workers against excessive exploita- 
tion. 

In consequence of this development our loosely ar- 
ranged individualist state has assumed community func- 
tions which it formerly eschewed, and has measurably 
adopted the practice and theory with which Prussia 
became identified as early as the days of the Great 
Elector. There we may let the matter of the informing 
spirit behind the institutions of Prussia and the United 
States rest for the present, merely reasserting, as we 
pass on, that our eighteenth-century individualist liberty 
was no more our merit than the subjection to an all- 
powerful state was a Prussian fault, and that the Prus- 
sian patriarchal system represented the historical, and 
therefore the only conceivable, solution of the special 
problems that confronted Frederick William and his 
successors. 

From the theory of the Prussian state we pass by 
a natural transition to the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns 
who wielded the patriarchal power. Now this dynasty 
has undoubtedly produced a number of remarkable 
men. But the idea occasionally propounded by certain 
Prussian super-patriots that the members of the Hohen- 
zollern dynasty represent a higher level of capacity 
than the dynasties of other European states is diffi- 
cult to uphold. Let us look at the facts. Of note- 
worthy men there is, first, the Great Elector who 
founded the state and who stands like a Gulliver amidst 



Frederick the Great 41 

the Lilliputian shapes of seventeenth century Germany; 
then there is Frederick ii, called the Great, with whom 
we are about to deal; finally, two nineteenth-century 
sovereigns, William i and William ii, whom we shall 
treat later, appear to be above the average in natural 
endowment for their appointed task. But against this 
list of distinguished rulers there must be set an equally 
large group which does not rise above mediocrity, and 
brings down the efficiency index to about the figure 
maintained by the other reigning houses of Europe. 

There remains, however, an observation to submit 
on this head which opens a path to an understanding 
of the success which the HohenzoUerns have undeniably 
achieved. The organization of the Prussian state, as 
I have disclosed it, called for a very active kind of sov- 
ereign since his authoritative position put upon him an 
enormous number of duties. Now such duties, regu- 
larly exercised, made for a tradition of work and serv- 
ice which, once established, would prove a support for 
the weaker spirits and hold them to a standard far 
beyond their personal worth. 

This is well illustrated if we compare the sovereigns 
of Prussia in the eighteenth century, when kings counted 
for more than ever before or since in the history of 
Europe, with the sovereigns of a country like France. 
The prominent eighteenth century figure of France was 
Louis XV. This king found himself at the head of a 
brilliant state, with countless resources at his disposal 
but with no very solidly established tradition of royal 
service, and in consequence he fell victim to the many 
insidious temptations of power. He ended by becoming 



42 The Making of Modem Germany 

a self-indulgent oriental despot passing his days in a 
ceaseless round of pleasures. Now Prussia never had 
a Louis XV either in the eighteenth or in any other cen- 
tury, and it is not because there is anything In the moral 
stamina of the house of Hohenzollern that is superior 
to the moral stamina of the house of Bourbon. It Is 
simply because an honorable tradition of state service 
imposed itself on the rulers of Prussia from generation 
to generation. Though this Hohenzollern conception 
of office is a difficult factor to evaluate precisely In the 
upgrowth of the country, it is, without any doubt, of 
signal Importance. 

I am now ready to turn to Frederlclc ll, commonly 
called the Great, who occupied the throne of Prussia 
for well nigh half a century ( 1740-86) . When he suc- 
ceeded to the crown he was a young man, twenty-eight 
years old. He had shown from his birth a merry, pleas- 
urable disposition which made him love the society of 
his kind, and he had exhibited a receptive intelligence 
eager to assimilate the products of literature, music, 
science, and philosophy. In the years when he was 
growing up, the most impressive literature and art of 
Europe hailed from France, and it was therefore quite 
natural that, lured by Its novelty and charm, he should 
have directed his study to the stirring movement among 
his western neighbors. 

Like many young men of similar tastes and enthusi- 
asm he nursed the hope of a literary career and planned 
to link his name with the Immortals of the French 
Parnassus — Racine, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and their 
peers. Of course nothing came of it in the end, if we 



Frederick the Great 43 

except a solemn row of unimportant volumes entitled 
Oeiivres de Frederic II, and a passionate but hectic 
friendship with Voltaire. This was so characteristic 
of Frederick and summarized so many of the hopes and 
disappointments of his life, that I must be permitted 
to say a few words about it, however insignificant, from 
the point of view of our story of the Prussian state, a 
purely personal relationship may seem to be. 

Voltaire, half a generation older than Frederick, was 
singled out by the impressionable youth as the man of 
men, the authentic prophet with an intimate and sav- 
ing message. On his own initiative, and with the usual 
palpitations of a young enthusiast, he entered into cor- 
respondence with his idol, desiring nothing so much 
as to become Voltaire's friend. This early courtship 
was the happiest period of their association; but later, 
when Frederick became king and master of his own 
destiny, he resolved to go farther, and invited Voltaire 
to visit him in his dominions. The French author 
made several stays, more or less prolonged, under the 
roof of his royal friend, but alas ! friction developed, 
due to temperamental differences, and finally led to a 
grievous clash. The violent breach between king and 
philosopher gave birth to much malicious comment 
which has not entirely subsided to the present day. It 
is not worth while repeating, since it does not contribute 
to our true knowledge of Frederick; but what is worth 
while saying is that the early courtship of Voltaire 
drew the young Prussian prince into the fresh intel- 
lectual currents of the eighteenth century, supplied him 
with a Voltairean or rationalist mentality, and at least 



44 The Making of Modern Germany 

materially helped in fitting him for that role of enlight- 
ened despot with which he is Identified. 

Though the strong natural bent disclosed by Fred- 
erick in his youth toward the literature and philosophy 
of his day seemed to his tutors and friends the earnest 
of a great future, it flatly failed to win the approval 
of his father. That was King Frederick William i, 
who ruled the state from 17 13 to 1740, and who in a 
fuller account of Prussia than Is possible here would 
have to be conceded a prominent place. As an admin- 
istrator Frederick William i displayed a remarkable 
initiative and zeal, and in view of the care he gave to 
the problems of agriculture and colonization well de- 
serves the title of the Great Economist (der grosse 
Wirth) which he has won from Prussian scholars. But 
though honest and capable, he had a boorish disposition 
and was filled with a frank scorn for the refinements of 
the mind and of society. The constant playing on the 
flute by the young prince and his writing of French 
verses were In the father's eyes the symptoms of an 
intolerable effeminacy. Der Fritz ist ein efeminirter 
Kerl, was his oft repeated slur upon his son and he 
gradually made up his mind that unless matters changed 
radically, Fritz should never succeed him on the Prus- 
sian throne. 

At first he only nagged and criticised; then, his 
patience outdone, he gave commands. The result was 
a clash between father and son culminating in one of 
the most notorious court-scandals of the eighteenth cen- 
tury. I can not stop to sketch the whole drama here 
with its plots and passions, its tragic and comic episodes. 



Frederick the Great 45 

I can only state briefly that the son refusing to yield 
to parental tyranny at last formed the resolution to 
seek safety in flight. But before he could carry out his 
plan he was apprehended and summarily cast into 
prison. The father, excited almost to the pitch of 
insanity, talked wildly of having the prince shot as a 
deserter from the army and a traitor to the country. 
The bosom friend and accomplice of Frederick, young 
lieutenant Katte, the grim parent actually had tried by 
a military court and executed under the eyes of his 
recalcitrant and wayward heir. Then gentler counsels 
won the upper hand and the young man was reprieved, 
but not until he had eaten prison fare for one whole 
year and taken a solemn vow to the effect that he would 
henceforth curb his self-willed course and subject him- 
self in all things to his father's authority. 

There now dawned a new and Spartan period for 
the prince who at the age of nineteen entered upon an 
austere curriculum, the purpose of which was to pre- 
pare him as thoroughly as possible for his kingly duties. 
He was first apprenticed to a minor bureau in the civil 
service and, starting as a common clerk reporting for 
work at six o'clock in the morning, he had to make his 
way through the various stages of the Prussian admin- 
istration. Then he was readmitted to the army, and by 
similar close application worked his way up as an oflicer 
until he became familiar with every minute requirement 
of the military system. 

Probably no royal heir-apparent has ever received so 
thorough a schooling In the practical duties of his 
oflice as was imposed upon the chastened Fritz by his 



46 The Making of Modern Germany 

stern parent and taskmaster. Of course his fresh spirit 
suffered from this discipline and something bright and 
confident went out of Frederick's life never to return; 
but may we not affirm that the hard father contributed 
that quality of iron which, originally lacking, was neces- 
sary to give a foundation of solid strength to the gifts 
and graces of the young prince? 

When, after ten years of strict apprenticeship, Fred- 
erick came to the throne, the expectation in Prussia and 
Europe, founded on the young man's well-known 
literary inclinations, was that there would now be a 
radical change of system in the Prussian state, and that 
presently, in the place of the shrill cry of the drill ser- 
geant, there would be heard in the sandy wastes of 
rough and backward Brandenburg the song of the muses 
to the accompaniment of lyre and harp. Needless to 
say that all such expectations were cruelly deceived. 
Without denying his love of letters, Frederick II lived 
and moved from the first day of power in the traditions 
of the Prussian crown, and recognized as his main task 
the support and enlargement of his inherited state. 
Hardly on the throne, he plunged into the political 
whirlpool of Europe and thus created that issue which 
dominated Germany for the next one hundred years, 
the rivalry between Prussia and Austria. At this junc- 
ture it becomes necessary to refer briefly to the situa- 
tion of Austria in the eighteenth century. 

Austria was a south-German state which, beginning 
in a small feudal way, gradually rose to eminence in the 
valley of the Danube. Its dynasty was the family of 
the Hapsburgs, and its capital the city of Vienna, favor- 



Frederick the Great 47 

ably located on the blue waters of the great central 
artery. By a successful policy of wars and marriage- 
alliances the Hapsburgs, In the course of many genera- 
tions, accumulated the various provinces and dominions, 
such as Hungary, Bohemia, and the Tyrol, which still 
in this twentieth century make up the bulk of their pos- 
sessions. Even before the Reformation, Austria was 
the most considerable German state, and had acquired 
a kind of ascendancy over the rest of Germany which 
expressed itself In the recurrent election of a Hapsburg 
prince to the Imperial office. When in the Thirty Years' 
War, Germany, as we have seen, went to pieces, Aus- 
tria continued to enjoy a position of preeminence, for 
her ruler continued to be elected German emperor, 
though under a constitution so emasculated as to make 
his position merely ornamental. 

Under these narrowing circumstances, political life in 
Austria might have been smitten with paralysis if an 
opening had not been afforded elsewhere. From an 
Austrian viewpoint the greatest event of the eighteenth 
century was the decay of Turkey. In measure as the 
weakness of the Sultan became apparent, Austria was 
encouraged to engage In a policy of expansion down the 
Danube and Immediately met with considerable success. 
In consequence, she could afford to neglect Germany and 
desist from any effort to change the desolate situation 
there. In fact, Austria substantially resigned herself 
to the view that it was best to accept the settled German 
stagnation on the understanding that she be left in the 
undisturbed enjoyment of the few decorative German 
rights which were still hers. 



48 The Making of Modern Germany 

Matters standing thus, the continued exercise by 
Austria of the nominal headship of Germany meant 
nothing more or less than the perpetuation of the coun- 
try's impotence. Right here belongs the significance 
of Frederick the Great in the eyes of history. He took 
it on himself to challenge the traditional ascendancy of 
Austria, thereby inaugurating a fierce competition be- 
tween that state and upstart Prussia. By Frederick's 
bold act the dead German life, which lay like a wide, 
ice-covered marsh, was stirred for the first time in a 
hundred years and showed a faint movement as though 
spring were in the wind. In the eyes of the historian 
at least, if not in Frederick's own eyes or in those of 
his contemporaries, he was the innovator at whose chal- 
lenge sounded the knell of the old order in Germany. 

The rivalry between Austria and Prussia, which 
Frederick called into being, lasted for more than a 
hundred years, from 1740 to 1866, and led in its final 
consequences to the rebirth of Germany. Of this far 
conclusion the Prussian king had hardly a remote ink- 
ling. He was no German patriot, and no wonder, since 
there were no German patriots in existence anywhere 
and could not well be because there was no Germany 
that called for patriotism. He was the king of Prussia 
and a political realist, with a roving eye searching the 
horizon for opportunities to better the position of his 
state. It was in this spirit, as a practical Prussian 
statesman, I say again, not as an idle German dreamer, 
that he took up, on his accession, the nearby question 
of Silesia and therewith precipitated an Austro-Prussian 
war; and like many a man building better than he knew, 



Frederick the Great 49 

when, a century later, the harvest of his deeds had 
ripened, he was seen as the forerunner who had uncon- 
sciously prepared the ground for a new Germany. 

The province of Silesia, which caught the eye of the 
young king, was an Austrian territory along the Oder 
river. By virtue of it, the Hapsburg possessions ex- 
tended into northern Germany and bordered upon 
Brandenburg. To certain limited sections of Silesia 
the house of Hohenzollern held a claim which the Great 
Elector had vigorously pressed, but Austria had resisted 
persuasion and threats alike and the controversy had 
made as good as no headway in half a hundred years. 

In October, 1740, some five months after Frederick 
had mounted the Prussian throne, the Emperor Charles 
VI, the last male of the Hapsburg line, died, and im- 
mediately the question as to who would succeed him at 
Vienna leaped to the front and engaged the attention 
of the European cabinets. Charles had made the testa- 
mentary provision that, in default of male heirs, he 
should be succeeded by his daughter, Maria Theresa, 
and his arrangements, embodied in a so-called Prag- 
matic Sanction, had been very generally accepted by 
the courts of Europe. But, as usual, a paper treaty 
was found to be a very inadequate barrier against the 
assaults of cupidity, and Charles vi was no sooner laid 
in the vault of his fathers than ominous movements on 
the part of Bavaria, France, and Spain made it clear 
that these powers would vamp up old claims of one 
sort or another wherewith to assert a prerogative to a 
portion of Maria Theresa's rich dominions. 

Young and clear-eyed Frederick of Prussia saw from 



50 The Making of Modern Germany 

what quarter the wind was blowing, and quickly resolved 
not to be behind his neighbors. He, too, had a claim 
— the aforesaid claim to parts of Silesia — and to his 
calculating mind the young Austrian heiress was in so 
perilous a position that Prussia would probably only 
have to present its ancient bill energetically to cause 
her to pay it in full. In consequence he marched an 
army into Silesia. The act meant war — a war which, 
regardless of the validity or non-validity of his Silesian 
claims, can not reasonably be called other than a war of 
aggression. Frederick himself in his Histoire de mor. 
temps, has taken substantially the same view. As I 
read his simple and unpretentious account, he saw un- 
folded before him an opportunity to carry his state to 
a new level of importance, and considered it pusillani- 
mous to let the chance slip by unused. Of course Maria 
Theresa resisted an attack, for which, to her mind, 
there was no possible warrant, but as her other ene- 
mies, Bavaria, France, and Spain, descended upon her 
at the same time, she became engulfed in a vast struggle 
known as the War of the Austrian Succession and last- 
ing from 1740 to 1748. In the course of it, in order 
to ease the pressure exercised upon her from so many 
sides she resolved to come to terms with Frederick. 
The result was that in a treaty signed in 1742 and con- 
firmed, after a second struggle, in 1745, she made over 
the province of Silesia to Prussia. Courageously con- 
tinuing the war with her other opponents, she was 
enabled not only to hold her own but finally to force a 
settlement which greatly enhanced the Austrian prestige 
in the eyes of Europe. 



Frederick the Great 51 

The young woman who sustained the terrible trial 
of this war proved, in the course of a long reign, to be 
the most capable sovereign that Austria ever had. 
Holding the rudder firm as any man, the Empress 
Maria Theresa was none the less a very feminine spirit, 
closely attached to her family, and profoundly swayed 
by her feelings whether of love or resentment. In the 
late war she had avenged herself on all her enemies 
who had come down upon her unawares — on all but 
Frederick, who, firmly possessed of the Silesian prize, 
was in her sight a sorry instance of how the wicked 
flourish in this evil world. She had surrendered to him 
a precious territory, but since it had been wrested from 
her by armed force, she not unnaturally considered her- 
self free to take it back in the same way at the first 
opportunity. 

With deliberate and extraordinary persistence Maria 
Theresa undertook to create a political system which 
would give her an assured preponderance over Prussia, 
and so, reversing the tables, bring Silesia back into the 
Austrian fold. Having first attached Russia to herself 
by formal treaty, she next turned to France. The 
French negotiations proved extremely difficult, owing 
to the long-standing feud between the houses of Haps- 
burg and Bourbon, and the reluctance of France to see 
the desirability of a changed course. However, by 
1756 an Austro-French treaty was perfected, and now 
Prussia was surrounded on three sides and could be 
crushed, it might reasonably be hoped, in a single vigor- 
ous campaign. 

Still the matter was, after all, not so simple as Maria 



52 The Making of Modern Germany 

Theresa's confident resentment pictured It. With un- 
equalled political daring Frederick ii coupled a mili- 
tary skill which made him the greatest captain of his 
time, and although he did not for a moment underesti- 
mate the force of the gathering tempest, he did not 
quail before It. He looked around for aid and found a 
helper in Great Britain. Great Britain In the eighteenth 
century was Involved with France In a tremendous 
struggle for the rule of the seas and the trans-oceanic 
continents, and this quarrel, dating back In Its origin 
over a hundred years, happened to be ripe for settle- 
ment at the exact moment which the Empress Maria 
Theresa had chosen to even scores with Frederick. In 
the year 1756 an Anglo-French conflict was a certainty, 
and if France was to have the aid of Austria In that 
struggle, Great Britain was sure to make an eager bid 
for Prussian help. Through the respective necessities 
of London and Berlin the two cabinets were forced into 
an alliance, and thus It was, with Great Britain at his 
side, that Frederick met the descent upon him of his 
three continental neighbors, Austria, France, and 
Russia. 

The struggle that followed, one of the most gigantic 
and far-reaching In history. Is familiar to us all as the 
Seven Years' War (1756-63). How It was fought 
out by England and France on all the seas and not only 
confirmed Britannia as the ruler of the waves but gave 
her India and Canada as well, is sufficiently known. To 
Americans this chapter of the Seven Years' War Is so 
preeminently Important that the Austro-Prusslan com- 
bat sinks by comparison Into Insignificance. And yet 



Frederick the Great 53 

It is the Austro-Prusslan phase with which we are here 
alone concerned. Therefore having reminded you of 
the world-wide ramifications of the Seven Years' War, 
I shall confine my attention to the struggle in Central 
Europe. 

It was eminently like Frederick, perhaps the most 
nimble and collected spirit of his time, that, as soon as 
he was certain in his mind the blow was about to fall, 
he sprang to anticipate it. A quick offensive would at 
least enable him to strike his enemies before they had 
combined their movements, and naturally he pounced 
upon Austria, his main enemy, first. But the campaign 
of 1756 was only partially successful, for Austria was 
not surprised and parried the blow. The next year the 
concerted advance of Austria from the south, of France 
from the west, and of Russia from the east was only 
stopped by two sweeping victories, one over the French 
at Rossbach, the other over the Austrlans at Leuthen; 
as for the Russians, when the news of these swift strokes 
reached them they retired from the scene without await- 
ing an attack. 

Beginning with the third campaign, that of 1758, a 
British army operating In western Germany stood off 
the French and considerably relieved the terrible pres- 
sure upon the harassed Frederick. But Austria and 
Russia by themselves continued to constitute a terrible 
menace, as will appear at a glance as soon as the vast 
area of united Austria and Russia Is compared with 
that of little Prussia and their enormous preponderance 
in money and men Is taken into account. Against such 
odds Frederick maintained a bold front, though it was 



54 The Making of Modem Germany 

plain that he could not keep up the fight forever. In 
1759 he was badly defeated by the Russians at Kuners- 
dorf, In eastern Brandenburg, and from that time 
showed unmistakable signs of exhaustion. It was only 
by one of the most remarkable examples of moral 
courage ever given that he did not regard his cause as 
lost and cry for quarter. 

Step by step, like hunters stalking a quarry, the Aus- 
trians and Russians closed In upon him until he had 
hardly more in hand than the original nucleus of Bran- 
denburg. Probably no man in his dominion beside him- 
self believed there was any further use in fighting. Thus 
he stood his ground, defiant to the last, when a stroke 
of fortune saved the day. At the end of the sixth cam- 
paign (January, 1762) the Czarina Elizabeth of Rus- 
sia died, and her successor, as capriciously moved by 
friendship for Frederick as Elizabeth had been by hate, 
insisted on making peace and restoring to Prussia all 
the land he held. Maria Theresa was profoundly 
chagrined at this desertion and stuck to the war with 
Prussia for another year. But when she now began to 
be pushed back in her turn, she sadly made up her mind 
that her efforts were vain and, In February, 1763, con- 
cluded peace, at Hubertsburg In Saxony, on the basis 
of a return to the conditions before the war. 

The great seven years' struggle was over, and tech- 
nically it was a draw, for neither Austria nor Prussia 
gained a foot of territory. But the fact stands out that 
Maria Theresa was obliged to relinquish her plan of 
getting back Silesia and to accept Its Incorporation in 
Prussia as final. That made the struggle in effect a 



Frederick the Great 55 

Prussian victory, especially as Prussia had shown such 
strength that she had now to be accepted as a great 
power in Europe, capable of negotiating on a basis of 
equality with all the rest. Specifically for Germany, the 
war meant that Austria, preeminent so long within the 
German fold, was obliged to share her control with 
another state and to admit the northern upstart into a 
reluctant partnership. From the end of the Seven 
Years' War a silent agreement made Prussia ascendant 
in the north, with Austria retaining the leadership in 
the regions of the south. Henceforth, as concerns the 
political life of the country, there were two Germanics, 
each eyeing the other with jealousy, animosity, and even 
aversion. The deep estrangement augured ill for the 
future of the nation. 

In some respects it was not so much Prussia that 
came out of the war with honor, as the Prussian king. 
With remarkable unanimity admiring Europe turned 
him into a hero and hailed him as Frederick the Great. 
Everybody felt and expressed that against the enor- 
mous odds which Austria had brought into the field, 
the Prussian state had been able to maiatain itself, 
primarily, by virtue of the military skill, the moral 
courage, and the steady endurance of one man. 

But though the world saw in Frederick chiefly the 
soldier, the truth is that he never set overmuch store by 
his military reputation. " My successes," he said, tem- 
pering the exaggerations of an encomiast with the 
amused irony which never deserted him, " my successes 
are largely due to luck and the stupidity of my ene- 
mies " ! He regarded himself as a state-builder, a man 



56 The Making of Modem Germany 

of peace, and wished primarily to leave behind him a 
strengthened structure diversified and enriched with 
varied economic activity. 

While he did not occupy himself much with the theo- 
retic study of economics, he plunged with an eagerness 
that balked at no physical exertion into all the practical 
problems of agriculture, trade, and industry. Holding 
the patriarchal view derived from his ancestors that an 
intelligent control was necessary, and that, if honestly 
exercised, it could only be productive of good to the 
state, he did not scruple to summon, as It were, the whole 
labor of his people before his throne. Of course, to 
present-day Americans, accustomed to free, competitive 
activity and abominating the action of the government, 
his Interference often looks like foolish meddling with 
the laws of nature, and even the unbiased observer will 
discover that much of it was ill-advised and hurtful. 
Trade, for Instance, which always flourishes most lux- 
uriously when It is unhampered, Frederick burdened 
with all kinds of regulations and embargoes in the sup- 
posed interest of this or that Infant Industry. 

All things considered. It Is plain that the great king 
was ruled by the central idea that the chief desideratum 
for Prussia was the development of her manufactures, 
and that it was not too much to pay for this benefit 
with a very high duty against foreign goods. Let his 
own words tell his purpose. " I prohibit as much as 
I dare, In order to force my subjects to manufacture," 
he wrote to one of his ministers. Whether or no the 
game was worth the candle let others say, but the 
undeniable truth is that Frederick inaugurated, how- 




Frederick ii, called the Great 



Frederick the Great 57 

ever modestly, the Prussian industrial development. 
Before he died the native woolen mills more than 
supplied the home market, while the Silesian linens 
traveled as far as England and America. Even 
silk goods were turned out in considerable quantity. 
His taking up this last-named industry shows him in a 
most characteristic light. Since imported silks sold at 
a good price on the local market, why not let the manu- 
facturing profit be earned at home? For years he dedi- 
cated considerable sums from the treasury to help the 
new business obtain a firm footing. When the capital- 
ists complained of the difficulty of getting raw silk and 
of its high cost, he distributed cocoons among the peas- 
ants and ordered the government agents in the country 
to line the highways with mulberry trees, on the leaves 
of which the cocoons lived. In the long run the enter- 
prise proved impracticable, for the cocoons called for 
more sun than bleak and chilly Brandenburg could 
furnish, but Frederick with his indomitable will kept 
up hope to the end that the various difficulties would 
be overcome. If, on the whole, the funds used to 
stimulate the silk Industry must be declared to have 
been wasted, numerous successes In other enterprises 
more than made up for this failure and justified Fred- 
erick in the feeling that his economic policy, with Its 
feature of state interference, was a move In the right 
direction. 

However, In spite of varied Industrial beginnings, 
Frederician Prussia was, and remained essentially, an 
agricultural state. Let us not be In the least doubt on 
this head, and let us understand the social structure 



58 The Making of Modern Germany 

which the agricultural economy involved. Generally 
speaking, the land of Prussia was divided into great 
estates owned by feudal landlords, familiarly called 
Junkers. A considerable area was owned by the sov- 
ereign himself, in fact his estates ran into the hundreds 
and made him the landlord of the country. They were 
thrown together for administrative purposes into a 
royal domain and managed from a central office at 
Berlin, returning a revenue which was one of the most 
important items of the annual budget of the state. 
Frederick, fully aware of the value of this resource for 
his purse, was tireless in urging improvements in the 
royal domain by introducing fertilizers, bettering the 
stock, and varying the crops. 

Naturally the progress made on the royal farms, 
many of which served as experiment stations, imposed 
itself by force of imitation on the neighboring Junkers. 
But improved methods and increased returns did not 
mean social changes in the countryside. For centuries 
the estates had been worked in accordance with feudal 
usage; that is, the workers were peasants legally sub- 
ject to the landlords and obliged to pay for the little 
holdings on which they lived by three, four, or even 
five days' labor per week on the master's land. These 
conditions made the Prussian peasants serfs, and 
depressed them to a position only better than slavery 
in that they could not be bought and sold and usually 
had some vested rights in their bits of land. 

In the general absence of a large, progressive, and 
enlightened Prussian middle class stirring up criticism 
of these conditions, Frederick never ventured to come 



Frederick the Great 59 

forward with a program of peasant reform. Since 
the Junkers were in possession and constituted the most 
powerful class in the state, it was best to let well enough 
alone. Wise monarchs do not revolutionize the socie- 
ties they govern merely for the sake of experiment. By 
fostering an industry and calling the nucleus of a middle 
class into being, he created the only counterweight 
which, in the course of time, would prove effective in 
diminishing the influence of the landlord group. How- 
ever far we may go in giving Frederick credit for 
certain constructive features of his economic program, 
he is certainly not to be classed as a social reformer. 

My limited time permits me to give only a hurried 
consideration to the many other instructive features 
of Frederick's reign. The king created a bureau which 
put the management of the national forests on a scien- 
tific and systematic basis; he maintained a good net- 
work of highways, and added a number of canals to 
those already in use; he drained bogs and colonized 
peasants from other parts of Germany on the reclaimed 
land. 

His method of work was highly individual. Week 
in and week out, for many hours each day, he sat in his 
cabinet dispatching the affairs which his secretaries 
submitted. With the advent of summer he regularly 
traveled from one end of his kingdom to the other in 
order to keep his eye responsive to the realities of life 
and to hinder his spirit from drying up in the tedium of 
a deadly routine. Let us see Frederick as he was — an 
absolutist administrator of the eighteenth century, a 
typical enlightened despot who labored with energy. 



60 The Making of Modern Germany 

intelligence, and devotion to increase the population 
and well-being of the state. Everything for the people, 
nothing by the people, was essentially his motto. And 
a careful consideration of all the circumstances will 
impose the view that this Frederician system would 
continue until the urban classes, still very negligible, 
in spite of an industrial beginning, had lifted them- 
selves to a higher economic and intellectual level and 
insisted on being heard in all matters of public policy. 

A final word about the great king's army. If, after 
his first plunge into the war of the Austrian succession, 
he was far from wishing to use it wantonly for the 
sake of " glory," he had no two opinions as to the 
need of keeping it ready for defense. In this respect 
he shared the view of all his predecessors beginning 
with the Great Elector, founder of the state. If by 
any chance his interest in the army should ever have 
flagged, a single glance at the map, showing his 
exposed position in the heart of Europe, would have 
sufficed to spur him to renewed military activity. In 
consequence of an unrelaxed attention, his permanent 
forces swelled to a figure which was out of all pro- 
portion to the wealth and population of the state. 
Toward the end of his life he boasted an army which 
was little short of 200,000 men, approximately the 
figure of the standing armies of such large powers as 
Austria and France ! 

To keep the ranks full a recruiting system was 
required which awakens interest as it was not far re- 
moved from universal, compulsory service. But the 
compulsion was a class compulsion and applied only 



Frederick the Great 61 

to the peasants, not to the burghers. As the officers 
were exclusively drawn from the landed gentry, and 
mere burghers were jealously excluded from officer 
positions, the Frederician army was a perfect mirror 
of the traditional feudal organization of Prussian 
society. A body of hardy peasants officered by gentle- 
men to whom they looked up as to superior beings — 
such was the Frederician army, and as such it had 
an undeniable solidarity fully proved in the furnace- 
test of war. But it was the product of a medieval 
class system which was already becoming antiquated, 
and the future alone would show whether it would 
be able to hold its own in the democratic age which 
was just beginning to dawn. 

Such for better and worse were the society and 
institutions of Prussia in the days of Frederick the 
Great. The other sovereigns of Germany, dazzled 
by the brilliant successes of the king in peace and war, 
looked upon him with envy and paid him the flattery 
of imitation. And now for the first time since the 
disasters of the Thirty Years' War, new life began 
to stir through the length and breadth of the German 
land. It showed first of all in the ideal world, in the 
realm of the mind. There was a manifest awakening, 
a casting off of old fetters at some of the universities, 
notably at Gottingen and Leipzig, while in the class- 
rooms at Konigsberg Kant expounded his famous 
philosophy which opened a new era of speculation and 
differed from the contemporary mechanistic systems 
by affirming the ethical freedom and therewith the 
dignity of man as the noblest creature under the 



62 The Making of Modern Germany 

sun. In the field of criticism Lessing and Herder, in 
lyric and dramatic poetry Goethe and Schiller, made 
contributions that put German literature on a broad 
and modern foundation, while music, that art with 
which the name of Germany is most intimately linked, 
unfolded Its wonders in the moving strains of Bach 
and Handel. 

Thus, toward the end of the eighteenth century, in- 
numerable signs pointed to the rebirth of the German 
people, a rebirth which, in sharp contrast to the auto- 
cratic Frederlclan state, was volksthiimlich In the 
best sense of the word because proceeding out of 
the depths of the national soul. Curious to reflect, 
Frederick, the most eminent German of his day, had 
little understanding for the intellectual revival of his 
people. Brought up in the elegant French tradition, 
writing and speaking the Gallic tongue far more flu- 
ently than his own German, he found the door of his 
mind locked to an art and literature which had their 
roots in the soil and which withered in the close atmos- 
phere of the drawing-room. Not long before his 
death he wrote a review — naturally in French — of 
the German writers of his time, the young titans of 
the Sturm iind Drang, and reprimanded them for their 
rough words and careless forms; they reminded him, 
he declared, of that uncouth and detestable English 
barbarian, GuUlaume Shakspeare ! None the less, a 
lingering faith In the destiny of his people persuaded 
him that better things would come and caused him to 
declare that, like Moses In the desert, he hailed from 
afar the Promised Land which he would not live to see. 



Frederick the Great 63 

In August, 1786, in his villa of Sans Souci near Pots- 
dam, Frederick the Great, familiarly known to his 
people then and now as der alte Fritz, closed his eyes 
upon this world. It was a Germany still hopelessly 
divided in political matters which at the news of his 
death turned Its mental vision to the place where the 
dead king and warrior lay in state, but it was certainly 
not the Germany of Frederick's youth, afflicted with 
chronic dry rot in every department of human activity. 
The breath of an authentic spring was abroad and 
fresh forces were shaping a national life which Fred- 
erick In his blindness did not appreciate, but which 
none the less owed much of Its inspiration to the magic 
of his name. No less an authority than Goethe has left 
incontrovertible evidence on this head. In his famous 
autobiography, Dichtung iind JVahrheit, the poet says 
that he and the youth of his day were first touched 
with national pride by the thought that they were 
Frederick's countrymen, and that after many gener- 
ations a German had again proved himself a construc- 
tive political force and writ his name across the sky. 
Thus Frederick, more French than German in all the 
superficial aspects of his mind, was yet a quickener 
of German national life; purely Prussian In his politics 
and creator of a greater Prussia, he yet prepared the 
way for a new Germany. 



Ill 

Napoleon Bonaparte: Prussia's Overthrow 
and Reconstruction 



CftitD Lecture 

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE : PRUSSIA'S OVERTHROW AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 

¥N my previous lecture I tried to make clear that 
-'■ Frederick the Great was the dominating figure in 
the eighteenth century history of Prussia. His sig- 
nificance lay In his enlarging his territory and revenue, 
in his administering his kingdom with alert intelli- 
gence thereby increasing its prosperity and preparing 
it for an industrial future, and in his successfully chal- 
lenging the ascendancy of Austria in Germany. From 
Frederick's time, the great issue in Germany was the 
rivalry between Austria and Prussia, between Hapsburg 
and Hohenzollern, an issue in which the two opponents 
were so evenly matched that it was not settled for 
one hundred years. 

My task today is to follow the history of Prussia 
during the period of the French Revolution, and In 
order to understand what befell It is necessary, first, 
to turn our attention to France. The famous rising 
of 1789 Is often regarded as a volcanic and ruinous 
upheaval. We arrive much nearer the truth by look- 
ing upon It as the logical consequence of the sound and 
steady development of the French people. The seven- 
teenth and eighteenth centuries had brought about a 
vast economic and social change In France which 

[67] 



68 The Making of Modern Germany 

reduces itself, on analysis, to the rise of the middle 
class, or bourgeoisie, through commerce and industry. 
The bourgeoisie, like every advancing group since the 
beginning of time, desired to get control of its own 
destiny, and became more keenly set on its program 
in measure as it realized the waxing senility of the 
French state. 

Many generations before, at the close of the Middle 
Ages, this state had taken the form of an autocracy, 
reaching the height of its organization as well as of 
its power under Louis xiv (i 643-1715). The eigh- 
teenth century, dominated by the name of Louis xv 
inaugurated a sharp decline. The monarchy forgot 
its national mission, occupied itself with sumptuous dis- 
play and inane pleasures, and lost the moral energy 
necessary to deal with the abuses that multiplied to an 
alarming degree in every department of the state. The 
administration became hopelessly corrupt, the finances 
developed a chronic deficit which no increase of tax- 
oppression was able to cure, and In the long wars 
with England the government was ousted from one 
vantage-point after another until the nation felt Itself 
deprived of its outlook Into the future and Intolerably 
humiliated. 

Meanwhile the two feudal classes, the clergy and 
nobility, though obliged to yield their political power 
to the monarch, had retained so many privileges, both 
real and honorific, as to enable them to occupy a wholly 
exceptional position in the state. They enjoyed a 
complete exemption from some and a partial exemption 
from other taxes, and all the exalted posts in the diplo- 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 69 

matic service as well as the officer positions in the army 
and navy were exclusively reserved for the born aristo- 
crats. In the eyes of the middle class, occupied with 
business enterprises at home and abroad and becoming 
daily richer and more self-confident, the situation was 
fast assuming an intolerable aspect. The leading 
intellectual representatives of the bourgeoisie, men like 
Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, and D'Alembert, clam- 
ored for a change of system, and when the monarchy, 
openly controlled by the two privileged groups, proved 
unable to effect a reform, an outbreak became inevitable. 

Such is the meaning of the year 1789. An effete 
social and political system was overthrown by the rising 
middle class, which felt strong enough to take the direc- 
tion of affairs into its own hands. But it had just 
begun to labor at the reorganization of the government 
when it found itself displaced in its turn by the demo- 
cratic masses, shaken out of their age-long sleep by 
the fierce agitation of the period. Into the struggle 
that followed between bourgeoisie and masses it is 
not my business to go further than to recall to your 
minds that the masses, or at least their most energetic 
group, gaining a victory, guillotined the king and estab- 
lished a republic. 

Being solely concerned with the effect of the Revo- 
lution beyond the limits of France, I now beg you to 
switch your attention and note that from the first day 
all the neighboring monarchies looked upon the French 
convulsion with alarm. Sporadic friction over diplo- 
matic Issues, both real and unreal, produced sparks 
which, refusing to be extinguished, started an inevitable 



70 The Making of Modern Germany 

conflagration. In the year 1792 war began between 
France and Austria and, spreading, gradually Involved 
all Europe. The French republic, stirred to heroic 
efforts by the risks it ran, equipped armies on an un- 
heard-of scale and was able not only to defend Its soil 
against Invasion but presently to Invade the territory 
of Its enemies. The republican victories were sweeping 
and unparalleled but had an ominous aftermath : they 
brought the military leaders to the front, chief among 
them Napoleon Bonaparte. 

Endowed with a remarkable Intelligence directed 
solely by personal ambition, Bonaparte saw his oppor- 
tunity and, supported by a devoted army, In the year 
1799 overthrew the republic and seized the power. 
How, completely abandoning the original alms of the 
Revolution, he gradually took up the grandiose but 
futile dream of conquering Europe Is a palpitating 
story but does not concern us here. Our concern Is to 
learn how he, and the French Revolution before him, 
affected the kingdom of Prussia. 

The Prussia of Frederick the Great bore a certain 
outward resemblance to the France of Louis xv. Both 
were autocratic monarchies, and both the French and 
Prussian societies showed certain familiar feudal ear- 
marks, above all, a powerful landed gentry endowed 
with special privileges. There the resemblance ended; 
for, whereas In France the monarchy was old and dis- 
credited, and the society, though feudal In law and 
outward form, had been undermined through the rise 
of the bourgeoisie, In Prussia, on the contrary, the 
monarchy was young and authoritative, and the society 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 71 

was feudal In fact as well as law, because a middle 
class was as yet more of a hope than a reality. 

Thus while advancing France was In utter contradic- 
tion with Its Inherited laws and Institutions, backward 
Prussia was still In more or less complete harmony with 
Itself. The consequence was that the Revolution, an 
event of the utmost logic, In fact a necessity, In France, 
could not even be understood In Prussia, and gave rise 
to the gravest fears. And when, with astonishing 
rapidity, the Revolution became aggressive, pouring 
like molten lava over the French boundaries, Prussia, 
Identified with the old regime, naturally and spontan- 
eously ranged herself on the side of France's enemies. 

The sovereign who followed Frederick the Great, 
his nephew, Frederick William ii, was a dissipated 
man of a soft and unstable character. Quick to con- 
duct his country Into the war, he was no sooner In than 
he regretted his decision. He lamented the loss of 
blood and treasure on the Rhine for no tangible terri- 
torial profit, and, though all the monarchs of Europe 
had come together to defend as from ravening wolves 
what they proclaimed to be their holy cause, he pres- 
ently deserted their union and signed a separate peace 
at Basel (1795). By Its terms Prussia became a spec- 
tator In the great struggle between the old and the 
new order of things, and from now on for eleven 
years. In spite of luring offers from both sides, per- 
sisted In her neutral attitude. The French armies 
marched from victory to victory, the French state 
passed through a long succession of domestic crises, 
Napoleon's star began to rise and shed Its luster over 



72 The Making of Modern Germany 

Europe, but still the Prussian monarch declared that 
the struggle, which raged all around his borders and 
caused the Prussian state to rock on its foundations, 
was none of his. 

Such a neutrality, in plain contradiction with the 
facts, could be accounted for only on the ground of 
political stupidity and moral cowardice. Sooner or 
later the hour would strike when it could not be main- 
tained and then Prussia would be sucked into the vortex 
against her will and without that resolute conviction 
which is the only certain earnest of victory. There 
is no more despicable chapter of Prussian history than 
the official neutrality observed for eleven years in the 
face of an unexampled catastrophe of the European 
world. It was the conclusive evidence that, in spite of 
its many successes under Frederick, the Prussian mon- 
archy was hollow at the core and ripe for overthrow. 

Meanwhile, Napoleon Bonaparte had begun his spec- 
tacular career of victory. Having assumed the imperial 
crown in 1804 amidst splendid medieval ceremonies, 
and having won a dominating position beyond the 
boundaries of France in the Netherlands, Italy, and 
South Germany, he administered, in the Austerlitz 
campaign of the autumn of 1805, a third and superla- 
tive beating to his most consistent continental enemy, 
Austria. There was now no reason why he should any 
longer hesitate to complete his control of central Europe 
by forcing neutral Prussia, lulled by a false and irra- 
tional security, into his political system. Of course 
the timid Prussian king was profoundly hurt by the 
aggressive attitude of his hitherto friendly western 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 73 

neighbor. Big, sodden, apoplectic Frederick William ll, 
who had inaugurated the neutrality policy, was now no 
longer on the throne. He had been succeeded in 1797 
by his son, Frederick William ill, who, though hon- 
orable and virtuous by all the standards of private 
life, was in the conduct of public affairs as slack and 
irresolute as his unlamented father. When, summoning 
the last remnant of his self-respect, he resisted the will 
of his tormentor, the lightning flashed and the storm 
broke. 

The war of 1806 between Napoleon and Prussia is 
one of the great Corsican's most brilliant achievements. 
He gathered his forces with even more than his usual 
swiftness and practically with one master blow deliv- 
ered at Jena, in the forests of Thuringia, shattered the 
Prussian army. Thereupon the whole Prussian state 
fell like a house of cards. The wretched king made 
his escape into East Prussia and there, supported by 
Czar Alexander of Russia, with whom he had entered 
into a belated alliance, continued the struggle a little 
longer. In July, 1807, in the extreme eastern corner 
of the state, at Tilsit, Napoleon and Alexander made 
peace, the beaten Frederick William humbly accepting 
the terms that were arranged for him by the two 
emperors. 

By the treaty of Tilsit, Prussia lost half of her terri- 
tory; besides, she had to agree to support a French 
army of occupation and pay an indemnity, the 
amount of which was purposely left undetermined in 
order to keep a sword suspended over the anxious 
government. In the eyes of contemporaries Prussia 



74 The Making of Modern Germany 

was stricken from the list of the great powers without 
any likelihood of ever recovering from her terrible 
abasement. 

The chapter that follows is the proudest in Prussian 
history, for it tells the story of a deliberate and pain- 
ful reconstruction upon a sounder foundation than the 
one that had crumbled so miserably. In the hour of 
need the best manhood of Prussia gathered around 
the throne and set an example of devoted self-sacrifice 
for the state that has few parallels. And yet without 
meanly stinting our praise let us avoid misconceptions. 
We may read in many books that Prussia, following 
her collapse, went through a radical transformation, 
achieving by a succession of royal decrees all the ben- 
efits of the French Revolution. That is a manifest 
exaggeration as a moment's reflection will show. The 
French Revolution was the proclamation orbi et iirhi 
of the coming of age of the French bourgeoisie, and 
since Prussia had only an embryo bourgeoisie, created 
by the economic policy of Frederick the Great, it stands 
to reason that the country could not possibly have been 
reorganized after the French pattern. 

Prussia after Jena was, like Prussia before Jena, 
an essentially agricultural state of the feudal type, and 
any reconstruction plans which left that fact out of 
account would have been foredoomed to failure. 
Therefore the actual reconstruction proceeded, as we 
may say, historically, and with wise moderation left 
the absolute monarchy unimpaired with its two tradi- 
tional pillars of a trained civil, service and a standing 
army. But something, both new and vital, was joined 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 75 

to the old by means of reforms, the main purpose of 
which was to arouse the latent manhood of those classes 
of the population hitherto neglected and submerged. 
These were the peasant-serfs who worked the estates 
of the nobles, and the town-dwellers engaged in trade 
and industry. To raise their personal, legal status, 
thereby increasing their self-esteem, to give them 
political power in order that they might learn to look 
upon the affairs of the state as their own — such was 
the end of the new legislation which, while it aimed 
at a social renewal, certainly did not in the spirit of 
doctrinaire fanaticism attempt the impossible task of 
making Prussia over into a kind of German France. 

Those were terrible and solemn days when, after 
the peace of Tilsit, King Frederick William called his 
optimati about him to take counsel concerning the sav- 
ing of the remnants of the state from final ruin. He 
himself, stiff, upright, without vision or originality, 
counted for nothing in the crisis. Fortunately his 
wife, the spirited Queen Louise, covered his insignifi- 
cance with her feminine grace and sounded the note 
of heroism for which the people, seated in the darkness 
of despair, were listening. 

During the negotiations at Tilsit the queen's simple 
courage had prompted her to seek out Napoleon in 
order to bend her knee before him and ask for better 
terms. True, the victor remained adamant, but her 
petitioner's role, sustained with royal dignity, carried 
her at a bound into the hearts of her people. Ponder- 
ing the Prussian catastrophe, her unflinching honesty 
brought her face to face with the truth touching her hus- 



76 The Making of Modern Germany 

band's reign : '* We have fallen asleep on the laurels 
of Frederick the Great, the creator of a new era," she 
wrote to a friend. " Not progressing with that era we 
have been left behind." 

There exists a well-known portrait of Queen Louise 
coming down a staircase with youthful and erect grace, 
a jeweled star shining at her brow. That is the guise 
in which she appeared to her people in their hour of 
need, spreading just that glamour of leadership with- 
out which monarchy is but an intolerable incumbrance. 
Her moral courage thrown at the decisive moment 
into the poHtical balance inclined the scales in favor 
of a brave, forward-looking policy, but the actual meas- 
ures now adopted came, not from her, but from a group 
of trained administrators and ardent reformers. Stein, 
Hardenberg, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Humboldt, and 
others, men who were one and all exceptionally endowed 
by nature, but the greatest of whom was unquestionably 
Stein. 

Baron Stein, or, as his correct title is, Freiherr vom 
Stein, was not a native Prussian. He was born in 
Nassau, the homeland of that famous line of princes 
who fill so shining a page in Dutch history. The baron 
belonged to an ancient house of imperial knights 
(Reichsritter) and had, as a young man, come to Prus- 
sia in search of a career. Possessed of great ability, 
he had risen fast in the administrative service but was 
of too austere and independent a temper to become 
popular at court. None the less, on the morrow of Til- 
sit, the advisers of the king were unanimous that the 
only man to bring order out of chaos was the head- 




Queen Louise 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 77 

strong administrator. He accepted the grave responsi- 
bility, and by the simple weight of his personality soon 
exercised an effective dictatorship. 

Long before the disaster of Jena, Stein had arrived 
at the conclusion that the Prussian absolutism was 
out of date and would have to be remodeled. But — 
and this was all Important — the new vigor to be 
injected Into its lifeless bones was to be drawn not so 
much from the example of revolutionary France as 
from that of commercial and individualist England. 
Stein's central concept, focus of all his political thought, 
was that the best asset of a state is the energy of its 
citizens, and that to liberate and increase that energy 
Is the chief end of government. Stein turned first to 
tTie peasants. In a decree Issued October, 1807, he 
put an end for all time to serfdom in Prussia and 
declared the workers of the soil free men. But what 
was to be their future relation to the land? Stein's 
idea undoubtedly was to establish them as independent 
owners. However, the property rights in dispute 
between them and their masters could not be adjusted 
over night, and before a settlement was reached Stein 
had left office. 

The result was that the peasants, receiving an insuf- 
ficient endowment of land, neither then nor afterwards 
succeeded to the possession of the bulk of the Prussian 
soil. Thus, though the liberation of the serfs rang 
the knell of feudalism in its legal aspect, It did not 
occasion a far-reaching social revolution. To this day 
the Prussian countryside is, in the main, an affair of 
large estates; the landlords, or Junkers, continue to be 



78 The Making of Modem Germany 

a very important social and economic element, while the 
agricultural laborers are a free and wage-earning class 
but not, in overwhelming numbers at least, independent 
proprietors. 

From the peasants Stein turned his attention to the 
burghers. To arouse them from the political apathy 
with which they were afflicted seemed even more import- 
ant than to liberate the serfs, because the state would 
be more Immediately benefited by the restored faith 
and vigorous cooperation of the middle class. Accord- 
ingly, after careful study, he issued the Stddteordniing 
(November, 1808), devised to put the towns on a 
self-governing basis. Frederick the Great in his day 
had busily tried to animate the cities with industrial 
life, but neither he nor his ancestors before him had 
had the wisdom to observe that a competent Industry 
could spring only from strong, individual initiative. 
Thus he had defeated his own ends, for though spur- 
ring his burghers to greater economic production, he 
had continued to rule their cities bureaucratically by 
royal commissioners. 

Stein, drawing breath in the era of English industrial 
expansion, saw that an enterprising, self-respecting 
business class implied political training and responsi- 
bility, and for this reason he resolved to start the urban 
communities on a career of self-government. In the 
back of his head he had the further idea of preparing 
the people in the elective municipal councils for the 
still larger work of ruling the state. In short, a con- 
stitutional monarchy was his ultimate hope, but before 
he could effect such a thorough-going change, the scene 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 79 

shifted and the curtain descended upon his ministry 
with tragic abruptness. The story, since it made him a 
martyr to the German cause, deserves to be recounted. 

While laboring to revive the state and the people, 
Stein never lost from view the immediate, practical 
end of liberating Prussia from the Napoleonic yoke. 
He planned a popular revolt to embrace all Germany, 
but, owing to his outspoken character, proved an 
impossible conspirator. One of Napoleon's secret 
agents in Germany succeeded in getting possession of 
a private letter of Stein's. It exhibited the writer in 
so anti-French a light that further continuance in office 
was out of the question, unless Prussia was ready to 
go to war with Napoleon at once. That was by no 
means the case, and therefore in November, 1808, after 
not much more than a year's service. Stein left office, 
a victim of his headlong patriotism. Napoleon, made 
aware, as by a flash in the dark, of the mettle of his 
enemy, resolved to be rid of him forever. In a decree 
issued from Paris he confiscated Stein's ancestral estates 
in Nassau and declared the rebuilder of Prussia an 
outlaw. Only by a hurried flight from Germany did 
the hunted statesman save his life. 

However, the work inaugurated by Stein did not 
cease with his fall. His successor, Hardenberg, in spite 
of his ideas having a far more bureaucratic tinge than 
those of Stein, upheld the policy of reform; and min- 
isters like Scharnhorst, head of the military commis- 
sion, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, charged with public 
education, made their names illustrious with memorable 
achievements. Scharnhorst's work more particularly 



80 The Making of Modern Germany 

supplemented Stein's, for he popularized and national- 
ized the Prussian army. He did this by throwing open 
the officer positions to all citizens; by abolishing foreign 
enlistments; by drafting the burghers into the ranks; 
and by proclaiming, in theory at least, the right of 
the Prussian state to the military service of every 
citizen. 

Some years later, in 1814, the principle of universal, 
obligatory service was definitely incorporated in a royal 
statute, and in the course of the last one hundred years 
has impressed the world with being the most charac- 
teristic single feature of the Prussian state. However, 
Scharnhorst himself, in the era of reconstruction, had 
to be content with less than the ideal he set up, for, 
making against the full realization of his military plans 
was first, the exhausted state of the national finances, 
and second, an express provision in the treaty with 
Napoleon by which the Prussian army was limited to 
42,000 men. The latter restriction, it is true, a clever 
device in a measure overcame. By replacing one group 
of young men after a short term of service with another 
group, Scharnhorst managed, without particularly 
arousing Napoleon's suspicions, to give military train- 
ing to a not inconsiderable section of the nation and 
thus to be ready, when the hour struck, with a large and 
effective fighting force. 

To renovated state and army the renovated educa- 
tional life of Prussia presents a worthy parallel, though 
at first it made its effects felt only at the summit of the 
system, in the university realm. In the year 18 10 
Wilhelm von Humboldt — brother of the great natur- 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 81 

allst, Alexander — acting as minister of public instruc- 
tion founded the university of Berlin. The new time 
called for new intellectual agents, and the universities 
older than Berlin, dedicated to theological creeds and 
moving in the settled ruts of scholasticism, proved 
unsuitable media of the fresh thought abroad in the 
land. The university of Berlin, it was expressly declared 
in the articles of incorporation, was to serve no creed 
and to be intent only on truth and science. Lehrfrei- 
heit iind Lernfreiheit — the right of teachers to teach 
and students to learn whatever love of truth urged — 
now for the first time established themselves within 
academic walls in Germany and, for that matter, in 
the European world. 

What that meant it is difficult for us to appreciate 
who live in a day when Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit 
have won universal recognition; but if it is recalled 
that a hundred years ago a narrow and rancorous the- 
ology predominated everywhere, and that the natural 
sciences as well as the other studies of the modern 
curriculum enjoyed a very uncertain academic standing, 
we will begin to realize that the founding of a uni- 
versity under the solemn invocation of mental freedom 
meant the advent of a new educational era. 

The Prussia which reshaped itself along the lines 
here sketched, inevitably rose again from the dust to 
which it had been leveled at Jena. Life seems to accord 
this reward of renewal to individuals and nations who 
refuse to accept the verdict of defeat. But the renewal, 
I must repeat, did not involve a wholesale rejection 
of the Prussian tradition. On the contrary, the essen- 



82 The Making of Modern Germany 

tial elements of that tradition — the strong monarchy, 
the trained civil service, the standing army — were 
retained; only they were nationalized and brought into 
touch with the people, besides being supplemented by 
a comprehensive legislation which had the tendency 
to awaken the citizen body to a consciousness of its 
responsibilities. This Prussia, smarting with the humil- 
iations Imposed at Tilsit, was not likely to remain an 
Indifferent spectator, If ever by a turn of fortune the 
throne of Napoleon began to rock. The more difficult 
the self-restraint Imposed by political wisdom, the more 
determined would be the leap at the foe when the 
favorable moment came. 

That moment came when In 1812 Napoleon made 
the fatal mistake of trying to conquer Russia. In spite 
of apparent successes culminating in a triumphant 
entrance Into Moscow, the French campaign ended in 
as complete a disaster as that of Xerxes when he 
mustered his Asiatic host for the Invasion and conquest 
of Greece. By battles, disease, and the bitter Russian 
cold Napoleon's whole fighting force, the effective prop 
of his throne, was as good as wiped out. When the 
whispered news spread through Prussia that the French 
Caesar had been obliged to hurry across Germany In 
the dead of winter, more like a fugitive than a sover- 
eign, a movement went through the people that was 
like the rustle In the forest leaves before the coming 
of the storm. The king, true to the last to the unherolc 
mold in which nature had cast him, was for discreetly 
waiting on Napoleon's next move. There was now no 
fine-tempered Queen Louise to fix his resolution, for 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 83 

death had called away the helpmate while the political 
darkness was still unbroken. But the awakened nation, 
remembering its proud lady, was alert and inexorable. 
Responding to the throbbing heart of the people, a 
Prussian corps under General Yorck took matters 
into its own hands and, on its own initiative, practically 
declared war on France. 

Therewith the crisis was precipitated, but though 
the indignant king threatened to try Yorck for treason, 
the people unanimously applauded the general's act. 
Under a mild form of duress Frederick William was 
hurried by a patriot group from Berlin to Breslau in 
Silesia, which had become the center of the movement 
of revolt. There, barely given time to strengthen his 
cause by the conclusion of an alliance with Russia, he 
was swept into a declaration of war against Napoleon 
(March, 1813), which to refuse would have been to 
abdicate the throne. 

The struggle that followed is known in Prussian his- 
tory as the War of Liberation, for it was fought to 
free the nation from the yoke of Napoleon. It was 
no sooner under way than the effects of the new spirit 
and organization became everywhere visible and 
nowhere more conspicuously than in the army. The 
army could indeed be only very slowly equipped, owing 
to the absence of funds, but, thanks to Scharnhorst, it 
boasted a solid stock of men possessed of the rudiments 
of military training. The chief command was given to 
Bliicher, a man old in years but young in spirit and 
admirably suited to keep the enthusiasm of troops and 
nation at the boiling-point. In addition to the regu- 



84 The Making of Modern Germany 

lars, there were such crowds of volunteers that finally 
the whole arm-bearing population was gathered into 
camp. But not alone from Prussia, from all parts of 
Germany men rushed to help the cause. To mention 
only one such volunteer because of the fame he reaped 
— the Saxon, Koerner, joined a troop of roughriders, 
called Jaeger, and in a number of splendid war songs 
crystallized the exaltation of the age. The young poet 
fell in battle at the age of twenty-two, dying a death 
which the ancient Greeks would have acclaimed as 
beautiful. As final evidence of the spirit of sacrifice 
abroad let a single statistical statement suffice. Prus- 
sia, a conquered country of contracted area and less 
than five million Inhabitants, mobilized almost three 
hundred thousand soldiers, a larger number than was 
furnished for the campaign of 1813 by either Russia 
or Austria. 

In spite of the disaster of 1812, the Emperor Napo- 
leon had an abundance of fight left In him. With the 
skill for organization that was an essential feature of 
his military genius, he equipped a new army and with 
the advent of spring hurried into Germany to seek out 
the enemy. Prussians and Russians together made a 
determined effort to hold the line of the Elbe. Twice 
defeated in the month of May, they had slowly to 
fall back. But to Napoleon's own surprise the enemy 
yielded few prisoners and retired from the field in 
perfect order. " The rascals have learnt something I " 
he was heard to mutter angrily In the course of his 
futile pursuit, and troubled by the many perplexities 
of the situation, he fell In with the offer of an armistice, 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 85 

the purpose of which was to discuss possible terms of 
peace. That act was his undoing, at least such 
was his own view repeatedly expressed in after 
years. For the armistice lasted over two months, from 
June to August, with the result that Russia and Prussia 
gained a much needed respite to complete their equip- 
ment, while Austria, hitherto neutral, slowly reached 
the conviction that her hour of revenge had come and 
joined the allies. At the same time Great Britain, 
already at war with Napoleon — she had been unin- 
terruptedly at war with him since 1803 — signed an 
agreement with his other enemies. There was thus 
constituted in the summer of 18 13 a formidable Quad- 
ruple Alliance pledged to dedicate its total strength to 
the overthrow of Europe's conqueror. 

When the truce ended without the conclusion of a 
peace, the campaign of 18 13 reopened. And now be- 
hold, the scene had shifted everywhere to Napo- 
leon's disadvantage. He was outnumbered and — 
unheard-of event ! — put on the defensive. He held 
the plain of Saxony, a central position, with his usual 
skill and obstinacy, but slowly his many and ubiquitous 
enemies drove in his outposts until the hero of a hun- 
dred battles, the modern god of war, was brought to 
bay near the great city of Leipzig. There followed a 
supreme struggle, a battle lasting three days and cul- 
minating on October 18 in one of the famous routs of 
history. Napoleon himself with a small body of troops 
managed to slip through the iron ring which the allies 
were drawing about him and gained the Rhine in safety, 
but central Europe was definitely lost to him and it was 



86 The Making of Modern Germany 

very doubtful whether the resources still in hand would 
suffice to maintain his hold on France. Prussia was in- 
toxicated with joy. Not only had the nation gloriously 
redeemed itself, but the Prussian army under the ener- 
getic Bliicher, the Marschall Vorwaerts of his idolizing 
troopers, had been unquestionably the decisive factor 
in the lion hunt that closed at Leipzig. 

Irresistibly the victors poured after Napoleon until 
they reached the banks of the Rhine. There they 
paused until, slowly becoming aware that nothing was 
done as long as Napoleon himself was still at large, 
they crossed the river prepared to track him to his 
lair. His resistance in the famous winter campaign of 
1 8 13-14 was magnificent. But he was now a beaten 
man, fighting against hope and fatally outnumbered. 
When on the last day of March the allies captured 
the city of Paris, he accepted the verdict of arms, and 
on April 7, at his castle of Fontainebleau, drew up his 
abdication. Proclaimed the prisoner of Europe, he 
was sent into honorable exile to the island of Elba, off 
the coast of Tuscany. 

In the light of Napoleon's subsequent conduct the 
distinguished treatment meted out to him by the victors 
was more than he deserved. Still it may be urged in 
his defense that it was pure folly to expect so venture- 
some a spirit to be content with a play-kingdom such 
as Elba, while France, his willing prize, lay a 
few hours' journey across the blue Mediterranean. 
Abiding in Elba through the winter months, as soon 
as the spring of 18 15 stirred the smouldering fires in 
his blood, he struck suddenly and secretly for the shore 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 87 

of Provence. His former soldiers, to whom his word 
was law, once more rallied about him, and, although 
the level-headed shopkeepers and merchants grumbled 
and shook their heads, he was swept on to Paris by a 
flood of popular sentiment and triumphantly established 
on the restored imperial throne. 

The restored Napoleonic empire was not destined 
to last long. Les Cent Jours — the Hundred Days — 
the French call the brief period of Bonaparte's second 
dream of power. As soon as the news of his flight 
from Elba reached the diplomats of the Quadruple 
Alliance, they renewed their mutual pledges and, refus- 
ing to treat with their escaped prisoner in any form or 
manner, peremptorily declared him an outlaw. Then 
they let slip the dogs of war. Since with relatively 
unimpaired forces he had failed to resist the four 
powers in 1813, it was as good as certain that he 
would not prevail now. In point of fact a three days' 
campaign, conducted by only a fraction of the allies' 
forces, sufficed to crush him. 

Of course, being Napoleon, he did not go down 
without a struggle. Characteristically he himself forced 
the fighting by suddenly swooping down on Bliicher's 
Prussians. These, with a part of the British army, 
had wintered not far from the French frontier, in 
Belgium. At Ligny, on June 16, by quick maneuvering 
Napoleon gave Bliicher a sound beating. Then 
he turned against the British under Wellington, and 
two days later, on June 18, fought the battle of Water- 
loo. Everybody knows how the emperor, after the 
skies cleared at noon, recklessly sent his legions to dis- 



88 The Making of Modern Germany 

lodge the enemy, how the British for hours stubbornly 
held their ground, and how they were rewarded for 
their gallantry when, late In the afternoon, the Prus- 
sians came upon the scene. Bliicher, beaten two days 
before, had been eliminated, so Napoleon calculated 
from the situation. But to his misfortune the emperor 
underestimated the spirit of the marshal and his stead- 
fast troops. The fiery old man had pledged his word to 
Wellington to join him upon need, and on June i8, in 
spite of the heavy, rain-sodden roads, intrepidly worked 
his way toward Napoleon's right flank. 

The emperor caught, to his complete surprise, be- 
tween two fires was forced to witness the shattering 
of his army, and at nightfall made his escape from a 
carnage and rout that were worse than Leipzig. With 
his soldiers dead or captured he was deprived of his 
one sure following, and in the face of the cold aver- 
sion of the rest of France, abdicated a second time. 
Needless to say the allies did not repeat their Elban 
experiment. They sent him as far away from 
Europe as possible to the rocky mid-Atlantic island of 
St. Helena, where after a confinement, unhappily 
attended by both humiliation and physical suffering, 
he died six years after Waterloo. 

My hurried narrative can not have failed to show 
that the Prussian army figured prominently In both 
the first and second overthrow of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
With such achievements to Its credit the new Prussia 
had conclusively proved that it was not the mean affair 
which had gone down to defeat at Jena some years 
before, and that it would have to be readmitted to 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 89 

the councils of Europe. With the downfall of Napoleon 
effected, the great concern was the re-drawIng of the 
European boundaries, and naturally the victors of the 
Quadruple Alliance took it In hand as their particular 
prerogative. They discussed the question while the 
fighting was still going on, but finally agreed to adjourn 
the debate to a meeting called in the Austrian capital In 
the winter of 1 8 14-15. The famous Congress of 
Vienna created the public law with which Europe 
entered upon the nineteenth century, and of course the 
four allies, who controlled the situation, saw to it that 
their reward was duly entered on the books. 

At the Congress of Vienna, Prussia, the only country 
with which we are concerned, was restored to the terri- 
torial condition she boasted before the war of 1806. 
That does not mean that she received back the exact 
provinces held before Jena, but merely that in area and 
population she was restored to her ante-bellum power. 
To illustrate the procedure adopted: By giving 
up the territory acquired in the three partitions of 
Poland the government got in exchange certain Ger- 
man territory in Saxony and on the Rhine. The sur- 
rendered Polish provinces were snapped up by Russia 
which therewith was enabled to boast that most of the 
old kingdom of Poland was now in its power.* If, 
map in hand, you will compare the boundaries of the 
restored Prussia of 18 15 with the boundaries of 1806, 
it will immediately appear that the new Prussia was 
territorially more compact and, from the point of view 

* On the partitions of Poland and Prussians share therein see Appen- 
dix F. 



90 The Making of Modern Germany 

of race, more solidly German. In fact, except for a 
remaining belt of Poles along the eastern frontier, 
the state boasted only German citizens. 

Since Austria, after its restoration at Vienna, re- 
mained the same state of many peoples — Germans, 
Slavs, Magyars, Italians — which it had become 
through its age-long growth down the valley of the 
Danube, Prussia from now on enjoyed an indubitable 
advantage over Austria in the struggle for German 
leadership. Being German, she was, without effort 
and through no special merit, essentially harmonious 
with the whole German stock; whereas Austria, largely 
identified with non-German interests, was obliged by 
circumstances to pursue ends which were often not in 
accord with those of German nationalism and some- 
times diametrically opposed to them. 

The best illustration of the change in the relative 
importance of the two rivals with regard to the rest 
of Germany is afforded by the new Rhenish territories 
which, as I have just said, came to Prussia in exchange 
for Pohsh lands. Let us for a moment consider some 
of the implications of the solid establishment of Prussia 
on the Rhine. At first glance the advantage of the 
Rhenish acquisition was open to question, because the 
new territory was not contiguous with the bulk of the 
monarchy east of the Elbe; besides, it presented a diffi- 
cult problem of defense in the event of a renewal of 
French aggression. 

Now in building up a special Prussian territorial in- 
terest in western Germany the Congress of Vienna con- 
sciously and deliberately brought Prussia and France 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 91 

Into opposition. We must remember that the perhaps 
dominant Idea of the Viennese diplomats was so to draw 
the boundaries of Europe that defeated France would 
pause and reflect before resuming her ambitious assaults 
on central Europe. Their thought ran much as fol- 
lows: Eighteenth-century Prussia, provided with neg- 
ligible Interests on the Rhine, had proved a weak dam, 
In fact no dam at all, against the French floods; en- 
dowed at Vienna with a solid block of territory on both 
banks of the river, would she not prove a better bulwark 
In the future? Acting on this hope, the Congress, not 
without a certain malice, loaded a dangerous responsi- 
bility on Prussian shoulders. The Berlin government, 
it is interesting to note, took over the Rhine lands with 
reluctance, but having once accepted them, Prussia be- 
came automatically the protector of Germany against 
its Gallic neighbor, and, for better and for worse, as- 
sumed the honorable task of watch and ward on the 
most national of German streams, the Rhine. 

But that same protecting role Austria had exercised 
in the past centuries by reason of her ownership of the 
Brelsgau, on the upper Rhine opposite Alsace, and of 
the Austrian Netherlands, familiar to us under the name 
of Belgium. And now what happened? In 1815 the 
House of Hapsburg, prompted by the desire to with- 
draw from contact with France and to concentrate its 
attention nearer home, surrendered all these western 
outposts in return for a foothold in Italy. It was not 
an unreasonable move in itself, but it snapped most of 
the remaining bonds between Austria and Germany. 
Thus at the Congress of Vienna, with Austria's own 



92 The Making of Modem Germany 

consent, Prussia was put in the way of proving by serv- 
ice to the nation that the leadership of Germany be- 
longed henceforth of right to her. 

The Prussian monarchy of 1815, we may note again 
in a final attempt to measure the transformation of 
the Napoleonic period, was equal to the new oppor- 
tunities that came with the new time. I have 
repeatedly warned against the extravagant view that 
reconstructed Prussia deserted her traditional founda- 
tions. The strong monarchy kept control, and with 
it much of the patriarchal theory which I attempted to 
define in a previous lecture continued to obtain. None 
the less, a transformation of weight and moment was 
effected, inasmuch as Stein and Scharnhorst released 
the slumbering forces of the nation and wed the people 
to the state. Henceforth the view, dangerously prev- 
alent before Jena, that the state was an end in itself 
and therefore justified in setting tasks to its subjects 
with lordly unconcern for their counsels and wishes, 
lost all but a few hidebound supporters. 

In the new century individual Prussians, practicing 
local self-government, serving shoulder to shoulder in 
the army, made confident by a body of fundamental 
civil rights, were sure to assert themselves as they never 
had before. " Every citizen is in duty bound to defend 
his fatherland," ran the opening sentence of the famous 
conscription law of 18 14, crowning Scharnhorst's re- 
construction of the army. That sentence and the com- 
pulsory military service which it imposed put a solemn 
responsibility on every citizen, high and low, that showed 
itself in an increased dignity of bearing. It showed 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 93 

itself no less in an ethical enthusiasm voiced by scores 
of contemporaries — administrators, poets, and teach- 
ers — but most impressively sounded by such philos- 
ophers as Kant, the Prussian by birth, and Fichte, the 
Prussian by adoption. 

Most probably Kant and Fichte, in urging their 
views of the duty of the citizen, imagined they were 
stating a general position valid for any place and for 
all time; but as a matter of fact, limited, like the rest 
of us, by their personal experience, they merely postu- 
lated the moral conditions which, by saving Prussia, 
the country of their attachment, from its besetting 
perils, appeared to them to guarantee its permanence. 
Kant and Fichte taught the stirring doctrine of the 
individual will which, free in itself, discovers its true 
end in voluntary subjection to the state. Voluntary 
subjection was the gist of the matter, since it was only 
by the free offer of his hand and brain that the indi- 
vidual affirmed his moral integrity. In Kant the doc- 
trine took the form of the socalled categorical impera- 
tive, the " thou must " of the still, small voice ; in Fichte 
it assumed the character of a romantic patriotism. In 
any case, with an appeal mixed of reason and emo- 
tion, the great ethical masters of the age inculcated 
the solemn assumption by the citizen of a duty to the 
state and thus stamped or helped stamp an austerity 
on the Prussian spirit which has brought to the mind 
of many an observer the " dourness " of the Scots 
under the regime of Presbyterianism. Indeed it is far 
from fantastic to suggest that, on its ethical side, Kan- 
tianism was a sort of revived Calvinism. 



94 The Making of Modern Germany 

Summarizing this attempt to characterize the revived 
Prussian state, I would linger on the moral unity and 
force which the Kantian ideal gave. True, the spread 
of that ideal was not so much due to Kant, an abstruse 
and relatively unknown pedagogue of Konigsberg, as 
to the long working of historical causes which Kant 
formulated in terms of a personal and social ethics. 
For me at least, when I try to account for the 
Spartan rigor of the Prussian state coupled with the 
voluntary and passionate devotion to it of its subjects, 
I find*myself going over in my mind the peculiar experi- 
ence of the Prussian people, more particularly the dan- 
gers attending the birth of Prussia during the agony 
of the Thirty Years' War, and the crushing catastrophe 
precipitated by the genius of Napoleon Bonaparte. 

If it did not lead me too far afield, it would be inter- 
esting, in conclusion, to compare this Prussian state of 
1 8 15, in development and essence, with that contem- 
porary European state to which it presented the sharp- 
est contrast — England. As even a hurried comparison 
sheds a measure of light, I beg leave to call attention 
to a few outstanding facts of the English situation. 

The England of the early nineteenth century pos- 
sessed a parliamentary form of government, which 
means that the political control had passed into the 
hands of certain social groups represented in parlia- 
ment. These were the land-holding aristocracy and 
the well-to-do middle class made up of the merchants 
and bankers. 

These groups, after a long struggle, had won a 
victory over the king and had reduced him to impotence. 



Prussia's Overthrow and Reconstruction 95 

The act that registered their final triumph was passed 
In 1689 and is known as the Bill of Rights. Enamored 
of free action In a world that was just being opened 
by colonial enterprise, the victors (whom, for short, I 
shall call the upper classes), proclaimed their own 
political and economic liberty, and eagerly accumulated 
guarantees against the possibility of being Interfered 
with by the central executive. A weak, relatively Inac- 
tive state controlled by the upper classes; freedom, 
glorious freedom, for the individual members of the 
ruling orders to shape their destiny as they pleased; 
and more or less passive masses excluded from every 
voice in the government, but thrown sufficient abun- 
dance of crumbs from the crowded table of their 
"betters" to preserve their attachment to the system — 
such were the essential features of the English social 
and political regime of 18 15. 

Being what It was, the regime impressed on Great 
Britain an overwhelming individualist tendency, just 
as the concentrated system of Prussia, with Its all- 
powerful state, created a political unity, which, in spite 
of inherited feudal distinctions of caste, is suggestive 
of collectivism. In the course of the nineteenth century, 
in spite of new conditions and certain important modi- 
fications Imposed thereby on both systems, the histor- 
ically established tendencies of individualism and 
collectivism continued to prevail in Great Britain and 
Prussia respectively, causing them to develop as con- 
sistent examples of two diametrically opposed social 
ideals. 



IV 

Progress and Reaction: from the 

Congress of Vienna to the 

Revolution of 1848 



JFourtj) Lecture 

PROGRESS AND REACTION : FROM THE CONGRESS OF 
VIENNA TO THE REVOLUTION OF I 848 

AT the close of the Napoleonic period, the position 
of Prussia in the European world was determined 
by two events which I beg to be permitted to bring 
once more to your attention. The first was the social 
transformation wrought by Stein and the other patriot 
statesmen, and the second was the improved position 
of the country as a German power effected by the Con- 
gress of Vienna. Prussia's immediate future was there- 
fore definitely staked out for her: it would Involve an 
inner problem of continued reorganization, and an 
outer problem of her relationship to Germany. These 
two matters, which, owing to their constant interaction, 
It will not be possible or even desirable to keep steadily 
apart, will form the substance of our inquiry in this 
our fourth meeting. 

By way of introduction we must supply an omission 
in our development hitherto and bring the general 
German situation up to the point to which it had been 
carried by virtue of the great upheaval called the 
French Revolution. That the Revolution and Napoleon 
gravely affected the fortunes of Prussia we are now 
amply aware, but we have not paused to note what 
stir they made in the rest of Germany, and specifically, 

[99] 



100 The Making of Modern Germany 

what changes they produced In the form of union still 
legally maintained under the name of the Holy Roman 
Empire. We saw that the Holy Roman Empire was 
indeed left in existence at the end of the Thirty Years' 
War, but that Its functions were so reduced that the 
effective sovereignty passed from it to the component 
states. These were some three hundred in number, 
of which Austria and Prussia, as the largest, presently 
stepped to the front. The nameless but overwhelming 
majority were of course microscopic affairs, which tried 
to conceal their impotence behind a noisy insistence on 
their rights. 

Since the Holy Roman Empire was a political 
mummy conserved by peculiar circumstances, It was sure 
to crumble to dust at the first rude breath from the real 
world. This fact was so generally understood that 
eighteenth century humor poured a steady stream of by 
no means gentle ridicule over the sorry remains of a 
former splendor. Voltaire mockingly defined the Holy 
Roman Empire as a state that, In derision of its name, 
was neither an empire nor holy nor Roman ; and Goethe 
has one of the students in the drinklng-scene in Faust 
brawl out a song of scorn beginning : 

Das Hebe HelHge Romlsche Reich, 
Wie halt's nur rioch zusammen? 

No national sanitary commission insisting on re- 
moval, the Empire did somehow halt zusammen till 
a Day of Judgment dawned with the French Revolu- 
tion. Then, in the presence of this touchstone of reality, 
the dissolution proceeded so rapidly and spontaneously 



Progress and Reaction 101 

that by the time Napoleon Bonaparte arrived on the 
scene an imperial nod sufficed to hurry It into an 
unnoticed grave. The event occurred in 1806. By 
that year Napoleon in his conquering course had 
reached the point at which he was resolved to lay hand 
on central Europe. Examining with the direct, un- 
clouded gaze of the born soldier the confused situation 
In Germany, he became filled with an impatient desire 
to end the hundreds of infinitesimal sovereignties of 
medieval origin which had managed to perpetuate their 
useless existence. In execution of his design he threw 
scores of them together, handed other scores to larger 
neighbors and, before he was done, had by his ruthless 
proceeding, intolerant of legal artifice, simplified and 
modernized the map of Germany. What was left of 
the reshaped country he reorganized under the name 
of the Confederation of the Rhine and ruled with the 
title of Protector. 

When on Napoleon's disappearance the Congress 
of Vienna, in pursuit of its policy of reconstruction, 
drew up a list of the German states which It was pre- 
pared to acknowledge, the number was found to run 
to thirty-eight. Compare this figure with the three hun- 
dred and more of a decade earlier and you arrive at a 
picture of Napoleon In the role of Hercules intent on 
cleaning up the political stables of Germany. Many 
a Frenchman, unable to work up any enthusiasm for 
Napoleon's diminution of the German chaos, has iron- 
ically suggested that the grateful fatherland raise statues 
to the Corsican alongside of Luther and Bismarck. And 
the Germans, not unmindful of Napoleon's work, might 



102 The Making of Modern Germany 

have heeded the advice, if the reflection had not inter- 
posed that, invaluable as the emperor's destructive 
policy was, he had carried it through for his own am- 
bitious ends and not with the least idea of doing any- 
thing for the German nation. 

Putting discussion aside, it is indisputable that Napo- 
leon interred the ancient German empire, bade with a 
haughty gesture some hundreds of socalled potentates 
no longer to burden the earth with their pretensions, 
and brought the diplomats at Vienna face to face with 
a Germany immensely simplified, it is true, but still 
boasting the by no means inconsiderable number of 
thirty-eight sovereign states. 

One of the most engrossing issues which came up for 
consideration in the Congress of Vienna was the ques- 
tion what form of union, if any, was to be given, the 
thirty-eight states which had survived the floods and 
tempests. Nobody in even that conservative assembly 
suggested a return to the Holy Roman Empire. If it 
could by any conceivable hocus-pocus have been raised 
from the dead, we may rest assured that reactionaries 
like Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, would 
have made the attempt. 

But what was to be put in its place? A new patri- 
otism had come to life in Germany during the Napo- 
leonic conquest, and in the era of the Wars of Liberation 
it had blazed up grandly for a moment. Its upholders 
loudly declared that the victory won must be utilized 
in such a way as to secure Germany against a repetition 
of the recent French conquest and that the only method 
to effect that end was by a close, authoritative federa- 



Progress and Reaction 103 

tion. But, after all, these patriots were a scattered 
group and if a census had been taken would have been 
found to include hardly more than the membership of 
the intellectual classes. Since these individuals pub- 
lished books, held university chairs, and wrote for the 
newspapers, they could make themselves heard through 
the land, but it remained to be proved whether or no 
they had a following among the people and could effect 
political results. Opposed to them were, on the one 
hand, backward, inexperienced masses attached to their 
local governments and as yet unfamiliar with the idea 
of a united Germany; and, on the other hand, the sover- 
eign princes who, jealous of their inherited rights, had 
no desire to see their power curtailed in the interest of 
a federal executive. 

Finally, of momentous importance in every debate 
over the reorganization of Germany, was the ancient 
rivalry between Austria and Prussia, which, as soon as 
the common enemy was overthrown, blazed up afresh. 
If Germany was to become one, it would have to be 
united, as matters stood, under a monarchical form of 
government, and that meant that the German imperial 
crown would have to be tendered to either the Austrian 
or the Prussian sovereign, to either a Hapsburg or a 
Hohenzollern. But neither was willing that the other 
should be so distinguished, and until a solution of this 
difficulty was found the German situation was abso- 
lutely deadlocked. Thus the sincere efforts made by 
the patriots at Vienna, even though Stein with his 
immense national prestige stood behind them, led to 
nothing, and it was clear to all men endowed with 



104 The Making of Modern Germany 

political insight that the Austro-Prussian rivalry would 
have to be disposed of before German unification could 
advance an inch. 

Under the circumstances, the Congress of Vienna 
need not be criticised and excoriated, as has been often 
the case, for contenting itself with a subterfuge. After 
all, it was not within the power of the diplomats to 
terminate the jealousy of Austria and Prussia, nor was 
it their function to fan the low fire of German patriotispi 
to a vaulting blaze. As diplomats have always done, 
the excellencies gathered at Vienna took matters as they 
found them, and brought the German states into a 
union, the main characteristic of which was that the sov- 
ereignty of the component members was left untouched. 
The German Federation — der deutsche Bund — as 
the union was called, created neither an executive head 
nor a central administration; it did not levy taxes or 
provide an army and navy; in a word, it was a union 
existing only on paper and not a whit less impotent 
than the defunct and unlamented Holy Roman Empire. 
Its role in the subsequent years was so shadowy and neg- 
ligible, that in a brief account like this we may leave the 
Bund entirely out of account after registering the fact 
that at the Congress of Vienna it was considered the 
only form of union of which Germany was capable. 

As soon as the German patriots, aglow with expec- 
tation, examined what the diplomats had hatched, they 
were overcome with disappointment. They scoffed at 
the mock-union foisted on their land, and declared in 
unequivocal terms that they would not rest until the 
flimsy fabrication had been blown away and a solid and 



Progress and Reaction 105 

permanent edifice set in Its place. But how that result 
was to be achieved In view of the Austro-Prusslan and 
a heap of other difficulties, no patriot was able to say. 

With German unification In a state of suspended 
animation, our Interest swings to the second problem 
with which Prussia embarked on her post-Napoleonic 
career, the problem of her continued Inner upbuilding. 
I need not here rehearse the story of the Stein reforms 
further than to note that they had stood the test of 
fire In the great uprising of 1 8 1 3. But one point remains 
to be added to. the tale. Stein himself, profound 
believer In the awakened energies of the people, desired 
to crown his labors by Introducing a constitutional sys- 
tem of government. He was dismissed too soon to 
realize his Idea, but In the year 1815, when he had been 
for some time out of ofl^ice. It looked as if his plan 
were to be given a belated trial. 

In May of that year, only a few weeks before Water- 
loo, King Frederick William allowed himself to be per- 
suaded to spur the martial ardor of his subjects to the 
utmost by promising them a departure from the tradi- 
tional absolutism. " A representation of the people 
shall be established in Prussia," the joyful message ran, 
which. In view of the monarch's rooted distrust of 
change, must have been reluctantly wrung from him by 
the pressure of events. Loud and extravagant was the 
rejoicing of the Liberals, whose unbridled Imagination 
saw Prussia endowed by royal command with a consti- 
tution and a parliamentary form of government. 

But the Liberals, who had fed freely on the political 
literature of England and France and looked upon a 



106 The Making of Modern Germany 

Prussian evolution along English and French lines as 
the great desideratum, had a disappointment in store 
for them. To begin with, what the king had In mind 
with his vaguely phrased promise was something im- 
measurably less than their fond imaginings. Though 
a man without the faintest aura of geniality, Frederick 
William III had the not unimportant gift of common 
sense, and did not for a single moment plan to supply 
Prussia with a constitutional suit made according to 
the measure of his western neighbors. But even that 
modest degree of popular cooperation which he may 
have planned when he issued his statement was denied 
in the end. For this he laid himself open to just and 
bitter censure but the fault was not exclusively his. 

We must remember that every man is more or less 
the plaything of circumstance, and that Frederick Wil- 
liam, a very mediocre person, was not likely to resist 
the compelling forces of his age and Immediate environ- 
ment. Now the overwhelming fact Is that, after Water- 
loo had been fought and Napoleon had been chained, 
like another Prometheus, to his Atlantic rock, an irre- 
sistible reaction came over tired Europe. People had 
had enough of experiment and change and wanted 
chiefly to be let alone. The past, lying beyond the 
French Revolution, became to their warped vision " the 
good old days," and the enlightened autocracy of the 
eighteenth century the best form of government attain- 
able by erring man. 

The pleased monarchs were not slow to support the 
movement in their favor, and, together with them, the 
old ruling classes, the nobility and the clergy, were 



Progress and Reaction 107 

floated back into leadership on the favoring tide of 
opinion. The result was a general reign of conserv- 
atism, the fine fleur of which showed its ungracious head 
in the famous Holy Alliance. This was a combination 
of the victors over Napoleon sworn to maintain the 
governments and boundaries imposed by the Congress 
of Vienna. It was originally made up of all the victors 
— even the France of the restored Bourbons being ad- 
mitted into the partnership — but finally, on becoming 
uncompromising and quixotic in its devotion to the prin- 
ciple of political immobility, the Holy Alliance retained 
the reliable support of only the three eastern powers, 
Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 

These brief references to the dominant currents of 
European opinion after 1815 will help explain the fate 
of Frederick William's promise of a popular represen- 
tation. In his court, among the nobility, even among 
many enlightened representatives of the middle class 
he met a blank disapproval of every form of experi- 
mentation suggesting kinship with the French Revolu- 
tion, and in the face of an opinion which chimed most 
happily with his own intimate thoughts, he adjourned 
action from day to day and year to year. Only when it 
was impossible to delay longer, he honored, as it were, 
his own draft, and in 1823 established provincial 
assemblies throughout the monarchy organized along 
feudal lines and endowed with only consultative powers. 

Mountains had been in labor, the ridiculous mouse 
was born, was the comment of the disheartened Lib- 
erals; and as a matter of fact the provincial assemblies 
could not even by the dialectical skill of the hirehngs 



108 The Making of Modern Germany 

of the court be palmed off as a redemption of the royal 
promise and a genuine modern representation of the 
people. The decree of 1823 indicated that a political 
reaction was triumphant in Prussia, that a modification 
of the absolute regime was for the moment out of the 
question, and that the disappointed Liberals would 
have to content themselves with waiting for a better 
day. 

But, in spite of reaction, Prussia did not drop into 
a general standstill in the period which we are consider- 
ing. The very opposite is more nearly the truth. After 
all, the monarchy, if autocratic, was the heir of an 
enlightened tradition, and the democratic impulse com- 
municated by the era of Stein was far from spent. 
Therefore the labors of reform continued and in more 
than one respect the achievements of the reactionary 
period after 1815 do not yield in importance to the 
more famous and spectacular enactments of 1807. 

Let us consider these achievements, beginning with 
the realm of education. By a series of laws the Prus- 
sian schools were coordinated into a comprehensive 
national system. This was done by means of improved 
provisions for high-schools (gymnasia) and the exten- 
sion of the Lehrfreiheit und Lernfreiheit of the new 
university of Berlin to the older universities of the land ; 
but, above all, the existing primary schools (Folks- 
schiilen) were multiplied until they became general and 
attendance at them was made obligatory. In Prussia, 
first among European states, the rudiments of learning 
were carried, at public expense and by the coercion of 
law, to every boy and girl In the realm, with the result 



Progress and Reaction 109 

that by the middle of the century illiteracy had almost 
disappeared, and Prussia, in the matter of the educa- 
tion of its people, rose head and shoulders above all 
its neighbors. 

It is a curious circumstance that England and France, 
in political matters so much more democratic than Prus- 
sia, should in education, assuredly a democratic con- 
cern, have limped so far behind her that half a century 
passed before they even made an effort to do anything 
on approximately the same universal scale. Even today 
the Prussian literacy record is a just source of pride to 
ruler and people, and gives the state a kind of moral 
primacy over its rivals. 

No less conducive to the welfare of the people was 
the new economic policy. Prussia had taken over from 
the eighteenth century and from Frederick the Great 
an antiquated economic system involving an officious 
interference of the state authorities in every phase of 
production and exchange. I described it in an earlier 
lecture as an integral part of the prevailing patriarchal 
concept. By virtue of it, the government did not scru- 
ple arbitrarily to block off province from province and 
town from town. To illustrate this closing of the ave- 
nues of trade, let me mention that there were in force, 
within the Prussian boundaries of 1815, no less than 
sixty-seven separate tariff systems ! How with such 
hindrances was a smooth and profitable exchange of 
goods to be effected between even nearby markets? The 
arbitrary policy was by no means exclusively Prussian, 
for all the continental states followed a similar system. 
But recently freer ideas of trade had begun to spread. 



110 The Making of Modern Germany 

They emanated largely from Great Britain, where 
Adam Smith and other students of the new science of 
Political Economy thundered against the system of 
capricious restrictions. 

The new ideas, based on scientific considerations, had 
greatly influenced the reformer. Stein, and since Stein's 
day had made further headway by converting many of 
the high oflicials of the Prussian state. In 1818 the 
favorers of economic reform celebrated a great victory. 
They persuaded the king to end at a stroke of the pen 
the old confusion and to declare Prussia a single eco- 
nomic area where trade could move to and fro in entire 
freedom. 

So much gained, these wide-awake administrators 
applied themselves to the still more ambitious task of 
creating a tariff union, or Zollverein, with the other 
German states. The boundaries of the thirty-eight 
sovereign territories were so much an affair of hap- 
hazard that they crisscrossed at innumerable points, 
making the collection of customs dues an absurdly 
expensive business, besides paralyzing all trade that 
involved any considerable journey. 

The Prussian government took up the idea, indicative 
of a large and modern outlook, of leveling these arti- 
ficial barriers and converting Germany into a single 
trading territory. It began by offering admission into 
its own system to its most immediate neighbors. The 
terms were fair: participation in the total tariff revenue 
in proportion to population. It is amusing to look back 
and note the wild upflare of indignation against this 
socalled aggressive proposal. There was nothing dearer 



Progress and Reaction 111 

to each princeling than his traditional sovereignty, and 
how, he asked plaintively, could this apple of his eye 
be preserved if he made over his economic policy to 
other hands? Still, the financial advantages redound- 
ing from the Prussian plan were so overwhelming that 
one state after another grumblingly gave way. By 1 842 
the great amalgamation had been substantially carried 
through. 

The rival power, Austria, was not invited to join the 
Zollverein, but intrigue as she might, she could not put 
a stop to a movement which brought untold advantages 
to all concerned. From now on Germany, from the 
Alps to the North sea, constituted a free market for all 
Germans. Trade responded quickly to the opportunity 
of profit, and capital felt encouraged to build factories 
and introduce the new methods of machine production. 
As the Prussian tariff schedule fixed a low scale of 
duties, not only domestic but also foreign trade was 
stimulated and caused German merchants, so long con- 
fined to a parochial outlook, to raise their eyes to for- 
eign parts and gradually to reacquire the lost Hanseatic 
spirit of enterprise. 

But while the economic advantages of the union were 
immediate and tangible, certain moral and political 
after-effects were not slow to appear. On the one 
hand, the Zollverein preached daily the patriotic les- 
son of strength from union, and, on the other, it gave 
evidence to every thinking man that the logical head 
of Germany was not Austria but Prussia, the state with 
a progressive policy, the power that did things. 

Under these circumstances the German national con- 



112 The Making of Modern Germany 

sciousness gradually developed an energy which, In the 
long run, would have to be reckoned with. We have 
seen that In 1815 the handful of eager patriots who 
nursed the hope of German unification found them- 
selves balked In their plans largely through a lack of 
support from public opinion. The fact was, Germany 
had been so long politically impotent, and had fallen 
so far behind in the race of life, that a painstaking 
apprenticeship was required to enable her to compete 
with her neighbors on a basis of equality. Everything 
considered, the useless Bund concocted at Vienna was 
as good a union as the Germany of 1 8 1 5 deserved. The 
country was not ripe for a closer federation and would 
not be ripe until a change had been operated In the con- 
sciousness of the average German, a change as the 
result of which he would feel a waxing pride in his 
nation and make a clamorous outcry for political 
reform. 

That the oppression of Napoleon had done some- 
thing toward arousing the Germans to opposition and 
therewith to a national consciousness we are aware. It 
now behooves us to consider what the German intel- 
lectual classes of the period both before and after Napo- 
leon contributed to the same end. Though primarily 
concerned with the advance of civilization, their work 
was bound to have an Indirect political bearing. 

In speaking. In an earlier lecture, of Frederick the 
Great, I took occasion to note the eighteenth-century 
revival In Germany of literature, music, and philosophy. 
Poets like Goethe and Schiller, composers like Bach 
and Handel, critics and philosophers like Lessing and 



Progress and Reaction 113 

Kant, are names of which any nation may be proud and 
show that the dismal mental stagnation caused by the 
Thirty Years' War was yielding to a new bloom of the 
spirit. And the development thus auspiciously begun 
went on. Madame de Stael, the famous contemporary 
and antagonist of Napoleon, In spite of a passionate 
devotion to her French homeland, conceded to the 
Intellectual life of the Germany of her day the palm 
over that of every other country of Europe and pro- 
claimed her conviction In her book, De V Allemagne 
(1810), widely, though perhaps Incredulously, read by 
her astonished countrymen. 

Presently the natural sciences, somewhat neglected 
at first owing to the dominant metaphysical tendency, 
gained an honored standing In the universities. Physics, 
chemistry, botany, and the other branches were eagerly 
seized upon by fresh minds, and that good results were 
not wanting Is sufficiently shown by such names as Alex- 
ander von Humboldt, the traveler, and Justus Llebig, 
the chemist. At the same time a new generation of 
writers and musicians seized the torch from their prede- 
cessors, and poets like Heine and Elchendorff, com- 
posers like Beethoven and Schubert, philosophers like 
Hegel and Schopenhauer, historians like NIebuhr and 
Ranke indicated plainly that the nineteenth century 
would not prove an era of decline. Even Insular Great 
Britain now awakened to the vitality of the German 
message, and Thomas Carlyle, owing much of his Inspi- 
ration to Teutonic influences, by masterly translations 
and essays undertook to familiarize his countrymen 
with the varied products of the German workshop. 



114 The Making of Modern Germany 

Thus the brilliant work of a host of composers, 
authors, scientists, and scholars did much to counteract 
the disgrace of Germany's political Impotence, and 
caused a justifiable pride in the German name to be- 
come more and more general through the country. 
Why, with its intellectual and artistic contribution on 
a level with that of any other nation, should Germany 
remain politically an object of derision? Increasing 
numbers of Germans began Imperatively to demand an 
effective union, and toward the middle of the century 
the patriotic sentiment had become so powerful that 
some sort of action, perhaps a revolution, might be 
expected at any moment. 

However, as long as Frederick William ill reigned 
in Prussia there were grave obstacles to change, because 
an old, dyed-in-the-wool conservative like the king could 
not be weaned from his convictions. But, In 1840, 
Frederick William ended his days and was succeeded by 
his son, Frederick William iv. The new king was a 
fluid and rhetorical personality, the very opposite of his 
taciturn, almost petrified father. Undoubtedly cultured 
and gifted, he enjoyed the friendship of many of the 
intellectual leaders of the day, but In the field of politics 
he was as much devoted to tradition as his father, and 
as little inclined to change as Metternich himself. He 
shared the enthusiasm for the Middle Ages so common 
In his time, believed the modern materialist and demo- 
cratic tendencies to be contrary to the Christian reli- 
gion, and on the whole fully justified the title of the 
Romanticist upon the Throne which the disappointment 
and contempt of the age fastened upon him. 



Progress and Reaction 115 

By the time of Frederick William iv's accession pub- 
lic opinion had definitely crystallized in the double de- 
mand of a constitution for Prussia and union for 
Germany. When the new king showed no Inclination 
to further these ends, signs of anger rapidly multiplied. 
In order to placate the opposition, in the year 1847 he 
called together at Berlin delegates from the provincial 
assemblies established by his father a generation before. 
This United Diet (V ere'inigte Landtag) must always 
remain memorable as the first body Prussia ever had 
suggestive of a national representative assembly. The 
king Intended it to exercise only consultative powers, 
but after the fashion of assemblies that feel the quick- 
ening breath of public opinion. It immediately attempted 
to extend Its prerogative, quarreled with the sovereign, 
and was dismissed after some weeks with every sign 
of the royal disapproval. 

A few months later the storm burst. A revolution' 
in Paris, which broke out In February, 1848, and ended 
in the overthrow of the unpopular Bourbon monarchy, 
encouraged the people of the continent generally to 
rise against their repressive governments. Even Vienna, 
the long acknowledged mouthpiece of conservative 
Europe, raised the cry for a new system and proved Its 
change of heart by driving that almost sacred symbol 
of the Holy Alliance, Prince Metternlch, from office. 
Thereupon Berlin, not to be outdone, on March 18 
followed the Viennese example. After a bloody clash 
had taken place between citizens and soldiers, the vacil- 
lating and romantic Frederick William, horrified by the 
prospect of a civil war, resolved to come to terms with 



116 The Making of Modern Germany 

the Insurgents without more ado. By solemn proclama- 
tion he pledged himself to the two demands of the hour, 
a constitution for Prussia and union for Germany. 
Thus as the result of a single sharp crisis and with a 
minimum of bloodshed, the unpopular conservative 
regime seemed to have been brought to an Ignominious 
end. 

^ Meanwhile the patriotic enthusiasm released through- 
out Germany had led to the calling of a national assem- 
bly which was to take up the question of German 
unity. Since the kings and princes had In half a hun- 
dred years made no headway with that Issue, let the 
people try was the general sentiment, and on the 
strength of It an election was held, based on manhood 
suffrage, which In May, 1848, brought together the 
best men of the nation at Frankfort-on-the-Maln. 

If scholarly equipment and earnestness of purpose 
could ever of themselves achieve political results, the 
Frankfort parliament would have acquitted Itself with 
credit. But German unity was much less dependent on 
theory than on conditions; In fact the conditions pre- 
sented so tough and complicated a problem that the 
delegates at Frankfort had hardly taken up their con- 
stitutional debates when they found themselves entan- 
gled in an inextricable net. 

Among the many grievous features of the general 
German situation the worst without doubt was the 
Austro-Prusslan rivalry. On what basis of obligations 
and honors were the two states to be yoked together, 
or, in case yoking was Impractical, to which should be 
conceded the political leadership? Those In favor of 



Progress and Reaction 117 

Prussia were for excluding Austria altogether; they 
pointed to the racially mixed character of the Hapsburg 
monarchy, and because of their rejection of a historic 
member of the German family were derisively called 
Little Germans (Kleindeutsche), All in favor of creat- 
ing a Germany enfolding all Germans whatsoever, and 
therefore also the Austrlans, took the name of Great 
Germans (Grossdeutsche). 

It serves to prove how recent developments, consti- 
tuting, as we may say, the logic of history, had been 
pushing Prussia to the front, that the long and fierce 
debate at Frankfort ended in the complete victory of 
the Little Germans. The circumstances that produced 
this result I cannot stop to examine. Suffice it that Aus- 
tria was formally excluded from the new German state 
and the headship thereof entrusted to the Prussian king, 
who was invited to adopt the title of emperor. It was 
a moment charged with electricity when In April, 1849, 
a delegation from Frankfort presented itself to Fred- 
erick William in his palace at Berlin to ofFer him the 
hereditary German crown. 

With the whole nation fastening its gaze on the 
Impressive scene, the king declined the honor. It was 
an act of rare pusillanimity and yet not without a cer- 
tain measure of excuse. The crown was offered by the 
people of Germany and therefore enjoyed, in the light 
of current democratic Ideas, the very highest sanction; 
but for Frederick William, an old-fashioned believer 
in divine right, the only sanction at all conclusive would 
have to proceed from the consenting vote of the sov- 
ereign German princes. To this clash of principle was 



118 The Making of Modern Germany 

added a substantial Issue of fact. Since his fellow-rulers 
had not been consulted In the matter of the German 
crown, Frederick William had as good as no guarantee 
of their loyalty and good-will. Some of them Indeed In 
their frenzied desire to retain an undiminished preroga- 
tive had not scrupled to enter into a secret league with 
Austria; and Austria, encouraged by this support to 
offer resistance to Its elimination from Germany, sum- 
marily forbade the Prussian king to accept the German 
crown. A diplomatic note, couched In no uncertain 
terms, threatened war, In case he took the Frankfort 
offer seriously. 

Doubtless a bold man might have faced these various 
risks, summoned the people with drum and trumpet, 
and won eternal honor. But Frederick William was 
not such a man, and since his timid nature quailed be- 
fore the threatened struggle, in which, moreover, as 
we have seen, he would be pushed into the distasteful 
position of defending a democratic crown, he told the 
Frankfort delegates to take their dubious gift whence 
they had brought It. Therewith the whole tragl-comedy 
came to an abrupt end. The German parliament, " a 
company of damned professors," had decreed political 
unity but It lacked the means to enforce Its own deci- 
sion. With heavy hearts the representatives turned 
homeward. German unification, the dream of the poets 
and philosophers, seemed incapable of realization. 

But what of the other hope which found utterance 
in the March revolution, the hope of putting an end 
to Prussian absolutism? Contemporaneously with the 
national parliament at Frankfort, a local parliament 



Progress and Reaction 119 

(Landtag), sitting at Berlin, labored with the narrower 
task of giving Prussia a constitution. The assembly 
turned out to be Inspired with very radical sentiments 
and proceeded to concoct an instrument which was very 
little to Frederick William's liking. He waited for the 
turning of the revolutionary tide, and when he thought 
the political excitement had abated, in December, 1848, 
adjourned the assembly sine die. 

Some Impetuous radicals now issued a call for an 
Insurrection, but the people, weary of the everlasting 
political turmoil, showed no desire to repeat the tri- 
umphs of the month of March. Almost to his own 
surprise the king found himself once more In command 
of the situation, and with the thought of redeeming his 
promise Issued a constitution to his people. In order 
to show a spirit of conciliation he took over many of 
its paragraphs from the constitution drafted by the 
recent Prussian Landtag; but all ultra-democratic fea- 
tures were carefully eliminated and the whole tone of 
the document became frankly monarchical. 

In the year 1850 this constitution, after being sub- 
jected to revision by a popular assembly, was put In 
force, and since it has been uninterruptedly operative 
in Prussia from 1850 down to our own day, a brief 
examination of It becomes imperative. First to observe, 
the king's position was carefully secured, for the civil 
and military administration of the realm was left in 
his hands; besides, the various departments of state 
were confided to ministers appointed and dismissed by 
him. As to the Prussian people, they were represented 
in the new system by a parliament of two houses. 



120 The Making of Modem Germany 

The upper house, or house of lords, was made up of 
two groups : hereditary members, and members ap- 
pointed for life by the king on the nomination of the 
larger landowners, of the universities, and of the cities. 
Thus composed it was sure to have a very conservative 
character. The lower house, or chamber of deputies, 
was elected by the people. The two houses had the 
usual rights of modern legislatures; that is, they criti- 
cised the administration, they voted the taxes, they 
drew up the annual budget, and they gave their con- 
sent to all new laws. The right of dismissing the min- 
isters the legislators did not have, for the ministers 
were both in theory and in practice the agents of the 
monarch. All points considered, this constitution con- 
ceded important rights to the Prussian people, but it 
certainly also followed the line of Prussian tradition 
by securing to the king a large measure of authority 
and the genuine headship of the state. 

The feature of the Prussian constitution which in- 
vited, and to' this day invites, the severest strictures of 
radical critics was the franchise with its so-called three- 
class system. The franchise provisions were the result 
of a desire to appear to grant universal suffrage while 
definitely favoring the propertied elements. The whole 
body of voters was divided into three classes on the 
basis of the tax-lists. The first class was composed of 
the largest taxpayers who together paid one-third of 
the direct taxes, the second class of next largest taxpay- 
ers who paid another third, and the third class of all 
the rest. 

In the first class were the richest citizens, compara- 



Progress and Reaction 121 

tively speaking hardly more than a handful ; in the sec- 
ond class, which was more numerous, were enrolled the 
men of medium Income; and In the third class were 
aggregated the multitudinous poor. When an election 
to the Prussian chamber of deputies took place the 
following procedure was observed: i. In a given par- 
liamentary district the three classes of voters met sep- 
arately In their respective polling-places, where each 
class elected the same number of delegates to a general 
assembly; 2, the delegates of the three classes came 
together in a general assembly and elected the deputy 
by majority vote. It is plain that in the meeting of the 
delegates the propertied elements were as two to one 
and that the successful candidate was likely to be a man 
both conservative and well-to-do. In consequence, the 
Prussian chamber of deputies, taken as a whole, has not 
been a democratic body and has generally shown a frank 
leaning toward vested interests.* 

Germans and Prussians who, when the Revolution 
of 1 848 had run Its course, compared the rpuch they had 
hoped for with the little they achieved were struck with 
a profound discouragement. And yet nothing would 
be more foolish than to declare that the great move- 
ment had been utterly in vain. True, the people had 
not been able to effect their unification through a popu- 
lar assembly, but the violent conflict of ideas and plans 
had given the death blow to many cherished and absurd 
illusions, and had brought to light all the stout realities 
of the situation. 

Thus everyone who had eyes in his head was now 

* For a fuller description of the Prussian suffrage see Appendix D- 



122 The Making of Modern Germany 

aware, or should have been aware, that the Austro- 
Prussian rivalry would have to be settled before an 
effective German unity was to be thought of; and every- 
one should have been equally clear in his mind that an 
Austro-Prussian settlement was in all human proba- 
bility attainable only by war. In the light of the recent 
past only incurable sentimentalists continued to believe 
that the long-standing quarrel would yield to peaceful 
negotiations stimulated by after-dinner oratory and a 
feast of song. 

To the growing clearness touching the problem of 
unification was added new light on the subject of Prus- 
sia. For the moment its credit was low indeed, and the 
hopes of the patriots were turned to aversion, but to 
thinking Germans the great crisis must have brought a 
much more intimate knowledge of the true character 
of the Prussian state and of its elements both of strength 
and weakness. If king and government had deceived 
every generous expectation entertained of them, they 
had also proved to all but those hopelessly blinded by 
prejudice, that whatever prospect for Germany re- 
mained centered in the tight and solid, though back- 
ward monarchy of the north German plain. 

In trying to present a final summary of the situation, 
let us ask the question: what did the record of a year 
of revolution show? It showed, first, that Prussia had 
ridden the storm much more gallantly than any other 
German state, particularly its immediate rival, Austria, 
which all but suffered total shipwreck; second, that 
when the German people in parliament assembled 
argued out the question of their unity they ended by 



Progress and Reaction 123 

turning Instinctively to Prussia and the house of Hohen- 
zollern; and third, though the monarchy had proved 
immensely reluctant about assimilating modern fea- 
tures, It had none the less come round to present-day 
ideas by putting itself on a constitutional basis. Ad- 
mitting that the constitution was conservative and that 
radicals were justified in visiting It with their disfavor, 
the fact stands out — and the fact denotes an epoch 
In our story of the Prussian system — that political 
emancipation was conceded to a people who in all ordi- 
nary respects already stood among the leading nations 
and who needed just this added stimulus to inaugurate 
a new era of development. 



Bismarck and the Unification 
of Germany 



Jfiftft Lecture 

BISMARCK AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY 

GREAT as was the disappointment of Germany In 
the revolution of 1848, It was none the less an 
Invaluable experience for a nation which, politically, 
still lay In Its swaddling-clothes — such was the reflec- 
tion with which I closed my review of the feverish mid- 
century crisis. It was not a small matter that Prussia 
had become a constitutionally governed state, and It 
was something for the country to be reminded, by refer- 
ence to a concrete Instance, that when the necessity of a 
definite choice arose between Austria and Prussia, the 
eyes of all had fastened, as under an Inner compulsion, 
on Berlin. 

On that great occasion Prussia, the chosen of the 
nation, had refused to act and assume the responsibili- 
ties of leadership. But suppose now that tardily and 
under altered circumstances she resolved to act. Sup- 
pose she reflected, or some king or statesman reflected 
for her, that in 181 5, at the Congress of Vienna, the 
German princes had faced the problem of unification 
only to produce that sorry mongrel, the German Bund; 
that the people, the broad masses, had in 1848 tried 
their hand at the game, achieving an utter fiasco; and 
that it was now the turn of Prussia to see what she 
could do by striking out for herself. The reflection Is 

[ 127 ] 



128 The Making of Modern Germany 

not fanciful, for It supplies the true clue to the career 
of Otto von Bismarck. As prime minister of Prussia, 
commanding the power and resources of the state, he 
fashioned a unification program along Prussian lines 
and carried it to a triumphant conclusion. But before 
taking up the story of Bismarck we must recount the 
succession of a new ruler, particularly important since 
without his support Bismarck would hardly have forged 
to the front. 

King Frederick William iv had been so greatly dis- 
credited by the events of 1848 that neither friend nor 
foe looked to him further for political comfort, and 
when, In 1857, he was obliged to retire, owing to signs 
of an ominous mental derangement, he passed from the 
scene unmourned. In default of children, he was suc- 
ceeded by his brother, William I, who acted as regent 
until the death of the royal sufferer in 1861 permitted 
him to take the title of king. 

When summoned to the throne William was already 
sixty years old, and was inclined to consider the book 
of his life as good as written. In this he was mistaken; 
and the fame which he harvested In a long reign of 
thirty years was not so wholly thrust upon him as Is 
sometimes represented. William was a tall, hand- 
some, soldierly man, son of the beloved Queen Louise 
and filled with much of her high sense of honor, though 
possessed of little of her emotional vivacity. 

He had spent his life in military service, and had 
acquired a very correct appreciation of what the Prus- 
sian army had done for the monarchy in the past and 
what It might still do in the time to come. That Prus- 



Bismarck and the Unification 129 

sia had yielded to the threats of Austria in the late revo- 
lutionary crisis, thereby letting slip from Its grasp the 
headship of Germany, had terribly wounded his suscep- 
tibilities, though he had been obliged to acknowledge 
that the unpreparedness of his country admitted of no 
other policy. None the less he took the disgrace to 
heart and was no sooner firmly seated in the saddle 
than he seized upon what was to him by far the most 
pressing question of the hour — the question of mili- 
tary reform. 

At this point I am obliged to return to the Prussian 
army where I left it In the War of Liberation. The 
labors of Scharnhorst had borne fruit in a series of 
remarkable victories, and had culminated in 1814 in 
the proclamation of universal obligatory service. But 
in the long peace period that followed, the system had 
developed certain gaps and deficiencies, of which the 
sum and substance was that the country, though doubled 
by i860 in wealth and population, had the military 
establishment of half a century before. 

In consequence of this immobility the law of uni- 
versal service, which, in spite of the hardships it im- 
posed, had become a source of pride to the people, was 
practically nullified because only a fraction of the re- 
cruits, automatically presenting themselves each year for 
military training, could be accepted by the government. 
What King William proposed to do with a minimum 
of delay was to increase the number of regiments so 
that the whole annual quota of recruits could be accom- 
modated. But while thus engaged in bringing the army 
abreast of the population, he resolved to add a few 



130 The Making of Modern Germany 

minor changes calculated to make for increased effi- 
ciency in the service. 

By the army bill as elaborated under his direction, 
the statutory universal service was to take the follow- 
ing form: for three years, beginning as a rule with his 
twentieth year, the young recruit was to serve with the 
colors; for the next four years he was to be with the 
Reserve, subject to immediate call in case of war; after 
that, for five years, he became a member of the Land- 
ivehr to be summoned in time of war in order to fill gaps 
in the Reserve; and finally, after being carried on the 
army lists for twelve years, he was incorporated to his 
thirty-ninth year in the Landsturm and became liable 
to service only as a last resort, as for instance, to repel 
a hostile invasion.* 

Having elaborated this bill with his ministers. King 
William had it submitted to the Prussian parliament 
for approval. There was little opposition at first, and 
the money appropriation necessary to provide almost 
fifty new regiments was duly voted. But it was ominous 
that it was voted only for a year, and when, in 1861, 
the appropriation came up a second time the chamber 
of deputies demanded as the price of its consent a num- 

* It should be noted that educated young men who got as far as a 
certain class in the gymnasium (high-school), served only one year with 
the colors. In return for this concession they were obliged to equip and 
maintain themselves at their own expense. The system as outlined above 
substantially holds to the present time. Perhaps the most important 
single change since William's day was effected shortly before 1900 when 
the service with the colors was reduced from three to two years, except 
for those who have to do with horses and artillery. It should also be 
noted at this point that service in the Landsturm is now extended to 
the forty-fifth year. 



Bismarck and the Unification 131 

ber of unimportant changes. A serious conflict followed 
between the government and the legislators, apparently 
over minor details of the army bill, In reality over a 
question of power. Prussia was now a constitutional 
monarchy — but where did the final authority rest? 
With the crown as of old, or with the creature of the 
new era, the elected chamber? The Liberal party, 
elated by the consciousness of a considerable majority 
in the house, naturally enough desired to swing the 
control to its side; while the king, though minded to 
obey the constitution as he understood it, stubbornly 
refused to agree that the executive had become a mere 
adjunct of the legislature. 

As soon as this constitutional Issue loomed up behind 
the army bill, not only was the measure itself threat- 
ened, but a struggle was Initiated which carried with it 
the gravest possibilities. The monarch, greatly agi- 
tated, tried to find a way out. He changed his minis- 
ters, he called for new elections In the hope of getting 
a more favorable chamber — all in vain. Every move 
found the Liberal majority unimpaired and more re- 
solved than ever not to vote the army bill until the king 
had seen the evil of his constitutional interpretation and 
knuckled under to the new master. But knuckle under 
he would not, though the waves of hostile opinion were 
rising steadily and beginning even to beat upon the 
throne Itself. 

As the only solution which promised civil peace and 
at the same time satisfied his sense of honor he resolved 
at last to abdicate In favor of his son, and In October, 
1862, had already prepared the necessary document, 



132 The Making of Modern Germany 

when his friends persuaded him to make one more 
attempt to carry the army bill under a new minister. 
Yielding to their counsels he summoned Otto von Bis- 
marck. Bismarck himself has told us In his Rem'iniS' 
cences how in an Interview with the king at the castle 
of Babelsberg he persuaded the old gentleman to tear 
up the abdication and then confidently shouldered the 
burden of the parliamentary conflict. 

The man who now stepped upon the scene was des- 
tined not only to uphold the army bill but to cut the 
Gordlan knot of German unity and to carry his country 
to the front rank of European states. In 1862 no one 
as yet dreamed of the fame In store for him. He was 
known to be a country squire, a Junker, of the most 
conservative shade, and the hostile liberal parliamen- 
tarians scanning his career could detect nothing In It 
but the height of bureaucratic commonplace. The fact 
that he had not figured prominently in public life and 
was therefore relatively unknown is the adequate excuse 
for their shortsightedness. 

Otto von Bismarck was born In 1815 of an ancient 
land-holding family of Brandenburg, and received a 
good education with a view to preparing him for an 
administrative career In the service of the state. Dur- 
ing his stay at the university of Gottingen he made 
the acquaintance of an American student, John Loth- 
rop Motley, destined to acquire fame as the historian 
of the Netherlands. The two men, representative of 
different social worlds and of diametrically opposed 
schools of political thought, none the less found enough 
in common for a warm friendship which, revived by 



Bismarck and the Unification 133 

occasional later visits, ended only with Motley's death 
in 1877. Bismarck's letters published in Motley's Cor- 
respondence show a tender and loyal side of his nature 
which the exclusive study of his political career would 
hardly lead one to suspect. 

University work and play over, the young squire, 
after passing the necessary examinations, embarked on 
the administrative drudgery associated with all bureau- 
cratic beginnings. Finding desk work highly unpala- 
table, he resigned his post in disgust and retired to his 
ancestral estates. By close attention to crops, hogs, 
markets, and the other problems of a busy agriculturist, 
he freed the family fortune from embarrassment, and 
might presently have settled down to the humdrum life 
of a country gentleman for good and all, if the mid- 
century revolution had not given him an opening and 
projected him into public life. His neighbors, impressed 
with his ability, sent him to Berlin to sit In the parlia- 
ment called together to make a Prussian constitution. 

In this assembly, in which radical and anti-monarchial 
sentiments predominated, he showed a courage fre- 
quently akin to folly by expounding his conservative 
opinions in and out of season, sometimes at the very 
risk of his life. His defense of the royal cause suc- 
ceeded in drawing the delighted attention of Frederick 
William iv, who resolved to employ the bold champion 
of monarchy in the diplomatic service. Without pass- 
ing through any of the preparatory stages Bismarck 
was promoted at a bound to one of the most responsible 
posts, and in 1851 went to Frankfort-on-the-Main as 
Prussian ambassador to the German Bund. 



134 The Making of Modern Germany 

During the next eleven years Bismarck served as 
the representative of his country at Frankfort, St. 
Petersburg, and Paris. It is the period of his political 
apprenticeship, during which he not only acquired a 
prodigious knowledge of the European situation, but, 
in touch with the great world and breathing Its vital 
atmosphere, grew to the full stature of his manhood. 
Although he always remained a Prussian Junker, the 
child of a long line of Junker forebears, he absorbed 
the best of the culture of his time into his being and 
discarded much of that uncompromising conservatism 
with which he had made his debut In 1848. But how- 
ever much he grew In character and outlook, nothing 
ever swerved him from a whole-hearted, almost fanat- 
ical devotion to his country. 

It was with a strong Prussian sentiment that Bismarck 
had stepped Into the public arena in 1848, and In spite 
of the disgrace harvested by Frederick William and the 
complete ebb of Prussian prestige, he never for one 
moment faltered In his faith In Prussia's destiny. It 
is not too much to say that Prussia, and only Prussia, 
filled his political horizon until he got to Frankfort; 
then slowly It dawned upon him that beyond Prussia 
there lay a German fatherland. At Frankfort, In 
accordance with the articles of the deplorable Bund, 
the representatives of the German princes engaged in 
the useless discussion of issues which they had no power 
to settle. Ever since 18 15 they had been occupied with 
these heavy academic sessions and In almost half a cen- 
tury had not agreed on a single measure worth record- 
ing. 



Bismarck and the Unification 135 

It took about one morning of windy colloquy to open 
Bismarck's eyes to the whole Incredible futility of this 
so-called union. Then his vigorous and elastic mind got 
to work. Capable as few men that have ever lived 
to penetrate make-believe, he saw that the whole 
tawdry, Frankfort edifice was nothing but a device to 
enable Austria to dominate Germany, and that the 
beginning of all good things would be the extinction of 
the federal sham. Presently a definite German policy 
began to take shape in his mind. The center and kernel 
of it was that Germany must be united firmly and gen- 
uinely under the only power fit to do the work, his own 
beloved Prussia. 

Such were the private views which Bismarck had 
developed, when In 1862 his sovereign summoned him 
to Berlin to act as prime minister and to steer the threat- 
ened army bill past the rocks and shoals and into port. 
His ministerial program was clear In his mind, so far 
as Its main Items were concerned, from the first day: 
he would dissolve as soon as possible the impotent 
Bund, he would eliminate Austria from Germany, and 
he would unite Germany under Prussian leadership. 
The steps to be taken to bring all this about remained 
to be determined and would of course depend on cir- 
cumstances; that, as a preliminary, Prussia must be 
armed and prepared for every eventuality was as clear 
as sunlight. Therefore he was of one mind with the 
king about the desirability of putting through the army 
reform and ready to risk his life in a struggle with the 
Liberal party rather than give up the bill. 

Accordingly, he Insisted on the maintenance of the 



136 The Making of Modern Germany 

new regiments, even though the appropriation for them 
was angrily struck out of the budget by the opposition. 
Manifestly guilty of a breach of the constitution, he 
found himself fiercely attacked on the floor of the house, 
and presently the whole country caught the parliamen- 
tary infection and reechoed with bitter constitutional 
strife. Bismarck became, as he himself stated, the best- 
hated man of Prussia, while foreign and domestic ob- 
servers freely prophesied a revolution, the terrible first 
fruits of which, as once upon a time In England In the 
days of Charles i and Strafford, would be the heads of 
King William and his defiant minister. 

Affairs were at this critical juncture when an event 
happened that drew the attention of the public else- 
where and gave Bismarck the opportunity for which 
he was waiting. In the autumn of 1863 the names of 
the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein passed like a 
flaming torch through Germany and fired all the stored 
powder barrels of national sentiment. The question 
of these two provinces was many decades old, and so 
complicated with historical claims and legal quibbles 
that justice cannot be done It here. It will sufiice If, 
neglecting the legal side, we make an attempt to under- 
stand the national, and really only essential phase of 
the Issue. 

Schleswig and Holstein, two provinces lying at the 
southern extremity of the peninsula of Jutland, had a 
ruler who was also, by an accident of succession, the 
king of Denmark. The union was merely personal, had 
lasted for generations, and had aroused no opposition 
until Denmark attempted to convert it into a genuine. 



Bismarck and the Unification 137 

administrative and constitutional reality. Then the 
inhabitants remembered that they were not Danes but 
Germans, at least in overwhelming majority; for Hol- 
stein was wholly German, and Schleswig was German 
except for a northern Danish rim. 

A great revolt broke out in that year celebrated for 
revolts, the year 1848, but the Schleswig-Holsteiners 
were defeated, largely because the European powers 
interfered in behalf of the king of Denmark. As usual 
in such cases, the fires of rebellion continued to smoul- 
der under the embers, and when in 1863 the king of 
Denmark, with the consent and at the instance of the 
Danish parliament, made a new effort at incorporation, 
the Schleswig-Holsteiners prepared once more to rise 
in arms. Of course, they were greatly encouraged in 
their resistance by the outspoken partisanship of their 
brothers throughout Germany. 

North and south, east and west, the Germans were 
of one mind and declared that under no circumstances 
were the duchies to be abandoned to the Danes. But 
how give effective help? Through the anaemic Bund, 
the only national government which Germany pos- 
sessed? Bismarck, with his sense for things that 
counted, laughed a scornful no, and, regardless of his 
unpopularity and of a new and frantic outbreak of 
criticism, pursued the only course which in his view 
was in harmony with the realities of the situation. 

The story of the next few years has many remark- 
able features but none more remarkable than this, that 
Bismarck stood almost literally alone and achieved 
what everybody wanted, the unity of the nation, by the 



138 The Making of Modern Germany 

policy and method which he considered feasible but 
which the majority of his countrymen condemned in 
unmeasured terms. To begin with, he made up his 
mind that Prussia should be the decisive factor in the 
Schleswig-Holstein imbroglio. But, before interfering 
in the duchies, he saw the necessity of obtaining secur- 
ity against a possible Austrian attack from the rear. 
Logically therefore, he opened up negotiations with 
Austria. 

Although the Hapsburg monarchy was, in the min- 
ister's profound private view, the power to be humbled, 
the enemy above all others, he recognized the need of 
adjourning the day of reckoning with Vienna in order 
to dispose first of the more immediately pressing busi- 
ness. He therefore proposed to Austria a united inter- 
vention in behalf of Schleswig-Holstein, and Austria, 
probably in the hope of currying favor with the German 
patriotic party, consented. In January, 1864, Prussia 
and Austria together sent an ultimatum to the Danish 
government demanding a withdrawal of the acts injuri- 
ous to the rights and sentiments of the people of Schles- 
wig-Holstein. Denmark refused and war followed — 
the so-called Danish war of 1864. 

Though a war have a basis of justice, if it presents 
the picture of two strong men locked in combat with a 
boy, it will not be adjudged heroic and enlist enthusi- 
asm. Waiving the question of justice, always a difficult 
matter to decide, we may imagine that Denmark, con- 
fronted by Austria and Prussia, felt very much like a 
frightened boy, and would certainly never have accepted 
the challenge of its doughty antagonists if the Danish 



Bismarck and the Unification 139 

ministry had not persuaded itself that it would receive 
help in its struggle from France or Great Britain or 
from both. In this it proved itself mistaken. France, 
and particularly Great Britain, made handsome prom- 
ises but declined to follow them up with deeds, and the 
result was that the Danish army fought alone and, 
after a valiant resistance, was utterly broken. There- 
upon the king of Denmark, in order to forestall worse 
disasters, was obliged to sue for peace. In August, 
1864, he made over his rights in Schleswig and Holstein 
to Austria and Prussia jointly. 

An arrangement more pregnant with dispute could 
hardly be imagined. Territorial partnerships have 
never worked well, and Bismarck, a hater of quack 
remedies, can not possibly have had any confidence in 
this one. Perhaps he consented to it because it was 
the only solution that could be reached in the hurry of 
the moment; perhaps — and this is altogether more 
likely — he foresaw it would prove an apple of dis- 
cord and so furnish a plausible excuse for that break 
with Austria which was a leading feature of his Ger- 
man policy. In any case, Austria and Prussia got into 
an immediate argument over the spoils of their Danish 
war. They tried various compromises, more or less 
futile, and in an incredibly short time were transformed 
from allies to enemies. 

Since Bismarck believed that war with Austria was 
a necessity, and since, moreover, the army reform had 
by this time been effected, he would personally have pre- 
ferred to try conclusions without more ado. But here 
he ran into a difficulty with his king who, as already 



140 The Making of Modern Germany 

stated, was far from being the figurehead which some 
writers picture him. William, let us remember, not 
Bismarck, had inaugurated the army reform, his pur- 
pose being to make the universal service provision a 
reality and to increase the military effectiveness of Prus- 
sia. But he had no such high-flying political plans as 
Bismarck and he was distinctly averse to a war with 
Austria, if it could possibly he avoided. The result 
was that it took two years of maneuvering by Bismarck 
before he could get the war he wanted, the war which, 
in his judgment, had to be faced in order to shatter the 
existing German organization. 

Certain of the coming of the war even though it 
delayed, in April, 1866, he signed an alliance with the 
kingdom of Italy. This young state, which saw in 
Austria its mortal enemy, eagerly seized the opportunity 
of completing its national unity by taking possession of 
Venice, still in the Hapsburg hands. By virtue of Bis- 
marck's arrangements, Austria in the impending strug- 
gle would thus be caught between the Prussian and 
Italian fires. In order to offer a vigorous resistance the 
Austrian government, as soon as it got wind of the Italo- 
Prussian arrangement, made overtures to the German 
princes, and almost all of them, especially the more 
important, such as the kings of Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, 
Saxony, and Hanover, apprehensive of Bismarck's uni- 
tarian plans, agreed to throw in their lot with the Haps- 
burg monarchy. 

In June, 1 866, the tense situation came to a head and 
war broke out. All central Europe was engaged on one 
side or another, but the north and the south German 



I 



Bismarck and the Unification 141 

powers were the giant protagonists of the struggle, and 
the question between them, stripped of all befogging 
minor issues, such as the possession of Schleswig-Hol- 
stein, was the question, born over a hundred years ago 
In the days of Frederick the Great : which was supreme 
in Germany, Austria or Prussia ? 

The campaign of 1866 was destined to reveal the 
reorganized Prussian army to an astonished world. 
The Prussian parliament and people, still venomously 
hostile to Bismarck, at first opposed the struggle as 
they had opposed the military bill, the Danish war, and 
every Issue with which Bismarck's name was connected, 
but once confronted with the necessity of fighting for 
their country, they gathered as one man around their 
sovereign. Over the subsequent enthusiasm they 
gradually forgot their exaggerated animosity against 
a better military establishment. Doubtless, too, they 
were impressed with the circumstance that the decisive 
factor of the war was Prussia's readiness In every tiny 
detail; owing to it, the advantages were from first to 
last with the northern kingdom. 

Not only was the Prussian army mobilized more 
rapidly than that of Its antagonists, but it was better 
equipped, above all, with a quick-firing infantry weapon, 
the so-called needle-gun; it boasted a more highly 
trained set of officers; and It was under a more effective 
supreme command. This had been entrusted to General 
von Moltke, the scientific continuator of the military 
traditions of Napoleon Bonaparte. Moltke, a taciturn 
and studious man, believed in having everything planned 
out beforehand down to the last button of the last 



142 The Making of Modern Germany 

uniform, and had prepared a plan of campaign which 
aimed to strike Austria to her knees with one over- 
whelming blow. Accordingly, he invaded the Hapsburg 
province of Bohemia on three converging lines, and 
on July 3, 1866, with all his assembled forces fell upon 
the enemy. 

The battle that followed is known sometimes by the 
name of Koeniggraetz, sometimes by the name of 
Sadowa, and constitutes an impressive tribute to the 
genius of its planner and to the courage and discipline 
of the Prussian soldiery. With the closing in of night 
the Austrians were dead, captured, or scattered, and 
their resistance as good as broken. The Prussian army 
immediately proceeded southward toward Vienna and 
might have taken the city if the beaten and discouraged 
Austrian sovereign had not made up his mind to sue 
for peace. 

That Austria had won some successes against its 
other enemy, Italy, fell with hardly the weight of a 
feather into the scales, in view of the completeness of 
the catastrophe in Bohemia. Besides, the south Ger- 
man allies of the Austrians had been defeated by the 
Prussians in a number of minor engagements and 
further help from them was out of the question. It 
was therefore the part of wisdom to close with Prussia 
before worse befell. Negotiations on being opened 
led to a provisional settlement, which was shortly after 
converted into the definitive treaty of Prague (August, 
1866). It is worth noting that the whole war barely 
lasted seven weeks and is one of the shortest in history. 

By the terms of the treaty of Prague, Germany 



Bismarck and the Unification 143 

entered upon her new and long-wlshed-for career of 
unity. True, the unity of 1866 was imperfect, but the 
foundations laid were so ample and solid that the com- 
pletion of the edifice was a foregone conclusion. If 
Bismarck did not get all he "wanted, he managed at 
least to have the essentials of his German program 
written into the treaty. These were : First, the Bund 
was declared dissolved; second, Austria acknowledged 
her exclusion from Germany; third, Prussia was author- 
ized to form a union of all those German states lying 
north of the river Main, the union to receive the name 
of the North German Confederation. 

You will observe that the south German states, four 
in number, Bavaria, Wiirttemberg, Baden, and Hesse, 
were excluded from the newborn Germany. And 
thereby hangs a diplomatic tale fraught with very 
notable consequences. Bismarck was naturally not 
averse to completing the German union at one stroke, 
and Austria, his prostrate antagonist, was in no posi- 
tion to hinder him. But another and a fresh power 
stepped into the arena at this juncture — France. 
France was ruled in this period by Napoleon III, who 
had at first taken no very passionate interest in the 
threatening Austro-Prussian conflict. 

Napoleon had, if anything, favored Prussia in the 
mistaken expectation that Prussia, as the smaller of the 
two German powers, would be defeated and would have 
to gather under his wing clamoring for protection. The 
rapidity of the Prussian triumph took his breath away 
and not unnaturally alarmed both him and his people as 
soon as they discovered that Bismarck planned nothing 



144 The Making of Modern Germany 

less than the unification of the whole of Germany; that 
is, the creation of a formidable empire just across the 
Rhine. French public opinion was emphatic that this 
purpose should not be consummated and, really a bit 
reluctantly, for Napoleon personally believed that 
German unification could not in the long run be 
thwarted, the emperor sent an ambassador to the 
Bohemian battlefields to forbid the carrying out of 
Bismarck's plans. 

The Inflexible Bismarck, who could always yield a 
point when yielding was politic, agreed to be content 
with something less than the whole bill, and the result 
was the compromise already mentioned, authorizing 
the union of north Germany with the express exclusion 
of the south German states. With regard to them the 
declaration was written Into the treaty that they were 
to remain sovereign and independent. Napoleon had 
undoubtedly scored a success, but it was a dangerous 
victory since It was built on an act of interference in 
the internal affairs of Germany and created a sentiment 
of rancor between France and the increasingly self- 
confident kingdom of Prussia. 

Meanwhile peace had been declared and the Prus- 
sian armies withdrawn from Austrian soil. King Wil- 
liam, with Bismarck and Moltke at his side, was 
received in triumph In Berlin. Amidst enthusiastic 
acclamations a reconciliation was effected between the 
monarch and his people as well as between the minister 
and the parliament. In fact the minister suddenly fell 
heir to a popularity that was as immense and unreason- 
ing as his former disfavor. His proposals touching the 



Bismarck and the Unification 145 

new union, the North German Confederation, were 
therefore received with approval and the constitution, 
which he drew up with his own hand and submitted to 
the representatives of the people, was passed with little 
alteration. 

Adopted and put In force In 1867, this Instrument 
has remained with a few, Insubstantial changes the con- 
stitution of Germany down to our own day. By virtue 
of It, the federal executive was declared to be hereditary 
In the king of Prussia who received the title of President 
of the North German Confederation. As to the legis- 
lative power. It was to be exercised by two bodies, the 
Bundesrath and the Reichstag. The Bundesrath was 
a sort of national senate made up of representatives of 
the component governments; In this assembly Prussia 
cast a larger number of votes than any of the other 
states but did not control a sufficient number to carry 
any measure by herself. 

The Reichstag represented the most Interesting and 
novel because most democratic feature of the consti- 
tution. It was elected on the basis of universal male 
suffrage — one representative being apportioned to 
every one hundred thousand Inhabitants — and was 
authorized to vote all taxes and pass all laws. It did 
not, however, control the federal ministers, who were 
appointed and dismissed by the executive. For the 
leading federal minister, the prime minister as he Is 
called in other countries, was revived the ancient title 
of chancellor, and naturally Bismarck received the first 
appointment to the post. 

It Is a composite and not always logical instrument, 



146 The Making of Modern Germany 

this Bismarcklan constitution of 1867, but one thing is 
clear, to wit, that Prussia — its king and government — 
by means of it secured a dominating role in the new 
Germany. This has been lamented In some quarters, 
both in Germany and abroad, but it is difficult to see 
how any other result could have been obtained in view 
first, of Prussia's historical development, and second, 
of her area and population, her mere material weight, 
which was considerably greater than that of all the 
other states put together.* 

The chief Interest during the first years of the exist- 
ence of the new Germany attaches to the relations it 
maintained to the great nation beyond its western 
boundary. We have noted the irritation occasioned 
in France by the victory over Austria. French opinion, 
which looked with almost unanimous ill-will upon the 
powerful state formed under Prussian leadership, urged 
Napoleon in to do his best to delay the German con- 
solidation and, in the event of failure, to insist on some 
sort of territorial compensation. It was In pursuit of 
this policy that Napoleon, after having done his utmost 
to keep the four south German states from being sucked 
into the national whirlpool, now came forward with 
new demands. He asked successively for Prussia's 
consent to his acquiring German territory on the left 
bank of the Rhine, the kingdom of Belgium, and finally 
the little state of Luxemburg. 

Bismarck managed to thwart all these plans with 

* On further features of the Constitution see the Appendix: for the 
full list of the German states Appendix B ; for the title and powers of 
the executive, Appendix C ; for the Reichstag suffrage, Appendix D. 



Bismarck and the Unification 147 

the result of a growing exasperation between the French 
and the Prussian governments and the nations behind 
them. It was plain that if the two states continued to 
live long at such nerve-racking tension, they would not 
be able to control either themselves or the situation. 
When two neighbors, engaged in daily intercourse, go 
about with hate in their hearts and concealed weapons 
on their persons, no sensible man will be surprised to 
hear that there has been a collision. 

It was the so-called Spanish incident that dropped the 
match in the powder-barrel. This incident enjoys a 
great fame, much greater, in my view, than it merits, 
because of the blind habit of mankind to be impressed 
with the immediate occasion rather than to deeply con- 
sider the ultimate causes of an event. If I have cor- 
rectly interpreted the intensely hostile feeling between 
France and Germany, it came from the unification of 
Germany on which Bismarck and the majority of the 
German people were set, and which France was equally 
resolved to hinder or at least delay. This is the nub 
of the matter, but I acknowledge and say again that 
a succession of incidents, befalling between 1866 and 
1870, contributed to swell the existing envy and sus- 
picion. Of these incidents the Spanish affair, leading 
to a dramatic climax and catastrophe, certainly de- 
serves attention, provided we are agreed not to lose 
our historical perspective and accept a part of the 
story for the whole. 

The Spanish affair grew out of a rebellion in Spain 
with which in itself we are not concerned. The throne 
being vacant, a Spanish committee in July, 1870, offered 



148 The Making of Modern Germany 

the succession to Leopold of HohenzoUern-Sigmarin- 
gen, a German prince distantly related to the king of 
Prussia. When the French government heard of the 
offer, it dispatched an ambassador to King William, 
who happened to be taking the waters at Ems, to ask 
him to forbid his relative to accept the Spanish crown. 
Thereupon, either of his own free will or under private 
pressure from the king the young prince declined the 
proffered honor. It would have been the part of wis- 
dom if the French government had contented itself with 
this result. But moved by the desire to score as heavily 
as possible against its hated rival, it now came forward 
with a new demand to the effect that King William 
should give assurances that no Hohenzollern prince 
would ever in the future be a candidate for the Spanish 
throne. 

To such a sweeping pledge the king would not com- 
mit himself and a deadlock ensued which was broken 
by the action of Bismarck. The chancellor of the 
North German Confederation had had no hand in the 
early stages of the Ems negotiations. He was enjoying 
a vacation on his estates, miles away from Ems, and 
was kept informed of developments by an irregular 
correspondence. Not till the second French demand 
was presented did the king, rendered indignant by the 
insistence of Napoleon, feel that he needed his chan- 
cellor's advice. He telegraphed him a detailed account 
of his conversations with the French ambassador and 
Bismarck incontinently communicated an abbreviated 
form of the dispatch to the press.* 

* On the Eras dispatch see Appendix G. 



Bismarck and the Unification 149 

His undoubted purpose was to answer the French 
blast with a counterblast and to stand by the conse- 
quences even though, as seemed not unlikely, the French 
people would take the brusque tone of Bismarck's com- 
munication as an insult and insist on war. The truth 
Is that, In view of the abnormally strained relations 
between Paris and Berlin, Bismarck had come to the 
conclusion that war with France In the near future was 
inevitable; and further, he had recently been brought 
around to the opinion that such a war was not undesir- 
able since it would almost certainly complete the still 
fragmentary union of Germany in an outburst of patri- 
otic passion. He had avoided the war for four years, 
sometimes in the face of considerable provocation, but 
he would not avoid it any longer if an opportunity 
presented itself that was favorable to his side. As 
such an opportunity he looked upon the Spanish inci- 
dent, and in so far must undoubtedly be regarded as a 
promoter of the war. But that recognition should not 
for a moment hinder us from seeing the equal or 
greater responsibilities of France arising from the 
headlong combativeness of the French government and 
from the permanently bad temper of the French public 
obstinately hostile to German unification. 

On July 15, 1870, the French empire declared war 
on Prussia and of course, by implication, on the North 
German Confederation. The whole North sprang to 
arms as one man; but what would the South do, the 
South on which Prussia, only four years before, had 
made war and which, by virtue of the treaty of Prague, 
was excluded from the new union? The South acted 



150 The Making of Modern Germany 

precisely as Bismarck had foreseen. The inflamed 
national sentiment crowded all petty animosity into the 
background and insisted on making common cause with 
the northern brothers. 

In point of fact, four years before, Bismarck had 
arranged secret treaties with the South German States, 
providing that they unite their forces with Prussia's 
in case of war. He now asked that the treaties be exe- 
cuted; but even if they had not existed, Bavaria, Wiirt- 
temberg, Baden, and Hesse would have entered the fray 
for the simple reason that the popular clamor in favor 
of joining hands with the North was unanimous and 
irresistible. Thus all sections armed themselves with- 
out delay and it was a united Germany which, for the 
first time in many centuries, marched against the foe. 

The enthusiasm and union of Germany were import- 
ant moral factors in the subsequent conflict, but they 
would never have been decisive if the German armies 
had not been properly prepared for the struggle. Since 
1866 the military system of Prussia had been copied 
by the lesser states and the advantages springing from 
this general readiness were great. The German 
armies were sooner in the field, they were more per- 
fectly equipped, they outnumbered their adversary, and 
they were more ably oflicered under the supreme direc- 
tion of the famous strategist, Moltke. As soon as the 
rival forces clashed, the French lines bent and broke 
and Germany marched from victory to victory. 

In a series of battles, culminating on August 18, in 
the battle of Gravelotte, one French army was shut 
up in the fortress of Metz, and two weeks later, on 



Bismarck and the Unification 151 

September 2, a second French army, the last available 
for field service, was driven into the fortress of Sedan 
and forced to surrender. Napoleon led the Sedan army 
in person and with it fell into the hands of the enemy. 
As soon as his capture was announced in Paris, the 
people of the capital rose, overthrew the disgraced 
empire, and on September 4 proclaimed a republic. 

The republic marks the last and most honorable 
phase of the French resistance. The hurriedly organ- 
ized government did what it could to create a new fight- 
ing force and save France from defeat, but the problem 
exceeded its strength. From Sedan the Germans pro- 
ceeded to Paris and subjected the capital, which since 
the two easy captures in the time of Napoleon i had been 
converted into the greatest fortress of Europe, to a 
strenuous siege. It was not a light task to surround 
with an unbroken cordon of troops a city of such size, 
especially as the provisional French government saw 
in the breaking of German lines its main military object 
and battered at them incessantly. 

After a four months' struggle the German circle was 
still intact while the Parisians, cut oflf from the rest of 
the world, were reduced to the point of starvation. 
Under the circumstances Paris was obliged to capitu- 
late and the government to sue for peace. A prelimi- 
nary treaty signed at Versailles in February, 1871, was 
followed a few months later by the definitive peace of 
Frankfort. By its terms France paid Germany an 
indemnity of one billion dollars and ceded Alsace and 
a part of Lorraine. 

Even before the treaty was signed Germany had 



152 The Making of Modern Germany 

reached the goal of her efforts and effected her final 
unification. The spontaneous action of all sections of 
the people at the beginning of the war, coupled with the 
profound emotion released by the German victories, 
created an irresistible sentiment In favor of the entrance 
of the southern states Into the North German Confed- 
eration. Negotiations, begun between Bismarck and the 
representatives of Bavaria and her neighbors, were 
rapidly brought to a head, and on January i8, 1871, 
the completed union was proclaimed to the world in an 
Impressive ceremony, conducted by one of those strokes 
of irony in which history abounds in Louis xiv's splen- 
did palace at Versailles. 

In this former home of the French monarchy and in 
the midst of the roar of cannon from the siege of Paris, 
King William of Prussia was hailed by the new title 
of German emperor. As the constitution of 1867 had 
been wisely drafted with an eye to the early entry of 
the South German States, very few changes, most of 
them merely verbal, sufficed to bring It abreast of the 
new situation. 

In the light of the unity crowned and sanctified by 
means of the war of 1870, that struggle came to be 
regarded by Germans with something almost suggestive 
of religious fervor. But however much they were 
Inclined to congratulate themselves on the unity re- 
gained, they had to accept one dangerous fruit sprung 
from the late conflict. The war left France with a sting- 
ing resentment In her heart, partly because of her defeat 
and consequent loss of self-esteem, partly because of 
the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. She made It per- 



Bismarck and the Unification 153 

fectly clear from the first hour that she had her purpose 
set upon revenge and would sooner or later attempt to 
undo the verdict of 1870. The grave breach therefore 
between France and Germany that marked the period 
1866-70, so far from being healed, was made irrepar- 
able. Could this result have been avoided by means of 
more generous terms imposed on France, above all, 
by not Insisting on the cession of Alsace-Lorraine? 

As many well-disposed persons have answered this 
question in the affirmative the opinion deserves at least 
to be recorded. The Germans for their part have not 
failed vigorously to defend their act. They have 
pointed out that the territory of Alsace-Lorraine had 
been torn from Germany by force in the period of Ger- 
man weakness In the seventeenth and eighteenth cen- 
turies, and that what the sword has taken, the sword 
may in fairness also restore. The population, they 
further Insisted, was In Its overwhelming majority still 
German in speech and manners, although its long asso- 
ciation with France had undoubtedly given It a super- 
ficial French veneer. Finally, with regard to the 
abstract question of justice among nations they declared 
that such justice can not be construed as an obligation 
of Germany In its dealings with France but not of 
France In Its dealings with Germany.* 

Looking at the issue from every side the fair-minded 
student will probably agree that Alsace-Lorraine Is a 
thorny problem which can not be settled by an Olym- 
pian verdict. Assuming the historical view-point, and 
letting our mind travel back into the past, we become 

* On the Alsace-Lorraine question see Appendix H. 



154 The Making of Modern Germany 

aware that the issue belongs to the familiar category of 
boundary disputes; that it has been in debate between 
France and Germany for about a thousand years ; and 
that it has thus far, in accordance with the imperfect 
nature of man, been handled exclusively by the crude 
and primitive method of force. Will the time ever 
come when it shall be solved by the dictates of reason 
and humanity? We are privileged to hope so, nay, we 
must nurse that hope if the amelioration of man's lot 
is ever to be more than a dream; but for the immediate 
day in which we live, let us remember that our first 
obligation as students and observers of life is to see 
things as they are. In this realistic mood we may, 
without dismissing our ultimate hopes, content our- 
selves with reiterating that Germany acquired the ter- 
ritory of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, and that, since 
France resented the seizure, an issue was created which 
supplied new fuel to an already ancient and terrible 
heritage of strife. 

Far back in the Middle Ages, when the first German 
empire began to break up and feudal chaos descended 
upon the land, the people expressed their national sor- 
row in the form of a legend. They declared — and the 
whisper passed from mouth to mouth — that the last 
great Kaiser to hold the enemies of Germany in check, 
the Kaiser Barbarossa, was not dead; he was sleeping 
in the depths of Kyifhausser in the very heart of 
Germany, to awaken in his own good time and descend 
from his mountain side in the glory of crown and scep- 
ter. Century after century the legend lived on refusing 
to perish, so that when the new empire was born in 



Bismarck and the Unification 155 

1 87 1 it seemed no more than the realization of an age- 
long dream. 

Emperor William, a tall and chivalrous figure 
touched with the reverence of almost four-score years, 
looked not unlike the legendary Barbarossa, and Bis- 
marck and Moltke, titanic in person as well as in 
achievement, seemed no unworthy paladins to ride in 
state at either side of their imperial master. A touch 
of mysticism inherent in the Germanic character saw 
the new empire as the old come back to earth, and 
swept the nation with a tumultuous sense of the renewal 
of its youth. Just as the German people had lost their 
old unity largely by their own faults and weaknesses, 
so they had won their new coherence under superb 
leadership, it is true, but essentially by their own 
strength, by their own will. That proud consciousness 
started them on their fresh career with a remarkable 
momentum. What would they, thus elated, do for 
themselves and for the world? 



VI 

Germany Since Her 
Unification 



@i«f) Lectute 

GERMANY SINCE HER UNIFICATION 

J N my sixth and concluding lecture I shall concern 
-*• myself with the story of Germany since her unifica- 
tion in 1 87 1. However, a narrative of events, pure and 
simple, will not suffice, and will have to be supplemented 
from time to time by exposition and argument because 
a great deal of recent German development has pro- 
ceeded upon lines unfamiliar to Americans, and because 
a passionate antagonism, having its origin in the resent- 
ments created by the present war, has spread a mist 
before our eyes obscuring many things of which we 
should none the less strive to obtain a clear picture. 

In pursuance of this plan of narrative coupled with 
discussion, I shall take up, precedent to all else, that 
profound mystery in American eyes, that eternal 
enigma, the German state. The German state of 1871 
was, as we have seen, the perfectly logical development 
of the Prussian state, the successive phases of which 
I must be permitted once more to recall. In the first 
place, I have shown that the early Prussian state from 
the Elector Frederick William to Frederick the Great 
was patriarchal in principle and method, the hereditary 
chief directing its energies, with good intentions, doubt- 
less, but exactly as in his wisdom and pleasure he saw 
fit. Next, I have shown that when this state miserably 

[159] 



160 The Making of Modern Germany 

broke down at Jena It was rebuilt by Stein and other 
worthies, along the traditional lines of authority, it is 
true, but with modifications resulting from the recogni- 
tion that the cooperation of the people was indispensable 
to its health and vigor. This second phase was fol- 
lowed by a third when, as a consequence of the revolu- 
tion of 1848, the king issued a constitution. A direct 
share by the representatives of the people in making 
laws and voting taxes was now admitted without, how- 
ever, as the crisis over the army bill showed, subjecting 
the crown to the dictation of the legislature. 

The German state of 1871 built around Prussia was 
the fourth stage in this evolution and, having been built 
by the Prussian Bismarck, shows essentially Prussian 
features. That means, to put the matter in a nutshell, 
that the modern German state constitutes a fusion — 
so far as I can see unique in the world — of the princi- 
ples of authority and democracy. The authority all 
Americans recognize and many denounce in unmeas- 
ured terms; the democracy, which is the undeniable 
yokefellow of authority, is often willfully ignored. But 
democracy and authority in, on the whole, healthy 
interaction, constitute what I must insist on as the 
peculiar German contribution to the political experi- 
ments of the present day. 

The equilibrium of the two principles may be ob- 
served all along the line, from the central government 
at Berlin to the village affairs of Weissnichtwo. The 
new federal authorities — Kaiser, Bundesrath, and 
Reichstag — did not, as already pointed out, destroy 
the state governments any more than the federal author- 



Germany since Unification 161 

Itles In the analogous organization of our own United 
States meant the wiping out of the component entitles. 
The state governments of Prussia, Bavaria, and the 
other twenty-odd states continued to handle all strictly 
local business by means of their own separate legis- 
latures and administrations. 

Below the state governments we encounter the pro- 
vincial and municipal governments with their still more 
restricted tasks. Government In Germany Is therefore 
not over-centralized, but carefully graded and distrib- 
uted In order to meet the needs of a complex social 
body; moreover, at every point, high and low, an adjust- 
ment Is attempted — the most characteristic thing as I 
am Insisting In the German system — between an 
authoritative administration, which exercises the actual 
direction of affairs, and a body representative of the 
people, the chief function of which Is to remind the 
administration that It does not exist for Its own sake. 

Certain advantages springing from the system are, 
at least In German eyes, undeniable and must be glanced 
at If we are to serve any useful purpose with this Inquiry. 
First, a German would have you observe the high char- 
acter of the administration. All the administrative 
posts are open to the citizens on the basis of special 
study proved by an examination. The consequence 
Is that Germany is governed by trained men, by experts. 
The nation has convinced itself that government in these 
days of multiplied public enterprises and countless 
human ramifications demands intelligence fortified by 
special preparation, and that the best brains of the coun- 
try ought to feel tempted to choose a public career as 



162 The Making of Modern Germany 

a regular livelihood. Of course dull individuals make 
their way into office and even originally alert men often 
lose their briskness in the heavy routine of a bureau- 
cratic existence but, allowance made for human failings, 
the statement may be ventured that in Germany more 
than elsewhere the affairs of nation, province, and city 
rest in the hands of specially trained public servants. 

A second advantage is that the German administra- 
tion has the continuity and independence required for 
fearlessly carrying through large undertakings. In 
many other countries a popular election or an adverse 
vote in the legislature suffices to check and even to 
paralyze the transaction of necessary public business. 
In such countries the legislature possesses a control over 
the government which produces some admitted evils; 
as, for instance, the promotion of friends and relatives 
of the legislators to office, boss rule, which means the 
control of legislature and administration in the interest 
of a clique, and finally, corrupt contracts involving what 
we familiarly know as graft. 

If these evils are almost unknown in Germany it 
goes without saying that it is not owing to the purer 
moral character of the German public servants, but to 
the system which does not put the administration under 
the thumb of the legislators prone — since they are 
human, too prone, alas ! — to abuse an extraordinary 
power. The independence of the German adminis- 
tration from minute, legislative control would therefore 
appear to make for honesty of service and continuity 
and efficiency of performance. 

A third advantage lies in the extraordinarily firm and 



Germany since Unification 163 

close organization of the nation secured by an authori- 
tative government. Germany has a social and economic 
unity that is probably without parallel. The reason is 
simple enough, for it lies in the fact that the country is 
not and has never been passionately individualistic. 
Individualism was the great creed of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and did a magnificent service, since 
it freed mankind from many ancient trammels imposed 
by king, church, nobles, guilds, law courts and other 
medieval inheritances. 

England and the United States are the two countries 
where individualism celebrated its greatest triumphs and 
where, in consequence, there became fixed in the laws 
and habits of the people a political system combining 
the greatest freedom of the citizen with a state exer- 
cising a minimum of control. Where the individual 
insists on free play for himself and a laissez faire atti- 
tude on the part of the government, you will always 
have a loose social organization often with a sorry 
appearance of disorder and cross purposes. Germany, 
in sharp contrast to England and the United States, 
represents the victory of the collectivist spirit by vir- 
tue of which the individual is subordinated to the whole, 
and a magnificent order binds and animates the mass. 

Whenever man does not work for a personal end, 
his energy and interest, we have been told by partisans 
of individualism, must needs flag; but it would be very 
difficult to discover an unusual degree of individual 
slackness in modern Germany. On the contrary, let 
the riddle be solved as it will, even though the German 
sees himself as a mere cog in a collectivist society, he 



164 The Making of Modern Germany 

is one of the most energized individuals alive today. 
Apparently the idea of a whole, outside and beyond 
himself, lends his labor at his appointed post a certain 
exaltation and makes him alertly responsive to the call 
of society which Is the call of duty. In fact his duty 
Is a more Important concept to him than his rights, and 
instead of his spending his time fighting for his rights, 
he gets what he considers his fair citizen measure of 
them through the performance of his duty. 

Precisely here belong the Verhoten signs which the 
self-assertive IndividuaUst from foreign parts invari- 
ably picks out as marks of German passivity and Inferi- 
ority. It is verhoten to walk on the railroad tracks; 
It Is verhoten to spit on the sidewalk; It is verhoten to 
take your wraps to your seat at the theater, and so forth 
and so forth. A traveling American feels himself out- 
raged by such injunctions, but your communlstlcally 
minded German does what he Is told without a single 
rebellious thought because he appreciates the value of 
order, and recognizes that Individual compliance with 
social regulations furthers the good of the whole. 

Finally, It remains to point out that the German 
claims for his system that it Is democratic since it enfolds 
every man, woman, and child, and actively contributes 
to the welfare of each and all. In effect the German 
state recognizes the right of every member of the com- 
monwealth to a living and accepts the obligation of 
finding him work. In consequence, while there is pov- 
erty In Germany, there Is no pauperism; and certainly 
a much more evenly distributed well-being prevails 
than In Individualist countries, like England and the 



Germany since Unification 165 

United States. These latter countries are loth to admit 
that authoritative Germany Is or can be democratic, 
and urge the claim that their Individualism has produced 
the only true democracy, hall-marked and authentic. 

In view of such sharply opposed opinions can It be 
that democracy Is susceptible of different definitions and 
does not present the same face to every observer? Let 
us rest our eyes for a moment on the familiar condi- 
tions of our own country. Our competitive Individual- 
ism has demanded and produced a rare freedom of 
action. Liberty and the pursuit of happiness — mark 
the coupling of these two concepts In our Declaration 
of Independence — are the ends at which we aim and In 
which we discover the essence of democracy. But free- 
dom and the pursuit of happiness necessarily bring with 
them Inequality of status, since the strong come to the 
front and more and more monopolize the wealth of 
the nation together with Its political control. 

Immense pauperized masses are a feature of evei7 
purely competitive society, and these masses can not 
possibly have or at least long retain any enthusiasm for 
a freedom that grinds them In the dust. In no case 
will they agree that competitive freedom makes for 
democracy or that any such democracy Is more than 
the hollowest of phrases. What these submerged groups 
understand by democracy, a democracy that Is more 
than painted fruit for the thirsty. Is a guaranteed living 
for everybody, a community enterprise In which every 
man to the lowest ditcher and hedger is a shareholder. 
In their eyes the competitive system with Its swollen 
profits and Inordinate power for the few. Is a passing 



166 The Making of Modern Germany 

phase which can not be overcome fast enough. Its 
beneficiaries are the capitalists and their hangers-on, the 
upper and middle classes, of which classes the whole 
individualist system merely serves to consecrate the 
triumph. 

The more we think about the matter the clearer it 
becomes that our dominant classes have abused the 
word democracy in their group interest. They carry 
the expression on their lips like a conjuring formula, 
but the thing they mean In their heart is not democracy 
but Liberalism. Liberalism, in fact, has been the genu- 
ine capitalist faith in the United States and, above all, 
in England throughout the industrial expansion of the 
nineteenth century. 

It is Liberalism that asks for freedom, both political 
and economic, in order that its upper and middle class 
adherents may amass wealth and climb the ladder of 
happiness; but Liberalism Is not in the least concerned 
with anything resembling an equal distribution of goods 
among all members of society, Indeed It is passionately 
opposed to any such idea. But if economic equality, 
rejected by Liberalism, is at all a true democratic Ideal, 
Liberalism and democracy, instead of being identical, 
are fairly antipodal, antipodal in the same sense as the 
two concepts for which they respectively stand, freedom 
and equality. A belief to the contrary notwithstanding, 
absolute freedom and absolute equality are what the 
philosophers call theoretic opposites; you can only enjoy 
them together by a practical fusion, that Is, on the basis 
of a compromise. 

Now Germany, which never bowed to the sway of 



Germany since Unification 167 

individualism and never experienced an out-and-out 
capitalist rule, has declared her readiness to get along 
with less freedom In order to have more equality, and 
bases her claim to being democratic on this choice. And 
If democracy Is the problem of the masses, the powerful 
engine of their material and moral uplift, I do not see 
how we can fail to admit that the American and English 
attachment to Liberalism works undemocratlcally and 
that non-Liberal, authoritative Germany Is dedicated 
to a much more genuinely democratic course.* 

* Our American failure to understand that Democracy and Liberal- 
ism as well as equality and liberty are antithetical rather than synony- 
mous concepts could be illustrated by daily statements from every news- 
paper in the land. I submit an excerpt from the Albany correspondent 
of the Chicago Tribune of August 13, 1915: 

" William Barnes Jr. today warned the constitutional convention, now 
in session here, that if a stop was not put to what he termed ' socialistic ' 
or class legislation there would be established in this country an auto- 
cratic state similar to that of Germany, ' denying utterly the American 
theory of equality.' 

" Mr. Barnes' attack was contained in a speech urging the convention 
to adopt his amendment prohibiting the legislature from passing mini- 
mum wage, old age pensions, or similar laws." 

Mr. Barnes is the Republican boss of the state of New York, agent of 
capital and the instrument of its political control. He therefore believes 
in middle class Liberalism and very properly is opposed to the German 
system. Observe, however, that he represents himself as enamored of 
" the American theory of equality." " To be thy defender I hotly burn, 
to be a Calidore, a very Red Cross Knight," The attitude never fails 
to bring a political meeting to its feet. My opinion is, not that Mr. 
Barnes is insincere in his professions, but that he is just mentally con- 
fused, like the whole body of our middle classes. Unfortunately the 
confusion redounds to the personal advantage of the New York boss and 
all other bosses, whose rule is likely to continue ujntil we intellectually 
exert ourselves and recognize that liberty and equality, under prevailing 
conditions, are antagonistic, and that we must choose between them. 
What Mr. Barnes and, for that matter, the whole American middle 
class, really think about equality is charmingly illustrated by his naively 
expressed aversion for " minimum wage, old age pensions, or similar 
laws." 



168 The Making of Modern Germany 

To turn now from discussion to the movement of 
events, I would have you understand that Germany 
from the moment of winning her unity showed an 
enormous vitality, not only because the fetters fell away 
from her limbs but also, and perhaps chiefly, because 
she became filled with a great and uplifting faith in her 
destiny. The result was a powerful forward movement 
along all lines of human endeavor, producing notable 
achievements in government, industry, science, educa- 
tion, and the arts. 

For many years after the French war the great name 
was Bismarck. Like Siegfried in the epic story of 
the Nibelungs, he had stood at the anvil and had swung 
the hammer in order to forge the mighty sword where- 
with to slay the dragon. But none knew better than the 
Iron Chancellor that the proclamation of the empire 
was only a beginning. The landmarks of a long-stand- 
ing national division could not be obliterated over night 
and called for unremitting labor if a genuinely ncAV 
order was to replace the old. The first Reichstag, filled 
with the spirit of hope and confidence, cooperated with 
Bismarck and passed laws establishing a national coin- 
age, an Imperial Bank, and a national system of weights 
and measures; at the same time it entirely overhauled 
the system of justice, crowning its work with a codifi- 
cation of the German civil law. 

Bismarck also began a struggle with the Catholic 
Church, the socalled Ktdttirkampf, the purpose of 
which was to establish the unquestioned supremacy of 
the state; but his success in this contest was far from 
brilliant and after a few years he was glad to bury the 




From a painting by Lenbach 



Bismarck 



Germany since Unification 169 

hatchet on the basis of a compromise. A weighty con- 
sequence of this episode, very little to Bismarck's taste, 
was the creation of a Catholic political party which suc- 
ceeded in getting the Catholic voters lined up behind 
it and which has played an important part in German 
affairs ever since. 

Far and away the most important legislative measure 
of this period was Bismarck's new economic policy. 
On its creation in 1871 the German Empire found itself 
in possession of an economic policy inherited from an 
earlier time. It was expressed by the word Zollverein, 
the economic union of Germany, effected, as we are 
aware, by Prussian statesmanship in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. Now Germany had enjoyed 
undoubted advantages under the Zollverein, not the 
least of which was the encouragement of capital and 
the gradual introduction of the new system of machine 
production. But England and France, which were 
earlier on the scene as industrial powers, long retained 
an easy lead and were able to swamp the German mar- 
kets with their exports. 

Partly to encourage native manufactures, partly to 
swell the German revenues, Bismarck took under con- 
sideration a plan to replace the low tariff schedules of 
the Zollverein, not far removed from free trade, with 
a system of high duties. This was protection, and in 
the year 1879 it passed the Reichstag and became the 
law of the empire. From that day to this Germany, in 
contrast to England, but in essential agreement with 
the United States, has been true to the protective sys- 
tem and has increased its industrial output and its for- 



170 The Making of Modern Germany 

eign trade by leaps and bounds. However, that the 
increase is due to protection is clamorously denied by 
free traders, who insist on ascribing it to other causes. 

You will permit me to waive this complicated aca- 
demic issue and content myself with reiterating the 
undeniable fact of the rise of a new economic Germany 
after 1879. Its leading features were individual energy, 
coupled with intelligent business organization. Larger 
and larger masses of capital were invested in manu- 
facturing enterprises, science put its widening knowl- 
edge at the service of industry, a merchant marine 
carried the products of labor to foreign parts, and 
agriculture, taking advantage of the new chemistry, 
doubled and even trebled the output of the farms. It 
should be carefully observed that this German devel- 
opment was not one-sidedly industrial, or commercial, 
or agricultural^ but that, in consequence of the unre- 
laxed supervision of the government, it embraced all 
departments of human activity and gave birth to an 
unusually well balanced economic system. The amaz- 
ing multiplication of manufactures, accompanied, as is 
always the case, by the magic growth of towns, has 
undoubtedly given preponderance to the urban over the 
agricultural element — and this preponderance is cer- 
tain to increase rather than diminish — but this devel- 
opment does not mean that the interests of those having 
land investments have been neglected as in England, 
where the favor extended to the manufacturers has 
gone the length of effectively driving the farmers off 
the land. 

All this economic expansion was brought about, not 



Germany since Unification 171 

over night, but through many decades and was prima- 
rily the work of individuals — bankers, engineers, chem- 
ists, merchants, managers, and all the motley company 
of modern captains of industry. But from all I have 
said before about the directive character of the German 
state it must be clear that the labor of the individuals 
was not permitted to become unsocial, but was adjusted 
and harmonized under the intelligent control of the 
government which never failed on need to descend into 
the arena in order to remind the individual atoms of 
their subordination to the whole. 

The principle of social control inherent in the German 
state celebrated its most famous triumph in connection 
with the problems of the workingman. Wherever in 
the world the new industrialism flourished, there was a 
tendency for great masses of men to be crowded into 
unhealthy slums and tenements within reach of the 
smoke-belching factories, to which they were tied for 
a living. Illness, unemployment, under-nourishment, 
mutilation, and violent death were some of the more 
glaring evils to which they were exposed. Individualist 
countries, like the United States, were inclined to leave 
the situation to agreement between those immediately 
concerned, to employers and employed, but it was not 
in accordance with the German idea for the state to 
stand aside in a matter of such supreme concern to the 
whole community. 

Accordingly, in 1881, Bismarck came forward with 
a comprehensive plan for giving the workingmen pro- 
tection against some of the worst evils of their lot. 
He drew up the compulsory Insurance Laws and sue- 



172 The Making of Modern Germany 

ceeded in having them passed by the Reichstag. The 
Insurance Laws are three in number, insurance against 
accident, insurance against illness, and insurance against 
invalidism and old age. They benefit the whole work- 
ing population, the money required to apply them being 
assessed upon the employers, the workmen themselves, 
and the state. 

The annual sum paid out to the beneficiaries of the 
system has steadily increased until the amount expended 
at present in a single year falls not far short of 
$200,000,000, a figure which is not much behind the 
annual expenditure for the army and navy taken to- 
gether.* As the bulk of the money comes from the 
employers and the state, which two agencies contribute 
considerably more than the workingmen themselves, 
the tidy sum just mentioned mainly represents additional 
wages distributed among the laborers and charged upon 
the industry and the public. 

Here was pioneer work in labor legislation which 
brought much honor to Germany and to the great chan- 
cellor who framed it. The Englishman Dawson, who 
has made a very sympathetic study of the insurance 
system, does not hesitate to call its author the leading 
social reformer of the nineteenth century, and another 
Briton, the well-known Liberal minister, David Lloyd 
George, was moved to pay it the subtlest of all 
compliments, the compliment of imitation. Since the 
beginning of the twentieth century the Bismarckian 

* In addition, a reserve fund of $500,000,000 has been accumulated 
which is invested in hospitals, sanatoriums, public baths, asylums for 
the blind, dwellings for workmen, etc. Robinson and Beard, Readings 
in Modern European History, Ginn & Co., Vol. 11, 192. 



Germany since Unification 173 

Insurance Laws, modified to meet local conditions, have 
become the keystone of British labor legislation. 

But a disappointment was in store for Bismarck of 
which we must take account If we would appreciate one 
of the gravest problems of present-day Germany. The 
chancellor's initiative in the insurance legislation sprang 
not from theoretic considerations — he was too much 
of a realist for that — but from an actual labor situa- 
tion, of which the main feature was that the proletariat, 
steadily growing in numbers and in misery, was becom- 
ing more and more alienated from the existing state 
and society and more and more attached to the revolu- 
tionary doctrine known as Socialism. 

Socialism was really of French origin, but in the 
period of German unification a German by the name of 
Karl Marx gave it a more precise and intelligible form, 
and succeeded in establishing a political party to help 
hasten the day of its triumph. Devoted men preached 
the doctrine to the workers In the mills and soon made 
proselytes by the scores and hundreds. What they 
declared was. In substance, that capitalist control of 
Industry must cease and that the community must take 
over the means of production to the end that every man 
may secure a just share in the total product of labor. 
This revolutionary preachment alarmed the propertied 
classes and so seriously threatened the state that Bis- 
marck was largely prompted thereby to inaugurate his 
insurance legislation. I am not denying that he was 
moved by the charitable wish of granting additional 
economic benefits to the wronged worklngmen, but 
I also insist that he was stirred, In an at least 



174 The Making of Modem Germany 

equal degree, by the hope of reattaching them to the 
existing order. 

In view of these diverse motives behind the Insur- 
ance Laws it behooves us not to rest content with noting 
the added wages distributed among the laborers but 
also to inquire how far Bismarck succeeded in persuad- 
ing them to stop their ears against the siren call of 
Socialism. And here we must report an almost com- 
plete failure. While the workers eagerly took the 
financial benefits, they utterly refused to surrender their 
socialist faith. The revolutionary propaganda contin- 
ued among them exactly as before, with the final result 
that the socialist party has uninterruptedly grown, poll- 
ing at the last Reichstag election of 191 2 the grand 
total of three and a half million votes. This is more 
than twice the vote of any other party and not far from 
half of all the votes cast. 

The alienation of the socialists from the existing 
state and society is not however so thorough-going as 
their votes and their speeches would lead one to suspect. 
More telling than speeches are deeds, and when in the 
summer of 19 14 the great war burst upon Europe, the 
German socialists rallied to the defense of the country 
with no less fervor apparently than the classes to which 
they were opposed. In the face of a common danger 
Germany again proved itself, as in 1870, to be a single 
national unit; but the solidarity exhibited in the war 
should not blind us to the fact that a serious inner divi- 
sion exists which will reappear the moment the war is 
over. 

While occupying himself with the many domestic 



Germany since Unification 175 

problems of Germany, Bismarck did not neglect the 
department of foreign affairs. In his eyes Germany, 
brought to unity and completion by the war of 1870, 
needed nothing but security In order to achieve a bril- 
liant, peaceful development. While the strong power 
which had suddenly arisen In the heart of Europe was 
not particularly welcome In any quarter, there was only 
one neighbor who looked upon It with settled aversion 
— France. 

Bismarck was fully aware of French opinion and 
resolved to provide against It, first, by Isolating France 
as far as possible; and, second, by so strengthening his 
own country with alliances that France would see the 
hopelessness of renewing the struggle for Alsace-Lor- 
raine. To this end, In the years Immediately after 
1 87 1, he cultivated Intimate relations with his two 
eastern neighbors, Russia and Austria. With both 
these powers on the German side France was diplo- 
matically checkmated. But, to Bismarck's deep regret, 
the bonds uniting Berlin with Vienna and St. Petersburg 
soon snapped; for, though Russia and Austria might 
be brought together by Bismarck's friendly mediation, 
they could not be kept joined as soon as it appeared 
that they entertained violently opposed ambitions on 
the Balkan peninsula. 

Southeastern Europe had been the apple of discord 
between Hapsburg and Romanoff since the decline of 
Turkey in the seventeenth century, and with an occa- 
sional brief lull has remained so to our own day. In 
fact we are now aware that It was this particular rivalry 
which Ignited the world conflagration of 19 14. 



176 The Making of Modern Germany 

In the year 1876, just as Bismarck's arrangements 
for a league embracing Germany, Russia, and Austria 
seemed to have been clinched, a Balkan crisis inter- 
vened which, in spite of all the masterful statesman 
could do, got out of hand and led to a war between 
Russia and Turkey. Austria, naturally enough in the 
light of her traditions, declared for Turkey, and in the 
Congress of Berlin, held in 1878 for the purpose of 
settling Balkan affairs, Austrian influence was strongly 
enlisted against Russia. Accordingly, against his wish 
and judgment, Bismarck was obliged to make a choice 
between the former friends and present enemies, and 
cast his vote for Austria. His calculation seems to have 
been that if Russia persisted in her forward policy in 
the Balkan peninsula, the existence of Austria would be 
imperilled and that the decline of Austria would prove 
a danger to Germany itself. 

Having the courage of his convictions he signed with 
Austria in 1879 ^ treaty of alliance. It was undoubt- 
edly directed against Russian designs, but Bismarck, 
who had a fundamental belief in the necessity of remain- 
ing friends with Russia for the purpose — if there were 
no other — of keeping Russia from joining hands with 
France, succeeded in convincing the Czar that the 
Austro-German alliance was purely defensive. The 
result was that Russia and Germany did not become 
incurably estranged in 1879 or for more than a decade 
later. Though always fearing that France and Russia 
might discover the advantage of forming an alliance 
in order to counteract the Austro-German treaty, Bis- 
marck's extraordinary diplomatic skill succeeded in 



Germany since Unification 177 

keeping them from committing themselves to a formal 
contract as long as he retained the chancellorship. 

Meanwhile, always on the qui-vive to strengthen the 
position of Germany against its one implacable foe to 
the west, he succeeded in drawing Italy into the Austro- 
German union. Needless to say, he would hardly have 
scored this triumph without a number of circumstances 
which came to his aid. In the year 1881 France sud- 
denly descended on Tunis and took it, thereby gravely 
affronting Italy which had been nursing the secret hope 
of making Tunis a colony of its own. The Italian 
government, angered by an act of apparently wanton 
aggression, applied to Berlin for support, and in 1882 
was formally admitted to the Austro-German partner- 
ship. 

In this way was born the Triple Alliance of Germany, 
Austria, and Italy, an alliance which continued unin- 
terruptedly in force until it was broken in May, 19 15, 
by the developments of the present war. Because it 
crumbled under an extraordinary strain we are probably 
now inclined to set small store by it, but that would 
be a mistake since for the thirty-three years it held it 
was a weighty factor in the diplomacy of Europe and, 
above all, from the point of view of German affairs, 
successfully strengthened the hand of Germany against 
France. 

These swiftly sketched developments present the 
picture of Germany In the council of European nations 
to the very end of Bismarck's term of office. In March, 
1890, he took his departure from a post which he had 
held for twenty-eight years and which he had utilized 



178 The Making of Modern Germany 

to bring about the most epoch-making changes in the 
fatherland. At that moment the position of Germany 
was so secure as to be beyond the possibility of over- 
throw, for, while the hostility of France had not abated, 
the Triple Alliance of the central powers rendered 
France harmless, and the Russian bear, although emit- 
ting an occasional growl from his northern lair, was 
yet far from planning a mortal combat. 

But why did Bismarck leave office in the year 1890? 
The answer to this question introduces us to the per- 
sonality of William il, who became king of Prussia 
and German emperor in 1888 by virtue of the death in 
that year of his grandfather, William I, at the vener- 
able age of ninety-one, and of his father, the Emperor 
Frederick, who died after a reign of a little more than 
three months. William ll, who was only twenty-nine 
years old when he mounted the throne, immediately 
showed that he had an impetuous disposition, consonant 
with his years, but also that he possessed a good natural 
intelligence joined to the firm will to be a genuine leader 
of his people. 

For two years after his accession he retained Bis- 
marck in office, often taking the occasion to profess a 
great reverence for the maker of Germany; but gradu- 
ally differences of opinion developed, and in March, 
1890, the hot young sovereign abruptly dismissed his 
famous minister. The details of the crisis have never 
been divulged but, given two head-strong men of 
opposed temperament, separated in years and in experi- 
ence by the space of half a century, and it is safe to 
assume that they will quarrel. 



Germany since Unification 179 

In view of the fact that the German Empire was 
Bismarck's handiwork, his dismissal caused an Immense 
stir throughout the world, and Cassandra voices were 
raised here and there prophesying that his structure 
was artificial and would fall with him. Such forecasts 
were quickly refuted by the events, for a national devel- 
opment now set In that carried Germany forward In 
the race of life at an accelerated pace and soon led many 
observers to declare that the age of William ii did not 
yield In brilliance to the age of Bismarck. 

In spite of Its air of exaggeration, there Is a certain 
justification about such a statement, although we are 
not permitted to deduce therefrom that William ii Is 
anything like the same overtowering personality as the 
Iron Chancellor. The new German emperor has 
proved himself a complex character. If, as already 
said, he was well-intentioned and energetic, more nota- 
ble still was the fact that he was enthusiastically and 
constructively modern. It is true he often talked In 
language suggestive of a burled past, of his sovereign 
rights, and prayed to a God who — terrible to think — 
looked for all the world like an enlarged Protestant 
pastor, but these were Idiosyncrasies which did not In 
the least Interfere with the recognition that he was liv- 
ing In an age which was being transformed by science, 
machinery, and organization, and that he could perform 
a unique service by helping to establish these various 
means of progress In his country. The laboratories 
of the inventors and investigators, the agricultural 
experiment stations, the great industrial enterprises on 
the Rhine and In Silesia, not to mention the schools, 



180 The Making of Modern Germany 

hospitals, and welfare establishments In every city In 
the land, became objects of his zeal, while every project 
that even remotely promised a betterment of the ma- 
terial and moral condition of his people was sure to 
elicit his encouragement. 

The eagerness and ubiquity which he displayed 
caused him to be laughed at, at first, even In his own 
country as a sort of traveling charlatan; then, as the 
effects of his stimulation made themselves felt, opinion 
swung to the opposite extreme and awed voices were 
heard which ascribed the least sign of unusual activity 
in Germany to the Imperial initiative and by implication 
reduced the share of the German people in their own 
achievements to little better than zero. 

It goes without saying that here as always the truth 
Is a golden mean, and that while conceding to William 
a really remarkable gift for arousing sleeping ener- 
gies to life, we would be shooting wide of the mark 
If we did not do justice to the part taken by the people 
themselves In their recent expansion. We may profit- 
ably recall at this point the peculiar character of the 
German state in which, as we have seen, authoritative 
leadership is combined with free popular activity. 

William II has proved on the whole an excellent 
executive after the German pattern, but his direction 
would without doubt have amounted to a blight rather 
than a help. If it had not been exercised in healthy Inter- 
action with the million-fold, coordinated labor-offering 
of his subjects. Once again I submit. It is wiser for 
the convinced individualists of other countries to try 
to understand the collectivist system of Germany than 



Germany since Unification 181 

to scorn It as unworthy of attention. There Is neither 
a moral nor an Intellectual excuse for speaking con- 
temptuously of the German people as an obedient flock 
of sheep under an autocratic shepherd; and even a 
declared enemy, like Lord Northcllffe, owner of the 
London Times and leader of the English press, is not 
doing his country any real service by sinking to the 
vituperative level of a recent public letter, wherein 
he speaks of the Germans as *' second-rate imitators," 
and " a nation of house-servants." * 

I have now prepared the ground for an open-minded 
consideration of the German achievements in the reign 
of William li. And just as only exaggeration and mis- 
understanding will lay them to the emperor's door, so 
only willful ignorance will speak of them as a sudden 
mushroom growth. Take German science, for example. 
Does science, by which I mean the deliberate conquest 
of Nature through the devoted study of her processes, 
show anywhere In Europe a more steady and cumulative 
expansion? True, In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, German science, though not negligible, lagged 
behind that of France and England; but one hundred 
years ago, in the days of Napoleon, it took Its place 
by the side of Its rivals, and In the last decades has In 
many particulars led the van; for example, In the fields 
of chemistry and experimental medicine. 

To pick out almost at hazard a few medical names : 
Dr. Behring, who gave the world the diphtheria serum, 
Dr. Koch, the discoverer of the tuberculosis and cholera 
bacilli, and Dr. Ehrlich, whose Salvarsan promises to 

* Published in the Chicago Tribune^ July 29, 1915. 



182 The Making of Modern Germany 

end the ravages of syphilis, are among the great bene- 
factors of our age. But chemistry, In Its two depart- 
ments of experimental and applied chemistry, best Illus- 
trates the constructive benefits of German science. 
What the experimental chemist discovers In the labora- 
tory, the applied chemist turns to account In the Indus- 
trial life of the nation. Thus the work of Llebig, 
touching the composition of foods and their relation 
to the soil, was tirelessly utilized by scores of hands 
until the ancient art of agriculture was revolutionized. 
The German farmers on being told what elements were 
necessary for every article they grew began to use 
artificial fertilizers In ever Increasing amounts until 
their annual expenditures on this Item exceeded that of 
any other nation. Result: Germany, occupying an 
area not quite so large as Texas, much of It soil that a 
farmer In the United States would regard as beneath 
his notice, produces sufficient food for sixty-seven mil- 
lion people. Without this achievement, an achievement 
of chemistry, she would long ago have been starved out 
In the present war. 

Let us look a little farther into the triumphs of the 
chemical laboratory. One of the most important agri- 
cultural fertilizers Is saltpeter, which owes an added 
significance to the fact that it Is necessary in the manu- 
facture of ammunition. Germany has been In the habit 
of Importing It in Immense quantities from Chili. Only 
recently German chemists have perfected a process for 
extracting it, or rather Its nitrogen Ingredient, from the 
atmosphere, thus enabling their countrymen to tap an 
inexhaustible supply of this element at home. Artificial 



Germany since Unification 183 

rubber, in the absence of the real article cut off by the 
war, now serves to produce German tire's, and a cheap 
substitute for gasoline, partly derived from potatoes, 
drives the German automobiles. But the greatest mir- 
acle has been wrought with coal which is made to yield, 
In addition to coke, its fuel element, v^arious pharmaceu- 
tical preparations such as asperin, phenacetin, and sac- 
charin; and, above all, the precious anilln dyes. The 
development of these has become a German specialty to 
such a degree that all the nations of the world pay 
tribute to Germany for the coloring substances needed 
by their textile mills. 

But dip Into other departments of modern activity 
and similar results appear. In the production of Iron 
and steel Germany in the twentieth century completely 
outstripped her rival. Great Britain,* while in the man- 
ufacture of electrical apparatus she stands facile prin- 
ceps among the powers of Europe. In the Invention of 
new machinery she has at least maintained a conspicu- 
ous place, as the name of Dr. Diesel, whose motor 
solves one of the greatest engineering problems of our 
time, may serve to prove. 

Not to make myself a plague with heaped up facts 
and figures, I conclude by pointing to the amazing 
growth of German foreign trade. Since 1870 the fig- 
ures have risen from one billion to five billion dollars; 
that Is, German foreign trade has multiplied five times. 

* The total iron output of Germany in 1912 was about twice as large 
as that of Great Britain. The respective figures are nine and eighteen 
million tons. Binz, Die Chemische Industrie und der Krieg. Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. 



184 The Making of Modern Germany 

In the same period British foreign trade has done well 
too, for it has Increased from two billions of dollars to 
five and a half billions, but compared with the rush of 
German trade it shows a far more deliberate move- 
ment of advance. 

Before leaving the economic field, permit me to say 
a word as to the vital significance of these various 
statistical statements, which, taken by themselves, are 
about as palpitating as the multiplication table. Reflec- 
tion will show that they spell economic organization, an 
organization which Is In last analysis no more than 
the Industrial equivalent of the political organization 
already examined. Exactly as in the case of the govern- 
ment, German economic enterprise recognizes the neces- 
sity of leadership; it believes in expert advice, which it 
gets by allying itself with the scientist; and It keeps the 
benefit of the whole before its eyes by submitting to regu- 
lation in the Interest of the consuming public and to the 
special taxation of the Insurance Laws In the interest 
of the worklngmen. 

The control of production and exchange by the state, 
often in minute detail, has perhaps aroused the aston- 
ishment of Americans more than any other feature. In 
our individualist eyes state Interference Is ruinous, and 
scores of learned professors of political economy and 
hundreds of capitalist newspaper editors have pro- 
claimed with far-sounding eloquence that government 
abstention is the very palladium of our liberties. And 
yet the opposite of ruin has been wrought in Germany, 
because state interference has. In the main, been honest, 
intelligent, and directed by the high social purpose of 



Germany since Unification 185 

keeping a group of rich trust magnates and their mid- 
dle-class dependents from appropriating to their exclu- 
sive benefit the profits of the nation's Industry. 

And, note well, Interference has not concerned itself 
one-sidedly with the employing class. The vast army 
of workers has been " interfered " with by Industrial 
courts for the trial of cases arising between employers 
and employed; * by government employment bureaus 
instituted to reduce the evil of non-employment; and, 
above all, by an excellent body of technical and com- 
mercial schools In the industrial towns. Even in our 
country we do not scruple to " Interfere " with the 
rights of the Individual when It comes to education, but 
Germany, which, like ourselves, compels school attend- 
ance only to the fourteenth year, has recently prepared 
the way for a momentous forward step. Why stop 
educating at fourteen, was the question raised by school 
authorities, before the boy and girl have been sup- 
plied with the equipment necessary to cope with the 
modern world? Why should not the state extend a 
helping hand to Its youth to the eighteenth year and 
send It forth into life In possession of definite industrial 
or commercial training? To this end Forthildungs- 
schulen, continuation schools, have been established in 
increasing numbers. 

Before long we may expect a law making the con- 
tinuation system general and obligatory through the 

* These courts are over 400 in number, handle about 100,000 cases a 
year, and settle the majority of cases in a few minutes' time with prac- 
tically no expense to the litigants. They are properly courts of arbitra- 
tion only, from which appeal may be made to the regular courts. That 
step is hardly ever taken. Dawson, The German Workman, p. lyjff. 



186 The Making of Modern Germany 

land.* Even though much remains to be done, these 
newest schools with their vocational features afford 
another illustration of the thoroughness of German 
organization which neglects no factor of success, neither 
capital nor labor nor science nor education, and cher- 
ishes as its ideal the simultaneous forward movement 
of the whole nation. t 

Even uncompromising American critics of the Ger- 
man system have often praised the success obtained by 
Germany in the government of her cities. This is really 
very illogical on their part, since German municipal 
government is absolutely of a piece with government 
in general; however, the Teutonic success in this depart- 
ment has been so conspicuous in comparison with our 
failure that the verbal admission was unavoidable. But 
what are the leading features of the German system? 
Let us consider them briefly since they must needs open 
another avenue of understanding to German life. 

We are all aware, we are even painfully oppressed 
by the fact that modern conditions have enormously 
enlarged the towns and increased their problems. 
There are the problems of public service including 
water, gas, sewage, electricity, and transportation, the 

* " Attendance at continuation schools is now compulsory in twenty- 
two out of twenty-six German states." Cyclopedia of Education, ed. by 
Paul Monroe, The Macmillan Company. Article " Industrial Educa- 
tion." 

t A good deal of additional educational effort is expended by private 
societies, notably the Social-Democratic party. For a brief review see 
Muthesius, Das Eildungsivesen im neuen Deutschland. (Deutsche Ver- 
lags-Anstalt.) The author speaks with justifiable pride of " the demo- 
cratization of knowledge " in modern Germany. He also points out 
shortcomings, and makes interesting suggestions as to improvements. 



Germany since Unification 187 

problems of public health involving diseases, hospitals, 
and food-inspection, the problems of tenements, slums, 
parks and playgrounds — in a word, the infinitely mul- 
tiplied problems of present-day community housekeep- 
ing. Now it is certain that all these problems are 
immediate practical issues, that they interest all resi- 
dents of a town alike, and that fundamentally they 
have nothing to do with national party programs, that 
is, with what we currently call politics. They can in 
consequence be most effectively met by a vigorous local 
authority proceeding under expert advice — the famil- 
iar German system already observed in state and indus- 
try ! In its application to the town the system often 
shows local variation, but, generally speaking, it exhibits 
as the controlling factor an expert mayor with a cabi- 
net of experts making up together the executive, the 
so-called Magistral. 

A German mayor is an out-and-out professional, like 
a lawyer or a physician; he has specialized in general 
administration from his college days, has begun his 
career in a small municipal post, and has looked forward 
to becoming mayor somewhere or other as the crown of 
a life of labor. Together with his cabinet of depart- 
mental heads he is appointed by the town council which 
in its turn is elected by the voters and exercises a gen- 
eral supervision, above all, in financial matters to see to 
it that the experts keep close to the earth and are not 
ridden to death by their respective hobbies. The pre- 
vailing custom is to let the Magistrat handle the city 
affairs with a minimum of restraint from the city coun- 
cil, thus encouraging initiative and enterprise. To 



188 The Making of Modern Germany 

serve on the town council is an honor but not a pecuniary 
advantage, since, besides drawing no pay, the members, 
in consequence of their aloofness from the actual details 
of government, have no jobs to distribute among friends 
and relatives. Their main business, when all is said, 
is to keep the Magistrat in touch with public opinion. 
In the search for its paid officials a town is willing to 
go far afield, literally advertising for mayor, engineers, 
and the other members of the Magistrat and giving 
the posts to the most experienced and promising indi- 
viduals presenting themselves as candidates. 

That under this absolutely business-like system Ger- 
many has clean, well-lighted streets and excellent pub- 
lic utilities, that she has abolished the slums and 
removed the worst features of industrial congestion, 
that business and residence sections, parks and play- 
grounds, have been articulated into a town-unit meet- 
ing the demands of usefulness and beauty need cause 
no particular surprise. A less expected merit of the 
system is that it has avoided routine and shown a 
remarkable openness to new ideas. 

The German towns, for example, and so far as I 
know they alone, have taken up a comprehensive land 
purchase policy by which they are acquiring more and 
more of the area within their administrative district 
and often considerable areas outside. In this way they 
provide for future growth, limit private speculation in 
land values, secure forest and recreation grounds for 
the inhabitants, and add to their revenues by appropri- 
ating the unearned increment. By the unearned incre- 
ment, a term much bandied by poHtical economists, is 



Germany since Unification 189 

meant the increased value of land resulting automatic- 
ally from the growth of population. 

There can be no question that in justice the automatic 
increase, to which the individual has not contributed 
by his labor, should go to the community itself; how- 
ever, under the regime generally prevailing it goes to 
the individual owners who literally grow rich while 
they sleep.* German towns have energetically attacked 
the evil by going into the real estate market and buying 
property right and left. Freiburg (in Baden) already 
owns seventy-seven per cent of its administrative area 
(exclusive of streets), Stettin owns sixty-two per cent, 
Munich, Cologne, Wiesbaden between thirty and forty 
per cent, and so on down the list. The policy is not 
without its problems and it would be absurd to recom- 
mend the system for imitation elsewhere, but it is worth 
pondering that all progressive German towns are per- 
suaded that the ownership of a large part of their area 
and of the circumambient region is indispensable, and 
that by means of the control of the real estate market 
they try to secure the systematic development of the 
town in the interest of the sum of the inhabitants. t 

* The great English dukes in possession of London real estate and the 
Astor family in New York furnish excellent examples of unearned incre- 
ment fortunes. 

t The most recent book on the subject is Dawson's, Municipal Life and 
Government in Germany, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1914. The opinion 
of Dawson, an Englishman, may be gathered from the following excerpts 
from the preface: "Impressed by the larger autonomy enjoyed by the 
German towns, I have even dared to ask the question whether in this 
country [England] — the proverbial home of free institutions — we yet 
really understand what true self-government means." And again: 
" Their [the German] institutions of the professional and salaried mayor 
and aldermen represent the highest and most efficient development of 
municipal organization reached in any country." 



190 The Making of Modern Germany 

But it is time to take up the diplomatic develop- 
ment under William li, and therewith broach the story 
of the rivalries among the European powers which led 
to the present war. We left Germany at the time of 
Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 in a very favorable situa- 
tion. Her unalterable enemy was France, but she was 
amply fortified against the possible action of France 
by means of the Triple Alliance of the central powers. 
During the time the Triple Alliance was hatched 
France, anxious though she was to fortify her position, 
had not succeeded in drawing any state into an alliance 
with herself. Undeniably she was isolated. 

Now Bismarck had no sooner disappeared from the 
scene than the French situation was improved by the 
magnetic drawing together of France and Russia. In 
view of the alignment of the central states it was quite 
the natural thing for them to do, and it is difficult to 
see how even Bismarck could have hindered a rap- 
prochement in the long run. In any case, in 1892, the 
Latin and Slav powers joined hands across the width 
of Germany and from that moment steadily perfected 
their Dual Alliance as a counter-weight to the partner- 
ship of Germany, Austria, and Italy. 

With the continent thus split in two, each group 
naturally became desirous of enlisting Great Britain 
on its side. But Great Britain at first remained dis- 
creetly aloof, preferring not to be drawn into the quar- 
rels of the mainland and content with the enormous 
political and economic rewards resulting from her com- 
plete supremacy over the ocean highways. This 
supremacy she was resolved to maintain as her historical 



Germany since Unification 191 

right by means of an invincible fleet, and all the interest 
she showed in the continent sprang exclusively from 
the occasional alarm she felt lest one or another of the 
European powers was venturing to look beyond the 
bars of its continental prison to the wide domain beyond, 
which Great Britain had marked for its own. 

It Is Important to observe that the experience accum- 
ulated during the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen- 
tury inclined the British public to see in France and 
Russia the most eager aspirants to extra-European ter- 
ritory, and that friction with them, occasioned by 
movements on their part of national expansion, flared 
up from time to time well to the end of the last century. 
Then suddenly the situation changed. By the year 
1900 the forward movement of Germany had reached 
a suflicient development to attract British attention. 
German trade was making Its rivalry felt in all the 
markets of the world, a German merchant-marine was 
dispatching Its ships into all ports and waters, Germany 
was making a bid for trans-oceanic colonies, even scor- 
ing a few modest successes In Africa and the islands of 
the Pacific, and, finally and most Important of all, she 
aspired to become a sea-power by building a fleet. 

Beginning with the twentieth century the British pub- 
lic with a perfectly correct instinct sensed in the rising 
power across the North Sea an ocean rival potentially 
far more dangerous than either France or Russia, and 
as soon as this conviction became general, It wisely led 
to an adjustment of the outstanding claims with the 
older rivals in order to leave the country free to con- 
centrate attention upon the newer peril. Edward vii, 



192 The Making of Modern Germany 

who had mounted the throne at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, may claim the merit of having inaug- 
urated the diplomatic action made necessary by the 
reinterpretation of English interests. In spite of the 
English theory to the effect that as king he was a purely 
ornamental feature of the constitution, he succeeded, 
by virtue of a remarkable tact, in arousing no objection 
to his playing the part of an unofficial foreign minister. 

Largely through his influence a treaty was signed 
with France in 1904 by means of which certain dis- 
putes, having chiefly to do with French and British 
ambitions in the Mediterranean sea, were compromised. 
The reward of France was Morocco, a sovereign and 
independent state, be it observed, which, before the 
rise of the German danger. Great Britain had jealously 
withheld from French control. Mutual satisfaction 
with a partnership thus auspiciously begun led inevitably 
to still closer relations, and presently England and 
France agreed to assume obligations which, without the 
name, effectively made them allies. Thereupon Great 
Britain turned to Russia. The questions between these 
two powers were more serious, involving Turkey, India, 
and China, and had repeatedly, as late as the second 
half of the nineteenth century, led to the verge of vio- 
lence. Once the verge was passed and the Crimean 
war (1854-56) followed. 

Of course issues embracing the whole of Asia could 
not be settled at a moment's notice, but a beginning 
could be made, as an earnest of good will, and accord- 
ingly the British cabinet tempted Petersburg with the 
peace-offering of northern Persia. By expressly reserv- 



Germany since Unification 193 

ing to itself the southern part of Persia bordering on 
the Persian gulf It did not unduly sacrifice British Inter- 
ests. This Persian treaty, signed in 1907, cleared the 
way for further Intimacy. To all intents and purposes 
Great Britain became a sort of silent partner in the 
Dual Alliance of France and Russia, thus converting 
it into what Is popularly known as the Triple Entente. 

From now on the tension In Europe was tremendous 
and the alarms never ceased. Triple Alliance and 
Triple Entente stood face to face like armed and ready 
duellists measuring each other with watchful eyes. 
Though they still exchanged polite words, they were 
prepared at any moment to end debate and fall to. Of 
course it is ti-ue that If men were not the creatures they 
are, If, for Instance, they cared more for spiritual val- 
ues than for the acres of the earth and the Increase 
thereof, the quarrels between the groups and the vari- 
ous members of the groups could have been adjusted. 
But, accepting men for what they are. It Is the barest 
nonsense to say, as kindly but mistaken people have 
been saying with afflicting insistence, that the nations 
themselves have no real quarrel with one another, and 
that the war has come solely In consequence of the secret 
plotting of the foreign offices supplemented by the 
blood-lust of a few diabolical autocrats. 

Calmly directing our attention to the actualities of 
the European situation, we will discover that, in the 
score or two of years preceding the present war, ques- 
tions of lands, commerce, lines of expansion, and control 
of small or backward nations had arisen, with regard 
to which the European peoples themselves, or the 



194 The Making of Modern Germany 

commercial classes which everywhere supplied the 
watch-words, substantially dictated the policy of their 
governments. If a popular policy is the desirable policy 
for a government to pursue, and if by a popular policy 
we mean one endorsed, or apparently endorsed, by the 
bulk of the public, then the current denunciation of the 
official policies of the European states, on the alleged 
ground that they were not in accord with the popular 
will, is uncalled for. Take the issue between France and 
Germany; will anybody seriously maintain that it was 
artificially kept alive by the dark and villainous plotting 
of the Wilhelmsstrasse or the Quai d'Orsay? Was the 
rivalry of Austria and Russia in the Balkans a monarch- 
ical fiction? And did the Russian people, for instance, 
as individuals and a nation, have no interest in the 
movement aiming at the control of Constantinople? 
Was it only Sir Edward Grey and not the British peo- 
ple, who was interested in the Einkreisung, the envelop- 
ment of Germany, in order that the very profitable 
British sea-supremacy might be indefinitely prolonged? 
And, finally, was it the Kaiser only, and not the German 
people, who wished to get the full benefit of the national 
expansion and showed a growing impatience over that 
feature of the policy of the Entente which aimed at 
excluding Germany from the partition of the earth 
among the European powers? 

That partition has been steadily going on in spite 
of all the humanitarians have urged against it and still 
urge. I do not here raise the question whether it is 
good or bad, I content myself with the fact. The fig- 
ures even show that the appropriation of the earth by 



Germany since Unification 195 

the favored nations has never been more frenzied than 
in the last generation, but they also show that whereas 
Great Britain acquired in the period 1890 to 1910 
nearly two million square miles, Russia almost as 
much, and France six to eight hundred thousand — a 
total of over four million for the Entente powers — 
Germany added only the inappreciable figure of two 
thousand square miles to her territory. The figures 
Indubitably show where the control of the earth's sur- 
face in recent times has lain and in whose interest it was 
exercised.* 

Although I have been arguing that the rivalries of 
the European nations which led to the great war were 
national rivalries, I am not unaware that I lay myself 
open to criticism unless I meet certain apparent facts. 
For instance, we are credibly informed that millions 

* On these figures see Appendix E. A brief narrative of German 
colonial expansion throws further startling light on the above facts and 
figures. The German colonial movement did not begin until 1884. It 
met with so little opposition on the part of other powers that by 1890, 
when the Anglo-German convention relative to Africa was signed, 
Germany had acquired practically all the colonies that ever fell to her 
lot: Kamerun, Togo, German Southwest Africa, German East Africa, 
New Guinea. In 1890 Great Britain was still so far from seeing a rival 
in Germany that she made over to her the island of Helgoland in 
return for concessions in Africa. It was this exchange that caused the 
amused remark of the explorer Stanley that Germany gave a suit and 
got a button in return. True, when in the war of 1914, the button turned 
out to be a battery, the British satisfaction perceptibly diminished. 
However, the point I wish to make is that in 1890 the relations between 
Great Britain and Germany were very friendly. Then in the nineties, 
in consequence of the German commercial expansion. Great Britain 
began to scent danger, turned gradually to France and Russia, and the 
result was that the colonial door was shut on Germany with a bang. 
From 1890 on, Germany's colonial additions were inconsiderable and 
she consistently met a flaming sword whenever she let fall an eye of 
desire on lands beyond her shores. 



196 The Making of Modem Germany 

of workmen, peasants, peace-advocates, and women of 
all classes, representing in their totality perhaps a 
majority of the people, are In all the countries opposed 
to the present war; further, we may safely assume that, 
before the war broke out, these same groups had little 
knowledge of their government's expansion policy and 
no sympathy with It so far as It was known. 

However, even though these facts be admitted, they 
lose much of their importance through the circumstance 
that the peace elements were at best only partially 
organized, and in no case controlled public opinion. 
That subtle directive Influence In national affairs ema- 
nated and emanates, as matters stand in Europe, from 
the commercial and professional groups located In the 
urban centers. With variations due to one cause or 
another, the leading countries have a middle class, 
capitalist regime. 

While dealing, as I do, with Germany, I can not be 
expected to unroll the whole evolution of modern 
society. I am obliged to assume and have indeed 
assumed throughout this lecture that the economic de- 
velopment which gave birth to modern capitalism and 
brought it political mastery is known and accepted. In 
the Interpretation, which, though I thrust it on no one, 
underlies this whole exposition, capitalism together 
with its middle-class following exercises control in the 
leading modern countries and is responsible for the 
opinion which, called public. Is in its origin nothing but 
the opinion of a group. The majority — the working- 
men, peasants, and other elements just mentioned — 
have thus far at least docilely accepted the opinion and 



Germany since Unification 197 

rule prepared for them, and so long as this submissive 
attitude continues, an expansion policy however visibly 
provided with the bourgeois and capitalist earmark, 
may be fairly described as national. 

With the modification conceded by this Interpreta- 
tion of the social and political situation in the European 
states, I reiterate the conclusion that the nations them- 
selves, set on material advantages as much as they have 
ever been since the beginning of the world, have egged 
on their governments; and although it Is true the gov- 
ernments hesitated deliberately to declare for war, they 
took so uncompromising a stand on the platform of 
national selfishness that war was bound to follow as 
a matter of course. Since 1900, and more particularly 
since 1907, '' the coming war" has been talked of In 
Europe as one talks of the weather; that Is, It has been 
the Inexhaustible, recurrent theme, and sudden crises — 
the Morocco crisis, the Bosnian crisis, the Albanian 
crisis and so forth — all but drew the dread specter 
across the threshold half a score of times. 

In view of these circumstances It Is absurd to declare 
that one or another of the powers was not prepared; 
In the essential sense of mental preparation they had 
all gone as far as It was possible to go, for they had 
accustomed themselves to look upon war as the ultimate 
appeal and had over and over again uncovered It as a 
threat. Of course the governments continued to make 
sonorous public professions of peace, but at the same 
time, and this alone was essential, they asked for 
Increased credits for the army and navy and solemnly 
declared they would never betray the sacred trust 



198 The Making of Modern Germany 

imposed on them of defending the legitimate interests 
of the nation. Such words, spoken from the platforms 
of the respective parliaments, awakened patriotic dem- 
onstrations throughout the country. This was the last 
straw — the growing disposition of all the peoples to 
envisage the horror and to forget over the waxing 
national rancors the more generous sentiments inspired 
by a common civilization.* 

While admitting that the diplomats and foreign 
offices might have exercised a more effective leader- 
ship, above all, admitting that it is regrettable that this 
class with such store of human treasure placed in its 
safe-keeping, should not have worked consistently for 
peace, I can not persuade myself to look for the cause 
of the war elsewhere than in the competition of the 
European nations, under the prevailing regime of capi- 
tal, for lands, commerce, and power, in a word, for a 

* In the course of this first year of the war there has been so much 
solemn profession of unpreparedness, especially on the part of the 
Entente group, that I wish I could quote freely from the numerous data 
at my disposal serving to prove my contrary opinion. No European 
government would have the face to represent itself as surprised by the 
war if it did not reckon, and reckon correctly, with the astonishing for- 
getfulness of the public. I have space only for a little evidence concern- 
ing Russia. In March and again in June of 1914 the St. Petersburg 
Birzhemya Fiedomosti (Bourse Gazette), published authorized inter- 
views with the Russian minister of war, Suchomlinov, wherein he 
described with extraordinary frankness the Russian military situation. 
The articles were, in substance, a paean: Russia is ready, so completely 
ready that in " the coming war" she will adopt not defensive but offens- 
ive tactics. " Russia and France desire no war, but Russia is prepared 
and hopes that France will also be prepared." Remember the speaker 
was minister of war! He added that arrangements have been made by 
which the Russian standing army, exclusive of Reserves and Landwehr, 
will be brought to 2,300,000 men, and concluxied significantly: " thet e 
figures require no commentary." 



Germany since Unification 199 

material good which In the minds of all has never ceased 
to constitute the end of life. If the philosophers and 
poets should ever succeed In persuading people to ex- 
change their old minds for new ones, we may hope to 
achieve an era of peace and good will; but until then 
the historian will do well to deal with the minds as they 
historically reveal themselves and, so proceeding, he 
will have to deal also with war. 

There Is nothing In the complicated diplomatic For- 
geschichte of the present war, nothing In the Innumer- 
able White, Red, Blue, and other prismatic Papers put 
forth since August, 19 14, as documents justificatifs by 
the various governments, which moves me to modify 
my conclusions. Naturally a close study of the situa- 
tion will reveal an endless number of details which I 
do not as much as name and which yet contributed, each 
Its perceptible little weight, to the fateful scales on 
which were balanced peace and war. Take, for 
Instance, the case of Serbia. Everybody knows that 
the assassination of the archduke Franz Ferdinand fol- 
lowed by the Austrian ultimatum to Belgrade was the 
immediate occasion of the war, but everybody who 
cares to penetrate below the surface knows, too, that 
the whole Serbian question Is merely an episode of the 
larger Issue as to whether Austrian or Russian Influence 
shall prevail In the Balkan peninsula. 

Thus It was the long-standing Balkan rivalry between 
Austria and Russia that precipitated the Irrepressible 
conflict, as some of the best observers, by the way, had 
often predicted it would; but, owing to the existing 
system of alliances and ententes, the other powers were 



200 The Making of Modern Germany 

drawn into the vortex and with the frenzy that seizes 
men when they face the inevitable, they suddenly and 
recklessly tossed all the accumulated historic rivalries 
and hates into the great melting-pot of war. 

France and Germany once more drew swords over 
Alsace-Lorraine, resuming a border-struggle of a thou- 
sand years, while England and Germany resolved to set- 
tle their more recent issue over trade, colonies, and 
sea-power by the same primitive method — by force 
of arms. Doubtless Serbia remains an Issue In the 
titanic conflict; also Belgium, Poland, Turkey and other 
countries have become Issues, upon which the respective 
populations hang with breathless Interest, but from the 
point of view of the general historian, the really capital 
questions are between the great powers and are three 
In number. 

The first touches the control of Southeastern Europe : 
shall It rest with Russia and her allies, or with Austria 
and those who have joined with her? This question 
has the most general scope, for every power, large or 
small, may expect booty or no-booty from the dominion 
of the dying Turk depending on whether or no It Is on 
the winning side. The second question may be equally 
important but concerns only France and Germany and 
the boundary between them. The third question is 
between Germany and Great Britain and involves the 
continued British supremacy of the seas. 

But Is this all the historian has to offer in answer 
to the anxious question. What is It all about? Is the 
riot of destruction of which we are the amazed and 
stricken spectators a quarrel over booty, on a different 



Germany since Unification 201 

physical scale but on the same moral level as the tribal 
warfare of our distant ancestors ? The kinship between 
us and our savage forebears — who, looking at the 
substance of things, would dare to deny It? But, in 
spite of resemblance, there Is also a difference occa- 
sioned by the several thousand years of effort in which 
we have acquired a certain control of natural forces, 
invented a series of astonishing tools, and perfected 
a remarkable social and political organization. 

To these varied benefits we currently refer as Prog- 
ress and Civilization, and hope by means of them to 
achieve in the future as in the past a steady Improvement 
of our lot. At the end of the development our enam- 
ored fancy sketches a kind of heaven on earth, the 
brotherhood of man reahzcd from pole to pole. It 
may be that we are wrong in our premises as well as in 
our expectations — the wise men of the Orient who 
proceed from other assumptions and find happiness not 
in possessions but in the vision of God have never ceased 
to tell us so — but however that be, our confidence is 
unshaken, and we await a solution of all our troubles 
from that mysterious agency, which we think we have 
somehow made unmysterious when we call it Progress 
or Knowledge or something equally sonorous. 

This universal if somewhat vague faith explains 
why, dissatisfied with the greeds and rancors which the 
war has exposed in all their terrible nakedness, each 
nation has attempted to justify itself to its own con- 
science and before the bar of pubHc opinion, in terms 
of the prevailing ideal. Each is persuaded that Civil- 
ization is on its side and that inherent in the enemy is 



202 The Making of Modern Germany 

something sinister and disruptive, calculated to hurt 
Civilization and to throw the world back into barbarism. 
Among the group we call the allies this conviction 
has swiftly crystallized into a watchword: they declare 
they are in this war to put an end to an uncivilized mon- 
ster which makes its lair in Germany and is called Mili- 
tarism. Sit anathema is their passionate cry. It is 
really an English cry which Russia and France, in lieu 
of a better fighting formula, have rather reluctantly 
adopted. But what do the allies mean by German 
militarism? The inquiry is decidedly worth prosecut- 
ing. Do they mean a standing army? Hardly; for 
the Russian standing army is much larger than the Ger- 
man, and the French is just as large, in spite of the 
much smaller population of the country.* Do they 
mean a navy always ready for war? Certainly not, 
since the British navy alone is about twice as large as 
the German. Again, total expenditure for defense can 
not be the decisive factor, since both Russia and Great 
Britain spend more on their army and navy than Ger- 
many.t Since therefore there is nothing peculiar about 
the German army in the matter of size or cost, and 

* The figures given by the Ne^ York Times of November 8, 1914, 
are as follows: Russia's army in time of peace consists (in round 
figures) of 1,284,000 men; the army of France of 869,000 men; the army 
of Germany of 800,000 men. The estimates given in the American 
Army and Navy Journal of October 3, 1914, are: France 749,000, 
Germany 735,000. 

t The Living Age, June 14, 1914, gives the expenditures compiled 
from figures furnished by the British Admiralty and War Office as 
follows: Russia $455,000,000; Gr^at Britain $375,000,000; Germany 
$350,000,000; France $280,000,000; Austria-Hungary $145,000,000. The 
per capita expense for 191 3 is given as follows: Great Britain $8.20, 
France $7.40, Germany $5.50. 



Germany since Unification 203 

German militarism is in these respects indistinguish- 
able from the Russian, French, and British variety, 
where does the special hideousness of German militar- 
ism come in? The answer is plain: it inheres unmis- 
takably in its superior readiness, and that is a matter 
of superior organization. 

And here, note, that while superior military readi- 
ness is immediately a matter of army organization, in 
the last analysis it is much more than that, it is a matter 
of organization in general — organization of industry, 
organization of commerce, organization of agriculture, 
organization of transportation, organization of any and 
every national interest capable of instant mobilization 
in the event of war. 

And now need I remind you, after our long effort to 
follow the thread of German development, that it is 
indeed true that Germany, beginning with Prussia, the 
German nucleus, has consciously labored at her national 
organization for a matter of two hundred years, and 
that she has carried it farther than any other people? 
The will to organize, involving trained professional 
leadership with democratic cooperation from every 
man, woman, and child, we have hit upon as the very 
essence of the German state and society. And by writ- 
ten and spoken word the teachers and preachers of the 
nation have performed the feat of fervently enhsting 
the whole people for this program. 

In fact it is this program which affects with its rami- 
fications every department of human activity and which 
cherishes as its ultimate end an alert, intelligent, and 
prosperous nation that the Germans have in mind when 



204 The Making of Modem Germany 

they speak of their Kultur. To this simple perception 
has the confused discussion of this enigmatic word at 
last boiled down: Kultur means the national program; 
and when the Germans declare that in this war they are 
defending their Kultur, they are affirming nothing more 
or less than that they are dedicated heart and soul to 
the peculiar coUectivist form of Progress and Civili- 
zation which their past has evolved. 

But that and nothing else is what the British mean 
by German militarism! The British, as ancient and 
passionate individualists, have an instinctive aversion 
for the German system, which on earlier occasions they 
have derided under such names as paternalism and 
bureaucracy, but which they now defy and denounce 
under the newer name of militarism. Regardless of 
the name, it is always the same familiar thing, the Ger- 
man organization, the German social and political sys- 
tem, the German Kultur. 

The German system, which the Germans themselves 
exalt as their Kultur, and the British decry as militar- 
ism, is thus moved into the very center of the world 
struggle. From the point of view of Progress and 
CiviHzation, the highest standards for judging life in 
which we Europeans and Americans have retained faith, 
this circumstance is to be welcomed, for it, and it alone, 
raises the war to a level above mere land-hunger and 
trade-hunger. 

In order to convey my meaning I would have you 
recall at this point that Progress and CiviHzation, as 
they have unfolded in the last few thousand years, have 
been largely concerned with social experiment. The 



Germany since Unification 205 

finding of new forms of human association certainly 
takes rank in the forward movement of the race with 
the invention of new tools and the stealing of knowl- 
edge from nature's unconcern. Now in the historic 
succession of social forms the British individualist 
organization holds a notable place and has for several 
hundred years done splendid service. But its past rec- 
ord is no proof that it will not be superseded by a 
system better adapted to the newer needs of the time. 

In the opinion of many intelligent observers there 
are good reasons for thinking that the German system 
is a more advanced type of social organization than the 
British one, and that the war will bring conviction on 
this head to the whole European world. I do not mean 
that individualism will be abruptly abandoned — that 
is not the way things happen in this world of gradual 
change — but that it will be combined somehow with 
collectivism, and that from the two opposites will come 
a wholly advantageous fusion and synthesis. From this 
pohtical and philosophical point of view, the winning 
or losing of the struggle by Germany will be an entirely 
secondary issue. I yield to the passion to prophesy 
with the utmost reluctance, but I should like to point 
out that if I am right the war may prove a constructive 
event of the highest importance, for it will bring the 
European nations together more closely than ever be- 
fore on the basis of a new social purpose and a higher 
social organization. 

May I point out, in concluding, another hope to 
which we may cling in the darkness surging around us 
and from which we may draw an unshaken confidence 



206 The Making of Modern Germany 

that the future of Europe will not be stark anarchy and 
ruin? That hope arises from the European man, the 
homo Etiropaeus, who through hundreds of years of a 
masterful struggle with nature has developed a sense 
of order diametrically opposed to the wastage of war. 
Of this European man we may unhesitatingly declare 
that he will not rest until he has established peace ; and 
since the high human valor of all the national variants 
of the European type has been eloquently affirmed by 
the terrible crisis of this conflict, we may entertain the 
hope that they will all survive and, when the time 
comes, act together to lay the foundations of the new 
Europe. 

Such general, coordinated action is essential to all 
our thoughts about the brave little continent which from 
the dawn of history has filled the world with its achieve- 
ments, for Europe owes what it is to the presence on 
Its diversified soil of many peoples with many kinds of 
endowments and to their age-long rivalry and coopera- 
tion. May the Europe of the future be in this respect 
not different from the Europe of the past! May not 
one people be permanently injured by this fratricidal 
struggle I May they all manage to survive the storm 
and continue to add to the diversity, the charm, and the 
energy of the movement of human life I 



appenDice0 



APPENDIX A 

THE HOHENZOLLERN RULERS FROM THE GREAT 
ELECTOR TO THE PRESENT DAY 

1 640-1 688. Frederick William, margrave and elector 
of Brandenburg, called the Great 
Elector. Creates the centralized state. 

1688-17 13. Frederick, son of the Great Elector. 
Known as Frederick ni among the 
electors of Brandenburg. Adopts In 
1700 the title of King In Prussia (soon 
changed to King of Prussia). First 
of the new title, he Is known from 1700 
on as Frederick L 

1 7 13-1740. Frederick William I, son of King Fred- 
erick L Completes organization of 
the autocratic or patriarchal monarchy. 

1 740-1 786. Frederick n, son of Frederick William i, 
commonly called Frederick the Great. 
Challenges Austria, makes Prussia a 
European power. 

1 786-1 797. Frederick William n, nephew of Fred- 
erick the Great. Opposes the French 
Revolution without understanding, 
vigor, or success. 
[209] 



210 The Making of Modern Germany 

1 797-1 840. Frederick William III, son of Frederick 
William 11 and husband of the famous 
Queen Louise. Defeated by Napoleon 
at Jena; beneficiary of the democratiz- 
ing revival championed by Stein, 
Schamhorst and others. 

1 840-1 861. Frederick William iv, son of Frederick 
William III. " The Romanticist upon 
the Throne." Helplessly opposed to 
revolution of 1848; grants Prussian 
constitution of 1850. 

1 861-1888. William I, younger brother of Frederick 
William IV. Serves as regent from 
1857-61. With Bismarck as prime 
minister defeats Austria (1866), 
France (1870), and becomes German 
Emperor (1871). 

1888. March- June. Frederick ill, son of William I. 

1888- William 11, son of Frederick in. Promoter of 
German national expansion. 



APPENDIX B 

THE LIST OF STATES COMPOSING THE GERMAN EMPIRE 



The Stitci 



Kingdoms (4) : 

Prussia 

Bavaria 

Saxony 

Wiirttemberg .... 
Grand-duchies (6): 

Baden 

Hesse 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin . 

Mecklenburg-Strelitz . . 

Oldenburg 

Saxe-Weimar .... 
Duchies (5): 

zAnhalt 

Brunswick 

Saxe-Altenburg . . . 

Saxe-Coburg-Gotha . . 

Saxe-Meiningen . . . 
Principalities (7) : 

Lippe 

Reuss, younger branch . 

Reuss, older branch . . 

Schaumburg-Lippe . . 

Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt 

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 

Waldeck 

Free Cities (3): 

Bremen 

Hamburg 

Lubeck 

Imperial Territory (1) : 

Alsace-Lorraine . . . 



Area in 
Square 
Miles 



134,000 

29,200 

5,700 

7,500 

5,800 
2,900 
5,000 
1,100 
2,400 
1,300 

800 
1,400 
500 
700 
900 

400 
100 
300 
100 
300 
300 
400 

99 
150 
100 



Population 
December 

1,1910 
(in Round 
Numbers) 



40,000,000 
7,000,000 
5,000,000 
2,500,000 

2,000,000 
1,000,000 
600,000 
100,000 
500,000 
400,000 

300,000 
500,000 
200,000 
250,000 
300,000 

150,000 
75.000 

150,000 
50,000 

100,000 
90,000 
60,000 

300,000 
1,000,000 
• 100.000 



Number 
of Members 

in the 
Bundesrath 



5,600 2,000,000 3__ 

■208,0001 65,000,0001 61* 



Number 
of Repre- 
sentatives in 
the 
Reichstae 



236 
48 
23 
17 

14 
9 
6 
1 
3 
3 

2 
3 

1 
2 
2 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

1 
3 

1 

15 



397 



*It will be seen that Prussia is far from having a majority in the Bundesrath. However, 
as its prestige is enormous, some precautions have been taken against a confirmed Prussian 
control. To cite an instance: when Alsace-Lorraine was recently given representation in 
the Bundesrath, it was stipulated that its three votes should not count in case Pruula. by 
metnB of them, carried a pending measure. 



[211] 



APPENDIX C 

CONCERNING THE TITLE AND THE POWERS OF THE 
GERMAN EMPEROR 

AS the titles German Emperor and Emperor of 
Germany are often used Interchangeably outside 
of Germany, It may be well to point out that only the 
title German Emperor Is authorized by law and usage. 
The form Emperor of Germany was duly considered 
in 1870, but rejected as having a feudal, proprietary 
ring, unsuited to the supreme executive of a con- 
federation. 

The German people very generally believed in 1870 
that they were reviving a title which had had currency 
among them at the time of their earlier medieval unity. 
But such was only partially the case. The head of 
medieval Germany originally bore the title king 
(Konig). But this king, In the person of the Saxon 
Otto, revived in 962 A. D. what he conceived to be the 
Roman empire, and adopted with the consent of the 
pope the title emperor (imperator, Caesar, Kaiser). 
Because of Its close association with the Catholic 
Church the adjective holy was soon added, the revived 
state of the Caesars presenting Itself to the world 
as the Holy Roman empire (sanctum imperium 
romanum). 

For several centuries the title king (referring to 

[212] 



The German Emperor 213 

Germany) and emperor (referring to the empire, to 
which the king might or might not succeed, depending 
on the pleasure of the pope) were kept thoroughly dis- 
tinct, and the king never employed the title emperor 
until he had been crowned at Rome. However, begin- 
ning with Maximilian i (1493-15 19), an Innovation 
occurred. Maximilian called himself emperor with- 
out going to Rome, and from his time on the title 
emperor, on the ground of Its superior ring, tended to 
become the ordinary designation of the chief of the 
German state, to the exclusion of the title king. The 
emperor even came to be called popularly the German 
emperor, although there was not the least legal justifi- 
cation for this form. I repeat : constitutional law knew 
only a sanctum imperium romanum, and Its head the 
imperator. This continued to be the case till the extinc- 
tion of the Holy Roman empire In 1806. 

It follows from all this that, from the revival of the 
Roman empire by Otto i to the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century, European usage recognized only one 
emperor, the Roman emperor, occasionally but Incor- 
rectly referred to as the German emperor. Now for 
some time before the formal end of the Holy Roman 
Empire, It was so plainly approaching Its last gasp that 
no one retained any respect either for It or Its empty 
claims. No wonder therefore that when General 
Napoleon Bonaparte looked about him for a suitable 
title, he should have seized on emperor without as much 
as a by your leave to the authentic but moribund owner. 

In 1804 Napoleon became the Emperor of the 
French. Thereupon the head of the house of Haps- 



214 The Making of Modern Germany 

burg, Francis ii^ who was the actual Roman (German) 
emperor, Invented a brand-new title for himself. Em- 
peror of Austria. Since he foresaw, and little foresight 
was required, the early extinction of the Roman empire 
and the attendant passing of his Roman title, he thought 
to insure himself against loss of dignity by having a 
second imperial title in reserve. Thus, just as the 
emperor perished together with his empire, two parvenu 
emperors, the Emperor of the French and the Emperor 
of Austria stepped upon the scene. 

The Napoleonic title did not long survive, but the 
title Emperor of Austria has lasted to our own day. It 
was supplemented in 1871 by the invention German 
Emperor adopted by the king of Prussia. In this new- 
est instance the imperial title has no more authentic 
association with the medieval emperor and empire than 
the French and Austrian titles. The most we can say 
is that it revives a popular German memory of great 
vigor and persistence. 

As the reader may be interested in the powers of the 
German emperor, I present in abbreviated form the 
articles of the Constitution relative thereto. 

THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION 

IV. The Presidency: 

Art. I J. To the king of Prussia shall belong the presidency 
of the Confederation, and he shall have the title of German em- 
peror. It shall be the duty of the emperor to represent the 
empire among nations, to declare war and to conclude peace 
in the name of the empire, to enter into alliances and other 
treaties with foreign countries, to accredit ambassadors and to 
receive them. 



The German Emperor 215 

For a declaration of war in the name of the empire, the con- 
sent of the Bundesrath is required, unless an attack is made 
upon the federal territory or its coasts. 

Art, 12. The emperor shall have the right to convene the 
Bundesrath and the Reichstag, and to open, adjourn, and close 
them. 

Art, 13, The Bundesrath and the Reichstag shall be con- 
vened annually, and the Bundesrath may be called together for 
the preparation of business without the Reichstag; the latter, 
however, shall not be convened without the Bundesrath. 

Art. 14. The Bundesrath shall be convened whenever a 
meeting is demanded by one-third of the total number of votes. 

Art. IS. The imperial chancellor, to be appointed by the 
emperor, shall preside in the Bundesrath, and supervise the 
conduct of its business. 

Art. 16. The necessary bills shall be laid before the Reichs- 
tag in the name of the emperor, in accordance with the resolu- 
tion of the Bundesrath, and shall be advocated in the Reichstag 
by members of the Bundesrath, or by special commissioners 
appointed by the latter. 

Art. ly. It shall be the duty of the emperor to prepare and 
publish the laws of the empire, and to supervise their execution. 
The decrees and ordinances of the emperor shall be issued in the 
name of the empire, and shall require for their validity the coun- 
ter-signature of the imperial chancellor, who thereby assumes the 
responsibility for them.* 



* Dodd, Modern Constitutions, Vol. i, p. 330. 



APPENDIX D 

THE SUFFRAGE PROVISIONS FOR THE REICHSTAG AND 

FOR THE SECOND CHAMBER OF THE PRUSSIAN 

PARLIAMENT ( LANDTAG ) 

TN spite of the somewhat analogous organization of 
-*- the United States, it has been my experience as a 
teacher that students do not carefully distinguish be- 
tween the Reichstag, the German equivalent of our 
national House of Representatives, and the Second 
Chamber of the Prussian parliament, which resembles 
the lower house of one of our state legislatures. While 
Insisting on the analogy, I am of course ready to admit 
that the Prussian parliament, In keeping with the pre- 
eminence of Prussia In the German federation, exercises 
a much greater weight In German affairs than attaches 
to any state legislature In the United States. 

Reichstag and Prussian Second Chamber exist and 
operate In virtue of two different fundamental laws: 
the Reichstag In virtue of the German Constitution of 
1867-70, the Prussian Second Chamber In virtue of the 
Prussian Constitution of 1850. That each has Its own 
suffrage provisions and that these differ widely should 
never be forgotten. The Reichstag has universal male 
suffrage (see Lecture v, p. 145) and the Prussian Sec- 
ond Chamber the so-called three-class system (see Lec- 
ture IV, p. 120). A fuller statement of the two suffrage 

[216] 



Reichstag and Landtag 217 

systems, affording the opportunity of comparing them 
at close range may be welcomed by some readers. In 
the interest of easy comprehension I shall quote the 
summary of the constitutional articles given by Lowell 
in his Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, 
rather than the elaborate original text.* 

THE REICHSTAG SUFPRAGE 

The Reichstag is elected for five years by direct universal 
suffrage and secret ballot. The voters must be t\venty-five years 
old, and not in active military service, paupers, or otherwise 
disqualified.f 

THE PRUSSIAN SUFFRAGE 

The Prussian Second Chamber is composed of four hundred 
and thirty-three members elected for five years by a suffrage, 
which although universal is neither direct nor equal. The mem- 
bers are chosen in districts, each of which elects, as a rule, two 
deputies. The members, however, are not chosen by the people, 
but by electors, and for this purpose the districts are subdivided 
into a number of smaller divisions called JJrwahlbezirke, or orig- 
inal electoral districts, in each of which one elector is chosen for 
every two hundred and fifty souls, on the following curious sys- 
tem. The voters are divided into three classes according to the 
amount of taxes they pay; the largest taxpayers who together 
pay one-third of the taxes forming the first class ; the next largest 
taxpayers paying another third of the taxes forming the second 
class ; and the rest of the people who pay of course the remaining 
third forming the third class. Each of these classes chooses 
separately, and by absolute majority vote, one- third of the electors 
to which the Urwahlbezirk is entitled. All the electors so chose«i 

* For original text see Laband, Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reichs, 
and Altmann, Aiisge^waehlte Urkunden zur Brand. — Preuss. Verfas- 
sungsgeschichte. 

t Government and Parties in Continental Europe, i, 252. A. L. 
Lowell, Houghton, Mifflin Co. 



218 The Making of Modem Germany 

in the district then meet together and elect the representative 
by absolute majority vote. 

The three class system was devised in 1849, and is a singular 
compromise between universal suflFrage and property qualifica- 
tion. Under it everybody votes, and has a certain share in the 
direction of public affairs; but the largest taxpayers, that is, the 
richest men, who are of course comparatively few in number, 
choose as many electors as the mass of the laborers, or to put the 
same thing from the opposite point of view, property . . . 
as well as mere numbers, are taken into account in the apportion- 
ment of power. The same principle is applied in the Prussian 
cities and villages, where the councils are divided into three 
equal parts, one of which is elected by each of the three classes 
of taxpayers** 



* Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, i, 302-5. 



APPENDIX E 

THE RACE FOR COLONIES 

rpHE figures given in Lecture vi, p. 195, relative to 
^ the colonial acquisitions of Great Britain, France, 
Russia, and Germany, in the period 1890-19 10 are 
taken from J. W. Burgess' The European War of 
igi4, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chapter in. With the kind 
assistance of my colleague, Mr. Scott, I have attempted 
to work out my own figures from the Statesman's Year 
Book, the Annual Cyclopedia, N. D. Harris' Interven- 
tion and Colonization in Africa, Houghton Mifflin Co., 
and other similar works. There Is considerable diver- 
gence among the authorities because, for Instance, pro- 
tectorates may or may not be counted as possessions, 
and because colonies credited in a given year with a 
certain area may suffer enlargement or diminution 
through subsequent treaties. No wonder, therefore, 
that I can not altogether make my figures on the colonial 
gains between 1890 and 19 10 march with those of Mr. 
Burgess. As to Great Britain, I arrive at essentially 
the same result, that Is, at something over 2,000,000 
square miles, but as to France, I reach, as against Mr. 
Burgess's 600,000 to 800,000 square miles, a total of 
about 2,000,000, due, without doubt, to the inclusion 
by my authorities of every square foot of Sahara sand. 
Because it Is the German colonial possessions that 
[219] 



220 The Making of Modem Germany 

are our particular concern, and because, further, the 
very small share of Germany In the partition of the 
world since she aroused Great Britain's displeasure may 
be a source of surprise to many, I shall set down In 
order the German acquisitions In the period 1 890-1910. 
The year 1 890 Is chosen as the point of departure owing 
to the fact that, after marking the achievement of a 
modus Vivendi between Great Britain and Germany 
In the Anglo-German convention, It was followed by 
relations which grew gradually more and more strained 
until they led to permanent ill-temper. 

GERMAN ACQinsmONS, 189O-I9IO 

Area in 
sq. miles 

1897. Lease of Kiauchau from China 200 

1899. The Caroline, Pelew, and Marianne Islands pur- 
chased from Spain 560 

190a Part of the Samoan Islands (other parts assigned 

to Great Britain and the United States) 1000 

Total 1 760 

The decade 1900-19 10 was, as far as I can make out, 
absolutely unproductive for Germany. However, it 
was not free from colonial conflicts as the long tension 
over Morocco sufficiently shows. In the Morocco quar- 
rel the Triple Entente prevailed and France got the 
African sultanate, but not without being obliged to make 
a concession to Germany. In 191 1 the latter received 
territory in central Africa, swamp and jungle belong- 
ing to the French Congo, of about 100,000 square miles. 
The value of the grant was very questionable, but the 



The Race for Colonies 221 

event released some German rejoicing as marking the 
end of a long period of emptiness and dearth. If the 
100,000 square miles of the year 191 1 be added to the 
1,760 square miles of the period 1890-1910' and the 
quarter of a century from the Anglo-German conven- 
tion of 1890 to the outbreak of the war in 19 14 be 
taken into account, the German figures make a more 
favorable showing than appears from Mr. Burgess's 
statement. However, even so it is plain that Germany 
was struck with a sort of colonial paralysis about 1890, 
and was left far behind in the race by the three for- 
tunate and cooperating members of the Entente. 



APPENDIX F 

THE POLISH QUESTION 

AS there exists in present-day Germany and has long 
existed a Polish question, it is proper to offer some 
account of it, even though I found no room for this 
important issue in the body of the lectures. 

For the student of German history the Polish ques- 
tion is as old as the migrations which marked the end 
of Rome, for when the fluid ethnic situation began at 
last to assume a certain fixity, it was found that the 
Germans had as their neighbors on the east a belt of 
Slav peoples, chief among whom were the Poles. The 
passionate rivalry of Slavs and Germans throughout 
the Middle Ages, the interminable pushing of both the 
language and state boundaries to and fro, according to 
the alternation of victory and defeat, I am obliged to 
pass over in silence, and shall begin with the situation 
as it was at the time of the founding of the Prussian 
state by the Great Elector. 

We have seen that the Great Elector was moved 
to create a centralized government primarily in order 
to get security for his inherited lands against foreign 
foes. Sweden, established a few miles from Berlin at 
the mouth of the Oder and the Elbe, was to his mind the 
main peril; but he was also aware that he was very 
much at the mercy of the kingdom of Poland. The 

[222] 



The Polish Question 223 

area of Poland was Immense, extending all the way 
from the Baltic to the Black sea and eastward far into 
what we now call Russia. Like all other kingdoms of 
medieval origin, Poland was not a national state but 
a feudal government, unstable and involved in frequent 
wars. Its political success, according to contemporary 
standards, appeared clearly from the fact that, though 
settled only In Its western section by Poles, it comprised 
many subjected or partially assimilated races, such as 
the Lithuanians, Letts, and Little Russians. To the 
lords of Brandenburg, and therefore also to Frederick 
William, It was a source of particular concern that along 
the lower course of the Vistula the Polish state thrust 
itself between the two Hohenzollern possessions of 
Brandenburg and East Prussia. That was bad enough 
but not all, for, In addition, the elector held East Prus- 
sia, not In fee simple, but as a fief from the Polish king 
who, as suzerain, was able in many ways to limit the 
incumbent's control. 

This East Prussian situation demands a little further 
elucidation In the light of Its development. Originally, 
Prussia was the name given to the territory on the 
Baltic sea lying on either side of the Vistula and inhab- 
ited by a tribe called Prussians. In the course of the 
thirteenth century the Prussians, who invited disdain 
and hatred by stubbornly remaining heathens, became 
the object of a crusade conducted by the Teutonic 
knights, a military-monkish order on the pattern of 
the Templars. 

The Teutonic Knights conquered the Prussians, mak- 
ing so thorough a job of it that the Prussians, as a peo- 



224 The Making of Modern Germany 

pie, before long entirely disappeared. The name, it 
is true, lived on, being taken over by their successors. 
These successors were Germans, the Knights themselves 
together with burghers and peasants whom the enter- 
prising conquerors settled on the soil. There thus grew 
up a curious proprietary state ruled by a monastic order 
of German warriors and made prosperous by German 
agriculturists and traders. Of course it was an anomaly 
and could not live. The agriculturists and traders were 
sure to resent a continued exploitation by a favored 
group, and if a neighboring power seized the oppor- 
tunity, afforded by the local dissensions, to interfere, a 
calamity was unavoidable. 

Toward the end of the fourteenth century the Polish 
kingdom which, like feudal kingdoms generally, was 
subject to ups and downs, experienced, after a consid- 
erable eclipse, a new period of expansion, and straight- 
way directed its attention to Prussia which barred the 
way to the Baltic. The Knights were invaded, repeat- 
edly defeated, and obliged at last to bow to Polish dic- 
tation. By the disastrous treaty of Thorn ( 1466) they 
surrendered West Prussia, involving control of the 
Vistula and access to the Baltic sea, to the king of 
Poland; and though they retained the less important 
East Prussia, they did so on condition of holding it as 
a fief of the Polish crown. With defeat and the result- 
ant loss of prestige their doom was sealed. 

In the year 1525 the then Grand Master of the Teu- 
tonic Knights acknowledged that they were out of date 
and, accepting the advice of Martin Luther, broke up 
the order. Incidentally the Grand Master failed not to 



The Polish Question 225 

make generous provision for himself, assuming the sec- 
ular lordship of East Prussia with the title of duke. 
His change of status, it goes without saying, did not 
alter his relation of vassalage to the king of Poland. 
The first duke bore the name Albert and was a member 
of the family of Hohenzollern, the same which in its 
main branch was established in Brandenburg. A hun- 
dred years later (1618) Albert's immediate line died 
out, and East Prussia passed by the law of inheritance 
to the elector of Brandenburg. 

Such then was the situation of the Great Elector in 
respect of Poland: he was, as duke of East Prussia, 
the vassal of the Polish king, and this same Polish king 
was an over-shadowing personage, since he ruled West 
Prussia, which lay between Brandenburg and East 
Prussia, and an immense east-European territory be- 
sides. Luckily for Frederick William, the stature and 
might of the king of Poland had for some time been 
dwindling. He was a feudal king, obliged continually 
to dispute the power with his nobles and finally worsted 
in the conflict. Slowly but irresistibly the Polish nobles 
appropriated the royal lands, authority, and revenues, 
leaving their sovereign the bare husks. As if their 
firmly established right to elect the king did not of 
itself bring him sufl^ciently under their thumb, they 
further insisted on paralyzing his action and that of 
the state for which he stood by two of the most aston- 
ishing usurpations ever recorded in history. First, 
every Polish noble sitting in the national assembly 
claimed the right to veto any measure of the assembly 
and render it null and void; and second, every noble 



226 The Making of Modern Germany 

at his pleasure presumed to resist an act of the adminis- 
tration by federating with other nobles and offering 
armed resistance. 

In consequence of this lamentable development the 
Polish kingdom of the seventeenth century, was, even 
though It still presented a broad front to the world, the 
foredoomed victim of its own internal disorders. The 
only event that could have saved It, the rise of a burgher 
class, never occurred. It will be remembered that it 
was the social transformation wrought by the growth 
of towns that caused, and alone caused, the overthrow 
of feudalism In the other countries of Europe. The 
Polish nobles and the Polish clergy owned the soil 
including the very persons of the peasants, and, having 
tied the hands of the king, found themselves In a situa- 
tion which may have appealed to them as an earthly 
paradise, but which from the point of view beginning 
to prevail in western Europe was unmitigated chaos. 

In sharp contrast to Poland, scene of a belated and 
unique feudal orgy, all the neighbors of Poland were 
at this juncture casting off their feudal garment and 
providing themselves with an attire better suited to the 
new age. We have seen how Frederick William, imi- 
tating Richelieu in France, centralized the power In 
his person; Sweden, Russia, and Austria were either 
doing or trying to do the same thing. A distracted 
medieval anarchy, surrounded by monarchies of a mod- 
ern type, was sure sooner or later to be overwhelmed. 
And, as It happened, the first blow was struck In Fred- 
erick William's lifetime by the great northern power, 
Sweden. The king of Sweden, pursuing the dream of 



The Polish Question 227 

a Baltic overlordship, attempted to conquer Poland 
and almost succeeded. Frederick William, hovering 
uneasily on the edge of the conflict, was sucked into 
the vortex, and by means of a mixture of cunning and 
valor secured a notable advantage — In 1657 the 
Polish king. In payment of services rendered, renounced 
his suzerain rights In East Prussia and proclaimed his 
former vassal its independent ruler. 

Although It was Sweden which first shook Poland 
to the foundations, it was the eastern neighbor of 
Poland, Russia, which compassed the Polish overthrow. 
With the advent of Peter the Great (i 689-1 725), 
Russia embarked on the policy of winning access to 
the west, and naturally, In the course of time, cast a 
covetous eye on the distracted realm of the Poles. 
Border troubles between the two Slav peoples had been 
frequent in the past, and thus far the Poles rather than 
the Russians had been the aggressors. With the cen- 
tralizing of the Russian state by the autocratic will of 
Peter the historic roles were inverted. 

Slowly Russian influence, based on Russian military 
power, made Its way into Poland until the Russian 
resident at Warsaw, with 100,000 Invisible bayonets 
behind him, was the uncrowned king of the country. 
In 1764 the Czarina Catherine, finding herself in com- 
plete control of the Polish diet, had one of her favor- 
ites elected king and therewith the last stage of 
subjection was reached. Probably Catherine's Idea was 
to prepare the way for a quiet absorption of the whole 
kingdom into Russia, but Poland's western neighbors, 
Prussia and Austria, had by a centralizing policy of 



228 The Making of Modern Germany 

their own grown so strong that they could force con- 
sideration of themselves. The result was negotiations, 
which in 1772 led to the first partition of Poland. 

In the first partition of Poland, Russia, Austria and 
Prussia took each one a convenient slice of Polish ter- 
ritory. Prussia got the province of West Prussia, 
which had never ceased being a predominantly German 
territory and which at last joined up distant East Prus- 
sia with the bulk of the Hohenzollern dominions. 
Though reduced In area, Poland was not destroyed by 
the first partition and continued, after 1772, exactly as 
before, to be a helpless Russian satrapy. But even the 
corrupt feudal nobles, or some chastened elements of 
this group, were now stirred to a sense of shame, and 
in 1 79 1 attempted to save the nation by strengthening 
the monarchy. The belated attempt was resented by 
the three powerful, land-grabbing neighbors, and a sec- 
ond and third partition followed in 1793 and 1795 
which put an end to the Polish state. But not In unre- 
lieved ignominy did Poland perish, for, under the leader- 
ship of the gallant Kosciusko, it offered resistance to 
extinction and showed the world that a Polish patriot- 
Ism, sole earnest of a better future, had at last been 
born. 

The arrangements made among Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria In the partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795 were 
destined not to last long. When Emperor Napoleon 
conquered Prussia (1806), he deprived her of most 
of her Polish acquisitions, and when Napoleon was 
overthrown in his turn (18 14), the question arose what 
was to be done with the parts of Poland which he had 



The Polish Question 229 

held. The Congress of Vienna, which took the matter 
in hand, finally decided that these Pohsh spoils of war 
were to be established as a new but diminished kingdom 
of Poland and given to Czar Alexander. A small sec- 
tion however, called Posen, was returned to Prussia, 
largely for geographic reasons, while German territory. 
Saxony and the Rhinelands, was offered and accepted 
in compensation for the rest. 

Thus by virtue of the arrangements of 1815, which 
we may call the fourth and final partition, Prussia, to 
her undoubted advantage as a German leader, found 
her share in Poland reduced to West Prussia and Posen. 
It is with these former Polish provinces that she has 
remained endowed ever since, and it is these that con- 
stitute the basis of her Polish problem in recent times. 
The question of the revival of the Polish state and 
nationality, a question which has never ceased to agitate 
public opinion, primarily concerns Russia, because Rus- 
sia since the year 1815 has been In possession of the 
bulk of the former Polish territory. 

In view of this situation, It is easily understood why 
the only two considerable revolts conducted by the Poles 
In the nineteenth century ( 1 83 1 and 1 863 ) were directed 
against their leading enemy, the Czar. Prussia In this 
same century has had trouble with her Poles but hardly 
anything that can be dignified with the term rebellion. 
West Prussia and Posen constitute, as I have said, the 
Polish question of Prussia, but the two provinces con- 
stitute only a minor feature of the Polish question as 
a whole, because, located on the Polish fringe, they are 
incapable of determining the destiny of the nation. 



230 The Making of Modern Germany 

The Polish question in Prussia, In the century 1815 
to 19 1 5, may be defined as the relation of the Poles 
in West Prussia and Posen * to the Prussian state. This 
relation has been marked by ups and downs, has been 
friendly and hostile In turn, and can not be followed 
here in detail. Summarizing the situation (If a situa- 
tion of the greatest variability can be summarized), 
we may say that the Prussian state has been at consid- 
erable pains to further the material Interests of the 
provinces of West Prussia and Posen, to extend to them 
the advantages of an honest, reliable administration, 
and to promote the cause of education; but at the same 
time It has attempted to Germanize the Poles by the 
gradual exclusion of the Polish language from the pub- 
lic administration and the schools. 

This Germanlzatlon policy has been resisted by the 
Poles with, on the whole, remarkable success. Aroused 
by a sense of oppression, they have made of their lan- 
guage and customs a sacred cult with the result that 
the official statistics indicate that they are as strong, 
if not stronger. In West Prussia and Posen at the 
beginning of the twentieth century than they were a 
hundred years earlier. But West Prussia and Posen, 
it should be observed, neither are now nor were, at 
the time of their acquisition by Prussia, Polish In a 
strictly national sense. They are and have been mixed 
provinces, the distribution of Poles and Germans ac- 



• There are Poles in the two other eastern provinces of Prussia, 
Silesia and East Prussia, but these constitute, or at least thus far have 
constituted, a body of loyal Prussians, and are a negligible part of the 
Polish problem in Prussia. 



The Polish Question 231 

cording to the statistics of 1905 as given In the Encyclo- 
pedia Britannica being as follows : 

Germans Poles 

West Prussia 1,073,000 567,000 

Posen 900,000 1 ,100,000 

It thus appears that the Germans constitute about 
sixty-five per cent of the population of the West Prus- 
sia and about forty-five per cent of the population of 
Posen. Only in the eastern districts of Posen is it pos- 
sible to speak of an indisputable Polish preponderance. 
However, a detailed analysis of the statistics reveals 
a weakness in the German situation. The Teutonic 
element is chiefly urban, while the Polish element is 
located on the soil in the capacity either of landlords or 
of proprietary peasants. The old feudal tenure, so 
disastrous a feature of the old kingdom of Poland, has 
long given way, the leading evidence of its former 
prevalence being the persistence of large estates. 

This agricultural preponderance of the Poles, Prince 
Bismarck considered the chief obstruction to German- 
ization, and accordingly, in 1886, he put through the 
Prussian diet his land purchase plan, by virtue of which 
the state was authorized to buy up estates, Polish or 
German, with the view to parceling them out among 
German peasant colonists. The policy has had a certain 
success in so far as German colonists to the number 
of some thousands have been settled on the soil, but 
the Poles by private colonizing enterprises of their 
own have settled an equal or larger number of Poles 
on the land, and the racial distribution, after thirty 



232 The Making of Modern Germany 

years of government effort along Bismarck's lines, 
remains substantially unchanged. 

Exasperated by the successful Polish counter-meas- 
ures, the Prussian government In the first decade of 
the twentieth century persuaded the legislature to pass 
a measure authorizing the expropriation of Polish land- 
lords In certain Indicated districts on condition of pay- 
ing them adequate compensation; but the measure thus 
far has been merely dangled as a threat and has not 
been put Into practice. 

From this hurried description It will appear that the 
relation of the Poles to the Prussian state has been 
characterized In recent times by an Increasing Irritation. 
The Germans conceive the Poles to be a danger and 
distrust their loyalty; the Poles by every means at their 
disposal resist the attempt to wean them from their 
national faith. Behind the cantankerous situation, 
wholly and adequately explaining It, lurks the shadow 
of the larger Polish question, the question whether or 
no the Polish state will be revived. 

Without any doubt that revival has been moved 
within the realm of probability by the present-day con- 
dition of the Poles In all the partitioned sections. They 
have outgrown the hampering feudal system which 
ruined them in the first place, they have transformed 
their serfs into a free peasant class, they have seen 
the rise In their midst of cities with a waxing trade and 
Industry, and they have developed to an extraordinary 
degree the community feeling which we call patriotism. 
Present-day Poland, from the point of view of social 
structure, is a modern commonwealth, to all appear- 



The Polish Question 233 

ances provided with the main conditions necessary to 
twentieth century existence. 

And now observe: should Poland in the future be 
reconstituted, it is very certain that it will put forth a 
claim to the Prussian provinces of West Prussia and 
Posen; Hotspur Poles will go further and also demand 
Silesia and East Prussia. But all such claims will be 
vigorously resisted by Prussia and Germany on the 
ground that Silesia and East Prussia are preponder- 
antly German, while West Prussia and Posen are quite 
as German as they are Polish and politically necessary 
to Germany's position in central Europe. We may 
therefore confidently affirm that the Polish question in 
Prussia is a serious one, grounded in stubborn facts and 
not likely to yield to a wash of sentimental phrases. It 
is an issue of power between a strong nation constituted 
as a state and a weaker nation which, after a terrible 
experience, has been lately getting stronger, and which 
fully hopes to reconstitute itself as a state, even though 
it will have to bide the word of the builder Time. 

The great war now going on in Europe has unques- 
tionably greatly increased the chances of the redemp- 
tion of Poland. Indeed in the light of the capital events 
of the summer of 19 15 it is hardly an audacious proph- 
ecy to declare that a Polish kingdom of some sort has 
become a certainty. Supposing an independent Poland 
called into being as the result of a German effort to 
weaken Russia — would we be justified in deducing 
that the effect will be a reconciliation between Poles 
and Germans and the amicable disposal of the Polish 
troubles in Prussia? Search as I may, I can discover 



234 The Making of Modern Germany 

no reason for answering such a question with an opti- 
mistic affirmative; for the issue between Poles and Ger- 
mans, as my whole exposition shows, is a race issue 
which has already been agitated for more than a thou- 
sand years. In my view at least, since nature has been 
so careless as to fail to provide clear geographical 
boundaries between Poles and Germans, they will prob- 
ably go on disputing the soil with each other in the 
future as in the past. It is our civilized habit to lament 
and whine over the human struggle as over something 
utterly unreasonable, but we are none the less aware 
that the struggle is a part of the law of life and that 
to engage in it is to furnish evidence not of decay but 
of health and vigor. 



APPENDIX G 

THE EMS DISPATCH 

T F I return to the Ems dispatch in order to make an 
-* addition to my brief reference in Lecture V, p. 148, 
it is because an enormous myth, a veritable upas-tree 
of luxuriant misinformation has gathered around this 
episode. The myth enjoys such general currency that 
quite uninformed people will tell you gravely that the 
Ems dispatch *' caused " the Franco-German war; they 
will admit, on inquiry, that they never troubled to read 
it, but they have been told by somebody — no matter 
who — or read somewhere — they can't remember 
where — that it was a diabolical Invention of Bismarck 
who thereby successfully tricked the innocent French 
government Into declaring war. As the most effective 
method I know for dealing with this mare's nest I shall 
attempt to tell the unvarnished tale of happenings im- 
mediately preceding and following the famous message. 
The communication known as the Ems dispatch was 
of course but a single feature of the complex, critical 
issue between France and Prussia, occasioned by the 
candidature of Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 
for the Spanish throne. Over this candidature, an- 
nounced In the early days of July, France and the 
French government might justifiably feel an alarm, 

[235] 



236 The Making of Modern Germany 

especially in view of the very acrid relations between 
Paris and Berlin in the four years just past, 1866-70. 
A Hohenzollern dynasty beyond the Pyrenees was cer- 
tainly unpleasant and might prove perilous. Since 
French opinion became agitated, the government could 
hardly avoid making a protest. But the government of 
Napoleon in needed no urging, and eagerly, not to say 
precipitately, dispatched Count Benedetti to the water- 
ing-place of Ems where King William of Prussia was 
taking the cure. The upshot of some rather exciting 
but perfectly polite exchanges was that, on July 12, 
the name of Prince Leopold was withdrawn by means 
of a dispatch addressed by the young man's father to 
the Spanish committee which had solicited the candida- 
ture in the first place. Therewith the incident was 
closed. It would have been the part of good sense for 
the French government to accept the situation and let 
the world, as it was inclined to do, interpret the with- 
drawal as a French diplomatic triumph. 

But the French foreign minister, the duke of Gra- 
mont, resolved not to take this view. It irked him that 
neither Prussia nor its king was involved in Prince 
Leopold's withdrawal, which presented itself in the light 
of a voluntary, unofficial act. By an extravagant speech 
in the chamber of deputies Gramont had lashed public 
opinion in Paris to a patriotic fury and he now felt his 
position shaken unless he should succeed in adminis- 
tering some sort of humiliation to the Prussian king by 
personally involving him in his relative's declination. 
He therefore made the fatal mistake of presenting a 
new demand, just as it seemed to the diplomatic world 



The Ems Dispatch 237 

that the crisis had happily passed. In the night from 
July 12 to July 13 he wired Benedetti at Ems that Leo- 
pold's withdrawal was not enough, and that it would 
have to be supplemented with the promise of the Prus- 
sian king that he would never permit a renewal of the 
candidature in the future.* 

On the morning of July 13, Benedetti accidentally 
met King William on the public promenade and, seizing 
the opportunity, then and there communicated the new 
demand. The king was greatly taken back and in a 
warm but courteous manner rejected the proposal; and 
when Benedetti later in the day tried to get another 
audience, the sovereign had him informed by an 
adjutant that his decision of the morning remained 
unaltered. 

The unexpectedness and impertinence of the new 
demand — for as distinctly impertinent it presented 
itself to the king and his attendants — disturbed the 
monarch's equanimity and he resolved to consult his 
trusted foreign minister. Bismarck had been at his 
country place, Varzin, but just before the solution, on 
July 12, of the first crisis he had come on to Berlin 
in order to be nearer the scene of disturbance. To Ber- 
lin, therefore, the king had a secretary of the foreign 
office, Abeken by name, send a report of the day's hap- 



* On the afternoon of July 12, Gramont made an additional demand 
through the Prussian ambassador in Paris to the effect that the king 
was to write a letter to Napoleon, which in purport would be a letter 
of apology. Since this demand does not connect up with the events 
directly leading to the Ems dispatch, I omit it from my story. It must 
be considered, however, if we desire to appreciate Graraont's inflamed 
state of mind. 



238 The Making of Modem Germany 

penings. It came into Bismarck's hands at 6 p. M. of 
July 13, and read as follows: 

Abeken to Count Bismarck, — His Majesty, the king, writes 
me : " During an accidental encounter with Count Benedetti 
upon the public promenade he asked me, finally in a most ob- 
trusive manner, to authorize him to telegraph his government 
that I would bind myself never to give my consent should the 
HohenzoUerns at some future time reconsider the candidacy for 
the Spanish crown. I refused, somewhat sternly in the end, to 
comply with this demand, saying that I neither could nor would 
enter into an engagement of this nature a tout jamais. I of 
course told him that I had as yet not received any word (from 
Prince Leopold) ; but since he had already been notified through 
Paris from Madrid, it must be obvious to him that my govern- 
ment had no part in this transaction." 

Later his Majesty received a letter from the prince. His 
Majesty having told Count Benedetti that he expected a com- 
munication from the prince, he decided, in consideration of the 
demand mentioned above and upon the advice of Count Eulen- 
burg and myself, not to grant Count Benedetti another audience 
about this affair, but to notify him by an adjutant that the 
prince's letter had confirmed the intelligence received by Bene- 
detti from Paris, and that his Majesty had no further communi- 
cation to make to the ambassador. 

His Majesty leaves it to your decision whether this new 
demand presented by Benedetti and our rejection of it should 
not immediately be made known to our ambassador (at Paris) 
and the press.* 

The above was the first intimation of the new French 
demand which Bismarck had and, in his prejudiced 
sight, it was without any question an attempt to humil- 
iate his sovereign. He was glad the king had been 
firm but that was not enough. He would proclaim the 

* This is the translation given in the English version of H. von 
Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire by William i, vol. vii, 
394. T. Y. Crowell Co. 



The Ems Dispatch 239 

firmness abroad and meet the challenger, Gramont, face 
to face. In order to do this he had only to use the per- 
mission extended by King William at the close of his 
message. With Moltke and Roon present — they hap- 
pened all three to be sitting at dinner — he took out a 
pencil and composed the following communication : 

After the royal government of Spain had officially announced 
to the imperial government of France that the prince of Hohen- 
zollern had withdrawn his acceptance of the Spanish crown, the 
French ambassador at Ems presented a further demand to his 
Majesty, the king, asking him for authority to telegraph to 
Paris that his Majesty, the king, would bind himself never to 
give his consent should the Hohenzollerns at some future time 
reconsider the candidacy for the Spanish crown. Hereupon his 
Majesty refused to grant the French ambassador another audi- 
ence about this affair, and notified him by an adjutant on duty 
that his Majesty had no further communication to make to the 
ambassador.* 

Having read this version of the Ems encounter aloud 
to his visitors, he sent it at once to the Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung^ which the government used for 
conveying information to the public, and later to the 
representatives of Prussia abroad in order that they 
might be informed of the state of the negotiations. 

Such are the main facts touching the BIsmarckian 
communication to the press about the Ems develop- 
ments. With regard to it we note, first, that it was 
fully authorized by the king; second, that it was an 
exact transcription of the facts; and third, that it was 
a public, categorical rejection of Gramont's second de- 

* The Founding of the German Empire, vol. vii, 396. 



240 The Making of Modern Germany 

mand and obliged that inept gentleman either to eat 
his words or else follow his words with a blow. 

Unluckily for Gramont, he and, in a more limited 
sense, the French government, the chambers, and the 
Parisian press and public, had committed themselves 
too utterly to an advanced position to recede from it 
without loss of pride. As a result they now enthusias- 
tically decided to take the consequences. On July 15, 
with the cooperation of government, chambers, and the 
boulevard public, war was declared. 

I shall conclude this narrative of facts by asking and 
answering a few questions. 

/. — Can it he maintained with any semblance of 
reason that Bismarck "falsified^' the Ems dispatch? 
Remember it was sent by Abeken, a secretary of the 
Foreign Office, in temporary attendance on the king. 
To declare for '' falsification " one must take the 
ground that a superior is obliged to communicate ver- 
batim to the public every report made by a subordinate 
in the performance of his duty. Such an idea is absurd 
and contrary to all known practice. A minister must 
be a free agent and communicate to the public as much 
of current affairs as he considers expedient; and he and 
not one of his clerks must accept responsibility for his 
step. Besides, if Bismarck felt any doubt about his 
liberty of action, there was the express permission in 
the telegram to take the press into his confidence! 
Consequently the question whether Bismarck committed 
a falsification may be answered with an emphatic no. 

2. — Who caused the Franco-Prussian war? My 
development shows that the turn that led to war was 



The Ems Dispatch 241 

taken when Gramont presented his second demand, 
which the king personally and emphatically rejected. 
Of course I hold, and have maintained in Lecture v, 
that, in the last analysis, the war was caused by a much 
larger issue, by the question of German unification 
which Prussia supported and France opposed during 
four years of waxing exasperation. If, however, after 
the fashion of a certain myopic school of political his- 
torians, the incident of the Spanish candidature be 
isolated for consideration, the responsibility for the 
war must undoubtedly be referred not to what King 
William did at Ems or Bismarck at Berlin, but to the 
duke of Gramont's hasty and senseless reopening of a 
quarrel which had just been happily composed. 

J. — Was Bismarck a factor in bringing about the 
war? To this question I do not see how it is possible to 
answer other than by a decided yes. The chancellor was 
a factor in two ways : first, by communicating King Wil- 
liam's rejection of Gramont's demand to the world 
and deliberately bringing the issue to a show-down, 
that is, to the point where Gramont would have to 
sheath the sword he had been too carelessly flourishing 
or else save his face by striking a blow with it; and 
second, he was a factor by his whole policy of German 
unification consistently pursued since 1862. This policy 
had been interfered with by France in 1866, and her 
unfriendly attitude had, if anything, grown more un- 
friendly since then. Bismarck had come to the con- 
clusion that only war would break down the French 
opposition, but also that a French war would release 
such patriotic enthusiasm throughout the whole of Ger- 



242 The Making of Modern Germany 

many that the union of north and south would follow 
automatically. 

To sum up, Bismarck in July, 1870, had ground for 
thinking that war with France would come sooner or 
later, that it was good diplomacy to choose the moment 
and not have it chosen by the enemy, and finally, that 
the struggle would probably prove productive of na- 
tional good. When therefore Gramont and the French 
government foolishly and to the loud shrilling of the 
war-trumpet delivered themselves into his hands, he 
met challenge with challenge, fully knowing that the 
final implication of his stand was war. He did not 
play and coquette with the situation, he was in dead 
earnest. 

It always takes two to fight, and therefore it would 
be absurd on its face to contend that Bismarck did not 
help produce the Franco-Prussian war. But from that 
position to an exoneration of the French government, 
both in the Spanish affair and in the much more weighty, 
in fact. In the one essential issue, that of German uni- 
fication, is a step that no sincere student will be able 
to take. 



APPENDIX H 

THE ALSACE-LORRAINE QUESTION 

T F I undertake to make an addition to my story of the 
*• cession of Alsace-Lorraine as told In Lecture v, it 
Is not to elaborate the famous boundary dispute In the 
light of the many wars fought and treaties signed be- 
tween France and Germany. Such a legal and military 
tale, however Interesting It might prove to be, lies 
beyond the scope of a volume like the present. Who- 
ever desires to know the strange vicissitudes of the 
Alsace-Lorraine border can obtain them In a clear, 
objective presentation by Ruth Putnam: Alsace-Lor- 
raine, From Caesar to Kaiser, ^8 B. c.-i8ji A. D.* 
A chapter called " After the Cession " exceeds the 
promise of the title, for It carries the administrative 
history of the region down to 1914. 

All that I wish to do in this note is to submit a few 
data which, in view of the prominence given the Alsace- 
Lorraine question in the present war, may help the 
reader form an opinion with regard to existing condi- 
tions In the disputed territory. 

When the transfer of title took place In 1871, both 
the French and the German people entertained illusions 
touching Alsace-Lorraine, to which they gave free and 
even extravagant expression. The exceedingly roman- 

*G. p. Putnam's Sons, N. Y., 1915. 

[243] 



244 The Making of Modern Germany 

tic view of the French was that the people of Alsace- 
Lorraine were flesh of their flesh and bone of their 
bone; if they had once belonged to Germany, it was 
because in some remote age they had been filched from 
France, and if they spoke a language other than French, 
it was a rude German patois but it was not German. 
The equally romantic view of the Germans was that 
the new fellow-citizens had been German till the seven- 
teenth century and that although they had since then 
acquired a regrettable French veneer, they would hur- 
riedly cast it off and joyfully be assimilated to their 
brethren across the Rhine. 

(jWhile the French view was based on the knowledge 
of a community of sentiment, the German view was 
inspired by trust in the community of speech. | For that 
the Alsatian tongue was a patois or dialect the Germans 
admitted; but so was the spoken language of the Baden- 
ers, the Suabians, the Bavarians, and of every other 
tribe which has been merged in the German nation. And 
if the Alsatians did not command literary German, that 
was regrettable but not unintelligible in view of the fact 
that the French government had given the people in- 
sufficient opportunity to learn German in their schools. 
To prove their contention the victors of 1871 had a 
census taken shortly after the occupation, and lo and 
behold! the German view seemed to be established 
beyond cavil. Since then one census has followed 
another at regular intervals, and although the popula- 
tion has increased by one-half, there has been no par- 
ticular change in the ratio of French to German speech. 
The most recent census, that of 19 10, may serve to 



The Alsace-Lorraine Question 245 

inform us how that ratio stands : those who speak Ger- 
man are given at 1,634,260 and those who speak French 
at 204,262.* The French-speakers are mostly In Lor- 
raine ; Alsace, except in some western districts, Is wholly 
German-speaking. 

Thus the Germans with their figures seemed to have 
triumphed over the French — seemed, for no sooner 
had they taken control than they discovered that speech 
has nothing to do with sentiment, at least In this ancient 
border-land, and that the French patriotism of Alsace- 
Lorraine was more than an easily remediable habit of 
mind. [^There cannot be the least question that at the 
time of the cession the profound and overwhelming 
sentiment of the provinces was French^ Back In the 
seventeenth century, at the time of the conquest by 
France, the sentiment was undoubtedly German, 
although of the tempered sort In keeping with the pal- 
pable decline of German nationality. For several 
generations the assimilation to France proceeded slowly. 
Travelers continued to note the German character of 
Alsace, and as late as 1770, the young Goethe, pur- 
suing his university studies In Strassburg, reported 
conditions in town and country that were essentially 
German. 

Then came the French Revolution. The heroic over- 
throw of a hateful regime coupled as it was with the 
prophecy of a new world of democratic justice won the 
hearts of the Alsatians and caused them to merge their 
consciousness with that of their French fellow-citizens. 
From 1789 to 1870 they shared In the vast transforma- 

* The Statesman's Year-book, 1915. 



246 The Making of Modern Germany 

tion that made France into a modern, bourgeois, and 
industrial commonwealth, and although they still held 
fast to their German speech, they became filled with 
a definite French patriotism. No wonder therefore that 
in 1870 they resented their incorporation in the new 
German Empire. 

Since that event some forty years have passed, and 
the question arises : Has there been any change in the 
sentiment of Alsace-Lorraine? An enormous amount 
of partisan and conflicting evidence makes it impossible 
to give a conclusive and unchallengeable answer. That 
the German-speakers have adopted a German conscious- 
ness, as it was hoped in 1871 they would do, may be 
denied ; but it may also be denied that they have retained 
the passionate French consciousness which character- 
ized them at the time of the treaty of Frankfort. The 
tendency, open and confessed, has been toward an 
Alsatian consciousness which was to be neither French 
nor German, but to be made up in equal shares of either 
element. 

An investigation of the native sentiment and opinion, 
conducted with the strict desire to know the facts, would 
do well to abandon the consideration of Alsace-Lorraine 
in the bulk, and to turn its attention to the different 
geographical regions and to the various strata of the 
population, since from time immemorial the sectional 
and factional character of the border-land has been 
marked. As such a detailed review is out of the ques- 
tion here — even if reliable material were at our dis- 
posal — I shall content myself with noting a few 
matters indicative of the present-day situation. 



The Alsace-Lorraine Question 247 

In the first place, the population of Alsace-Lorraine 
has suffered an important structural change since 1871. 
Several hundred thousand people, too French in feeling 
to submit to the new regime, carried themselves and 
their goods across the Vosges mountains. The official 
figure of these emigrants is 270,000, but their number 
was probably much larger.* Their place was promptly 
taken by immigrants from Alt-Deutschland, while in 
addition, the government brought in thousands of em- 
ployees to fill railroad, financial, or other posts, for 
which there were at first no native applicants or for 
which it was thought the natives could not be trusted. 
Although the exact figures of this invasion are unob- 
tainable, they are considerable enough to make the neo- 
German element a weighty factor in all the adminis- 
trative and commercial centers. 

An interesting native element, though at best a 
minority, are the Protestants of Lower Alsace 
(Unterelsass). There are several hundred thousand 
of these whose protestantism is of German origin, and 
who, besides, are involved in daily economic and intel- 
lectual exchange with their German neighbors. That 
their French political sentiment has suffered impair- 
ment is shown by the fact that within a score of years 
of their incorporation in Germany, they returned mem- 
bers to the Reichstag who modified their attitude of 
protest by attaching themselves to one of the acknowl- 
edged German parties. 

Before the beginning of the new century several 

* Alsace and Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser, 58 B. C.-1871 A. D., 
p. 191. 



248 The Making of Modern Germany 

other districts, some of them with Catholic constituents, 
Instructed their Reichstag representatives to do the 
same. Unquestionably as late as 19 14 the fifteen mem- 
bers which Alsace-Lorraine sends to Berlin still pre- 
served a strong provincial sentiment, but only two of 
the number declared for France at the beginning of the 
war, while the other thirteen, doubtless not without 
great agony of spirit, threw in their lot with Germany. 
This decision of the majority, which we are probably 
justified in assuming to be in line with the opinion of 
their constituents, was so movingly expressed by Repre- 
sentative RIcklln that I shall cite his letter to the Presi- 
dent of the Reichstag. Dr. RIcklln not only sits for 
Alsace in the Reichstag but Is also the presiding officer 
of the Alsatian lower house. He was hindered by ill- 
ness from attending the Reichstag session of August 
4, 1 9 14, which voted the credits for the war. To 
explain his absence he wrote a letter to the chief official 
of the German parliament part of which reads: 

The idea of war between Germany and France is so terrible 
and awful for us people in Alsace-Lorraine that we hardly dare 
to think of it. We do not want a war between Germany and 
France at any cost, certainly not for the sake of altering our 
political position. People who have spread a different view 
among the French and have thereby fanned the French thoughts 
of war are traitors to our people and have drawn upon them the 
curses of thousands of our people, fathers, mothers, and wives, 
who with bleeding hearts must see their sons and husbands go 
into the most terrible of all wars. 

To the last we hoped that we might be spared the terrors of 
a war between Germany and France, and even now our people 
refuse to give up hope. If, however, God has decreed otherwise, 
well — then the people of Alsace-Lorraine will do their whole 
duty and they will do it without a single reservation. 



The Alsace-Lorraine Question 249 

The rules of the Reichstag do not permit a representative to 
vote by mail, but I have the right to inform you that I should 
have voted, if I had been present, in favor of all the bills w^hich 
the present state of affairs demanded, including the bill grant- 
ing the necessary funds for carrying on the war.* 

One last consideration touching this difficult matter 
of Alsatian sentiment. The opinion in Alsace that gets 
Itself expressed In newspaper and magazine Is naturally 
that of the educated classes who dwell In towns and 
constitute the bourgeoisie. But precisely this Is the 
element affected by French culture and generally de- 
voted to French speech and French traditions. The 
broad masses, the peasants and artisans, constituting 
a clear majority of the population, have been barely 
touched by French literary or social influences and 
remain an essentially German group. However, If 
the majority employed In field and shop have pre- 
served a German consciousness that fact is not much 
bruited about, for It Is the educated townsman with 
his Gallicized or seml-GalllcIzed consciousness who 
does the talking and writing and boldly proclaims his 
voice as that of the whole province. 

The local administrative story of Alsace-Lorraine, in 
the period 1 871-19 14, confirms the Impression conveyed 
by the action of the Reichstag representatives In 19 14 
of a slow reasslmllatlon to Germany. It was under the 
title of Reichsland that Alsace-Lorraine was incor- 
porated In Germany. Owing to the prevailing hostile 
sentiment, exceptional regulations were kept in force 

♦Edmund von Mach, Germany's Point of Viev}, p. 87-88. A. C. 
McClurg & Co., Chicago. 



250 The Making of Modern Germany 

for a long time and only gradually relaxed. The first 
considerable concession was made in 1874, when the 
province was accorded a representation of fifteen mem- 
bers in the Reichstag. 

The second notable concession belongs to the year 
1879, when a general local government was established 
which, however, gave but a limited voice to the indig- 
enous population. Not till 191 1 did Alsace-Lorraine 
get a constitution of a fairly liberal character. By vir- 
tue of this Instrument Alsace-Lorraine Is accorded three 
votes in the Bundesrath, and the emperor, the acknowl- 
edged chief executive of the Reichsland, appoints a rep- 
resentative or Statthalter who takes up his residence 
at Strassburg. A Landtag of two houses is entrusted 
with the legislative rights. 

The upper house is composed of about forty mem- 
bers appointed partly by the emperor and partly by 
various local corporations, while the lower house Is 
elected by the people on the basis of universal direct 
male suffrage exercised by secret ballot. How this 
constitution will work It Is yet too early to say. Some 
intelligent foreign observers have voiced the opinion 
that the constitution. If followed by further conciliatory 
measures, will satisfy the native population and lead 
them to take their stand once and for all on " home- 
rule within the German Empire." * But since then the 
war has broken out and the fate of Alsace-Lorraine Is 
once again as so often before, to be decided by the 
sword. 

* Alsace-Lorraine, from Caesar to Kaiser, 58 B. C.-1871 A. D., 
p. 194 (note), names the American, Dr. David Starr Jordan and the 
Italian, Professor Ferrero, as supporting the above opinion. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

THE following titles are submitted in the hope of giving assist- 
ance to the reader who desires fuller information on the 
many questions too lightly touched upon in the foregoing pages. 
While I have confined myself, in the main, to English titles, I 
have added a few German ones for the convenience of those 
familiar with that language. 

BOOKS ON POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

Erdmannsdorffer, B. Deutsche Geschichte von 1648-1740. 
Published in Oncken's Allgemeine Geschichte. 

Friedjung, H. Der Karnpf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutsch- 
land, 185Q-66. Stuttgart. 

Harris, N. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. 
Houghton Mifflin Co. 

Headlam, J. W. Bismarck and the Foundation of the Ger- 
man Empire, 18 15-1871. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 

Henderson, E. F. A Short History of Germany. 2 vols. The 
Macmillan Company. 

Howard, B. E. The German Empire. The Macmillan Com- 
pany. 

Hue de Grais. Handbuch der Verfassung und Vervualtung in 
Preussen und dem Deutschen Reich. Berlin. 

Lowell, A. L. Governments and Parties in Continental Eu- 
rope. 2 vols. Houghton Mifflin Co. 

Priest, G. M. Germany since 1740. Ginn and Co. 

Putnam, Ruth. Alsace and Lorraine from Caesar to Kaiser, 
58 B. C.-1871 A.D. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 

Robinson, J. H. Constitution of the Kingdom of Prussia. 
Am. Acad, of Polit. and Social Sci., 1894. 

Stern, A. Geschichte Europas von 181$ bis zum Frankfurter 
Frieden von 187 1. 6 vols. Berlin. 
[251] 



252 The Making of Modern Germany 

Sybel, H. von. The Founding of the German Empire by Wil- 
liam I. 7 vols. Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 

Treitschke, H. von. Deutsche Geschichte im ig Jahrhun- 
dert. 5 vols. Leipzig. An interesting work by a passionate 
patriot; going unfortunately only to the year 1848. 

TuTTLE, H. History of Prussia. 4 vols. Houghton Mifflin 
Co. This is an unfinished work, going from the beginnings 
of Brandenburg to the middle of the Seven Years' War. 

BOOKS ON CIVILIZATION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 

Dawson, W. H. Prince Bismarck and State Socialism; The 
German Workman; The Evolution of Modern Germany. 
Charles Scribner's Sons. Municipal Life and Government 
in Germany. Longman's, Green, & Co. 

Dewey, John. German Philosophy and Politics. Henry Holt 
&Co. 

Francke, Kuno. a History of German Literature as De- 
termined by Social Forces. Henry Holt & Co. 

Hintze, O. Historische und Politische Aufsdtze. 4 vols. 
Berlin. 

Helfferich, K. Germany's Economic Progress and National 
Wealth. Berlin. 

Howe, F. C. Socialized Germany. Charles Scribner's Sons. 

Lichtenberger, Henri. Germany and its Evolution in Mod- 
ern Times. Henry Holt & Co. 

Schmoller, G. Staats und Sozialwissensvhaftliche Forschun- 
gen. Leipzig. 

Whitman, S. Imperial Germany. Chautauqua Press. 

biographies and memoirs 

Bismarck, Otto, Prince von. Reflections and Reminiscences. 

Harper and Brothers. 
Carlyle, Thomas. Life of Frederick the Great. 8 vols. 

Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Headlam, J. W. Bismarck and the Foundation of the German 

Empire. G. P- Putnam's Sons. 



Bibliography 253 

Henderson, E. F. Blucher and the Uprising; of Prussia against 
Napoleon. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 

KoSER, R. Koenig Friedrich der Grosse. 2 vols. Stuttgart. 

Lehmann, M. Freiherr vom Stein. 3 vols. ; Scharnhorst. 
Leipzig. 

Marcks, E. Kaiser Wilhelm I. Leipzig. Bismarck (not yet 
complete). Stuttgart. 

Metterntch, Prince. Memoirs. 4 vols. Harper and 
Brothers. 

Reddaway, W. F. Frederick the Great and the Rise of Prus- 
sia. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 

Seeley, J. R. Life and Times of Stein. 3 vols. G. P. Put- 
nam's Sons. 

Smith, Munroe. Bismarck and German Unity. The Mac- 
millan Company. 

WAR BOOKS 

Under this head I have enumerated a number of works deal- 
ing with the policy and general situation of Germany before 
and after the war. 

Bernhardi, F. von. Germany and the Next War. Long- 
man's, Green, & Co. 

BiJLOW, Prince von. Imperial Germany. Dodd, Mead & Co. 

Burgess, J. W. The European War of 19 14. A. C. McClurg 
&Co. 

Clapp, E. J. Economic Aspects of the War. Yale University 
Press. 

Cramb, J. A. Germany and England. E. P. Dutton & Co. 

Frobenius. The German Empire's Hour of Destiny. Mc- 
Bride & Nast. 

GoLTZ, VON DER. The Nation in Arms: A treatise on Modern 
Military Systems and the Conduct of War. Translated 
by P. A. Ashworth. George H. Doran Co. 

Mach, Edmund von. Germany's Point of View. A. C. Mc- 
Clurg & Co. 



INDEX 



Alsace, ceded to France in 
1648, 17; and part of Lor- 
raine ceded to Germany, 
152-3; prize of victor in 
war of 19 14, 200; discussion 
of issues of, 243-50 

Austria, formation of state of, 
46-47 ; nominal headship of 
Germany, 47 ; loses ground 
in Germany at Congress 
of Vienna, 90-92; renewed 
rivalry with Prussia, 103; 
allied with Prussia in Dan- 
ish war, 138-39; in war of 
1866, 140-43; alliance of 
with German Empire, 176; 
ultimatum to Serbia, 199 

Bismarck, historic role of uni- 
fier of Germany, 128; be- 
comes prime minister of 
Prussia, 132; biography of, 
132-33; develops anti- Aus- 
trian program, 134-5; con- 
ducts the Danish war, 138; 
makes war on Austria, 140- 
42; and the Spanish inci- 
dent, 148; chancellor of the 
Empire, 168; inaugurates 
the Kulturkampj , 168-69; 
passes Insurance Laws, 
171-2; his foreign policy 
after 1870, 175-77; dis- 

[255 



missal from office, 177-8; 
and Ems dispatch, 235-42 

Bliicher, at head of Prussian 
army, 83 ; in campaign of 
18 13, 86; in Waterloo cam- 
paign, 87-88 

Brandenburg, nucleus of 
modern Germany, 22 ; early 
history of, 22-24; merged 
in Prussia, 36 

Bund, established in 18 15, 
104; Bismarck's contempt 
for, 134-5 

Carlyle, mediates German 
thought, 113 

Civilization, what we mean 
by, 200-1 

Charles v, Emperor, and the 
Reformation, 11-12 

Charles vi. Emperor, last 
male of Hapsburg line, 49 

Chemistry (German), 182-3 

Church, of the Middle Ages, 
7; quarrels with the Em- 
pire, 8 

City government in Germany, 
186-89; Dawson's praise 
of, 189 

Cleves, on lower Rhine ac- 
quired by Brandenburg, 24 

Collectivism, Prussian tenden- 
cies toward, 95 ; its triumph 

] 



256 



Index 



in modern Germany, 163- 
68, 184-5; scorned by in- 
dividualists, 1 80- 1 ; question 
of involved in war of 19 14, 
205 

Colonial movement of the 
European powers, 194-5, 
219-21 

Congress of Vienna, 89-91 

Conscription law of 18 14, 92; 
reform of as proposed by 
William i, 129-30 

Constitution of Germany, 
145-6; powers of emperor 
under, 212-14 

Constitution of Prussia, 
granted in 1850, 119; de- 
scribed, 119-20 

Czarina Elizabeth, death of, 
54 

Danish war of 1864, 137-9 
Democracy, in modern Ger- 
many, 164-68; and Liberal- 
ism contrasted, 166-7 
Dual Alliance, of France and 
Russia, 190 

Education, compulsory in 
Prussia, 108-9; develop- 
ment of in modern Ger- 
many, 185 

Edward vii (of England), 
anti-German policy of, 
192 

Ems dispatch, 148, 235-42 

Fichte (philosopher), 93 
France, brought into rivalry 
with Prussia at Congress of 
Vienna, 91 ; rivalry of 1866- 



70, 146-7; permanent es- 
trangement from Germany, 
175; dual alliance with 
Russia, 190; entente with 
Great Britain, 192 

Frederick William, the Great 
Elector, 25 ; territory gov- 
erned by, 26; unifying pol- 
icy of, 27-28 ; and the army, 
29 

Frederick William i, father of 
Frederick the Great, 44; 
quarrels with his son, 45 

Frederick William 11, meets 
the French Revolution, 
71-72 

Frederick William iii, de- 
feated and crushed at Jena, 
73 ; signs peace of Tilsit, 
73 ; is forced to make war 
on Napoleon, 83 ; opposes a 
constitution, 105-7 J death 
of, 114 

Frederick William iv, charac- 
ter of, 114; bows to revo- 
lution of 1848, 1 15-16; 
offered German imperial 
crow^n, 1 17-18; grants Prus- 
sia a constitution, 119; dies 
discredited, 128 

Frederick 11, called the Great, 
35; his youth, 42-43; quar- 
rels with his father, 44-45 ; 
relation with Voltaire, 43 ; 
challenges ascendancy of 
Austria in Germany, 48; 
his motives in entering 
Silesia, 50; engages in 
Seven Years' War, 52-54; 
statesman and warrior, 55- 
56; develops manufactures, 



Index 



257 



56-57; his method of work, 
59; his army, 60-61 ; fails to 
understand German re- 
vival, 62 ; his death, 63 
French Revolution, 67-69 ; 
produces Napoleon Bona- 
parte, 70; and Prussia, 71; 
effect on Germany, 99- 

lOI 

German Colonies, 194-5, 219- 
21 

German Emperor, powers of, 
212-14 

German Science, in nineteenth 
century, 18 1-2 

Germany, eighteenth century 
revival in, 61-62; recon- 
struction of at Congress of 
Vienna, 102-4; early nine- 
teenth century revival in, 
1 12-13; revolution of 1848 
in, 1 16-12 1 ; unification of 
begins, 145 ; in war of 1870, 
149-51; unification com- 
pleted, 152; government of 
described, 160-8; antag- 
onizes Great Britain, 191-2, 
195 (note) 

Goethe, on rebirth of German 
nationalism, 63 

Great Britain, sides with 
Prussia in Seven Years' 
War, 52 ; its system of gov- 
ernment, 94-95 ; its foreign 
policy in recent times, 190- 
3 ; entente with France, 
192; continued sea suprem- 
acy at stake in war of 19 14, 
200; individualism of at 
stake, 205 



Gustavus Adolphus, King of 
Sweden, 17 

Hardenberg, successor of 
Stein, 79 

Hohenzollern, house of in 
Brandenburg, 25 ; their 
dynastic tradition of service, 
40-42 

Holy Alliance, 107 

Holy Roman Empire (Ger- 
many), decay of at end of 
Thirty Years' War, 13-14; 
Austrian control of, 47-48 ; 
end of in 1806, loo-ioi. 

Humboldt, Wilhelm, reor- 
ganizes system of instruc- 
tion, 80-81 

Individualism, as a political 
theory, 38 ; waning of in 
the United States, 39-40; 
triumph of in England, 95, 
163; also in United States, 
163, 166-7; versus collectiv- 
ism, 1 80- 1 ; challenged in 
war of 19 1 4, 205 

Industrial courts, 185 

Industrial development of 
Germany, 1 70-7 1 ; illus- 
trated by iron production, 
183; by foreign trade, 

183-4 
Insurance Laws (German), 
171-72; copied by Great 
Britain, 172-73. 

Junkers, in Prussia, 58; their 
role after Jena, 77 

Kant (philosopher), 61; his 
doctrine of duty, 93 



258 



Index 



Koeniggraetz, battle of, 142 
Koerner (poet), dies in War 

of Liberation, 84 
Kultur, meaning of, 203-4; 

its relation to militarism, 

204 
Kulturkampf, 168-9 

Leipzig, battle of, 85 

Liberalism, growth of in Prus- 
sia, 105-6; opposed to army 
reform, 131, 135-6; opposed 
to Democracy, 166-7 

Louise, Queen of Prussia, 75 ; 
death of, 82-83 

Luther, Martin, 10, il 

Maria Theresa, Empress, suc- 
ceeds her father, 49; her 
character, 5 1 ; engages in 
Seven Years' War, 52-54 

Marx, Karl, father of German 
Socialism, 173 

Militarism (German), at- 
tacked by allies in war of 
1914, 202; compared with 
French, Russian, and Brit- 
ish variety of, 202-3 

Moltke, in war of 1866, 141- 
42; in war of 1870, 150 

Morocco, French claims to, 
192 

Motley, friendship of with 
Bismarck, 132-33 

Napoleon Bonaparte, seizes 
power in France, 70; begins 
his conquest of Europe, 72; 
invades Russia, 82 ; his over- 
throw, 84-89; destroys the 
Holy Roman Empire, loi 

Napoleon iii, attitude of in 



war of 1866, 143-4; nego- 
tiates with Prussia, 146-7 ; 
captured at Sedan, 151 
North German Confederation, 
145-6; merged in German 
Empire, 152 

Paris, siege of, 151 
Parliament (German) of 

1848, 116-18 
Parliament (Prussian) oi 

1848, 1 18-19; quarrels with 

king over army reform, 130- 

32 
Patriarchal system of Prussia, 

38-40, 56; modified by 

Stein, 92 
Peace of Frankfort of 1871, 

151 
Peace of Prague (1866), 

142-3 

Peace of Tilsit, 73 

Peace of Westphalia, con- 
cluded in 1648, 13; state of 
Germany at time of, 15-16; 
intellectual decline at time 
of, 16; losses of German 
territory at time of, 17 

Persia, divided between Russia 
and Great Britain, 192-3 

Polish question in Prussia, 
222-34 

Pomerania, part of acquired 
by Brandenburg, 24 

Pope, quarrels with emperor, 9 

Pragmatic Sanction, regula- 
tion of Austrian succession 

by, 49 
Protection (economic system) 
adopted by Germany in 
1879, 169-70 



Index 



259 



Prussia, duchy of on Baltic, 
23 ; passes into hands of 
elector of Brandenburg, 23 ; 
history of, 223-5 

Prussia, kingdom of created in 
1700, 36; patriarchal sys* 
tern of, 38-40, 56; an agri- 
cultural state, 57-58; and 
the French Revolution, 70- 
72; revival of after Jena, 
74-81 ; makes war on Napo- 
leon, 83 ; at Congress of 
Vienna, 89-91; renewed 
rivalry with Austria, 103 ; 
continued reforms after 
181 5, 108-11; revolution of 
1848 in, 115; puts Austria 
out of Germany, 143; its 
Polish problem, 222-34 

Reichstag, 145; suffrage pro- 
visions for, 216-7 

Reformation, in Germany, 10 

Roman Empire, persistence of 
idea of, 6 

Russia, allied with France, 
190; draws close to Great 
Britain, 192; preparedness 
of for war of 1914, 198 
(note) 

Scharnhorst, reorganizes the 
Prussian army, 79-80, 92 

Schleswig and Holstein, issue 
of stated, 136-7 

Serbia, its part in war of 19 14, 
199, 200 

Serfs, in Prussia, 58; libera- 
tion of, 77-78 

Seven Years' War, 52-54 

Silesia, invaded by Frederick 
II, 48-49 



Socialism, 173-4 

Spanish Incident of 1870, 

147-8 

Stael, Madame de, on Ger- 
many, 113 

Stein, reorganizes Prussia, 76- 
79; put under the ban by 
Napoleon, 79 

Three Class system of fran- 
chise, described, 120-21, 
216-18 

Thirty Years' War, 12; con- 
cluded by Peace of West- 
phalia, 13; political conse- 
quences of, 13; economic 
and moral consequences of, 

15-17 
Triple Alliance, formation of, 

177; 190 
Triple Entente, formation of, 

193 

Voltaire, and Frederick the 

Great, 43 
Voyages of Discovery, effect 

of on Europe, 19-20 

War of 1914, origin of, 193- 

99 
Waterloo, battle of, 88 
Wellington, at Waterloo, 88 
William i, his character, 128; 
proposes army reform, 129; 
proclaimed German em- 
peror, 152; death, 178 
William 11, dismisses Bismarck 
from office, 178; character 
of, 179-80; foreign policy 
under, 190-1 

Zollverein, described, iio-ii; 
169 






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